SUBCHAPTER IV—DIPLOMATIC SECURITY PROGRAM
§4851. Authorization
(a) Diplomatic security program
(1) In general
In addition to amounts otherwise available for such purposes, the following amounts are authorized to be appropriated for fiscal years 1986 and 1987, for the Department of State to carry out diplomatic security construction, acquisition, and operations pursuant to the Department of State's Supplemental Diplomatic Security Program, as justified to the Congress for the respective fiscal year for "Administration of Foreign Affairs", as follows:
(A) For "Salaries and Expenses", $308,104,000.
(B) For "Acquisition and Maintenance of Buildings Abroad", $857,806,000.
(C) For "Counterterrorism Research and Development", $15,000,000.
(2) Omitted
(3) Repealed. Pub. L. 103–236, title I, §101(c), Apr. 30, 1994, 108 Stat. 388
(4) Allocation of amounts authorized to be appropriated
Amounts authorized to be appropriated by this subsection, and by the amendment made by paragraph (2), shall be allocated as provided in the table entitled "Diplomatic Security Program" relating to this section which appears in the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference to accompany H.R. 4151 of the 99th Congress (the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986).
(b) Notification to authorizing Committees of requests for appropriations
In any fiscal year, whenever the Secretary of State submits to the Congress a request for appropriations to carry out the program described in subsection (a), the Secretary shall notify the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate of such request, together with a justification of each item listed in such request.
(c) Repealed. Pub. L. 103–236, title I, §122(b), Apr. 30, 1994, 108 Stat. 392
(d) Prohibition on reallocations of authorizations
(e) Security requirements of other foreign affairs agencies
Based solely on security requirements and within the total amount of funds available for security, the Secretary of State shall ensure that an equitable level of funding is provided for the security requirements of other foreign affairs agencies.
(f) Insufficiency of funds
In the event that sufficient funds are not available in any fiscal year for all of the diplomatic security construction, acquisition, and operations pursuant to the Department of State's Supplemental Diplomatic Security Program, as justified to the Congress for such fiscal year, the Secretary of State shall report to the Congress the effect that the insufficiency of funds will have with respect to the Department of State and each of the other foreign affairs agencies.
(g) Allocation of funds for certain security programs
Of the amount of funds authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a)(1)(A), $34,537,000 shall be available to the Secretary of State only for the protection of classified office equipment, the expansion of information systems security, and the hiring of American systems managers and operators for computers at high threat locations.
(h) Furniture, furnishings, and equipment
(1) Use of existing furniture, furnishings, and equipment
If physically possible, facilities constructed or acquired pursuant to subsection (a) shall be furnished and equipped with the furniture, furnishings, and equipment that were being used in the facilities being replaced, rather than with newly acquired furniture, furnishings, and equipment.
(2) Omitted
(3) Repealed. Pub. L. 103–236, title I, §122(b), Apr. 30, 1994, 108 Stat. 392
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The amendment made by paragraph (2), referred to in subsec. (a)(4), is the amendment made by section 401(a)(2) of
H.R. 4151 of the 99th Congress (the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986), referred to in subsec. (a)(4), as enacted into law, is
Codification
Section is comprised of section 401 of
Amendments
1994—Subsec. (a)(3).
Subsec. (c).
Subsec. (h)(3).
1987—Subsec. (a)(3).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1994 Amendment
Embassy Security Requests and Deficiencies
"(1) Requests made over the previous year by United States diplomatic posts for security upgrades.
"(2) Significant security deficiencies at United States diplomatic posts that are not operating out of a new embassy compound or new consulate compound."
[For definition of "appropriate congressional committees" as used in section 5209 of
Construction Security Certification
"(a)
"(1) appropriate and adequate steps have been taken to ensure the security of the construction project (including an evaluation of how all security-related factors with respect to such project are being addressed);
"(2) the facility resulting from such project incorporates—
"(A) adequate measures for protecting classified information and national security-related activities; and
"(B) adequate protection for the personnel working in the diplomatic facility; and
"(3) a plan has been put into place for the continued evaluation and maintenance of adequate security at such facility, which plan shall specify the physical security methods and technical countermeasures necessary to ensure secure operations, including any personnel requirements for such purposes.
"(b)
"(c)
"(d)
[Reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director's capacity as the head of the intelligence community deemed to be a reference to the Director of National Intelligence. Reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director's capacity as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency deemed to be a reference to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. See section 1081(a), (b) of
Report to Congress on Obligation of Funds
Similar provisions were contained in the following prior appropriation acts:
§4852. Diplomatic construction program
(a) Preference for United States contractors
Notwithstanding
(1) bid on a diplomatic construction or design project which has an estimated total project value exceeding $10,000,000; and
(2) bid on a diplomatic construction or design project which involves technical security, unless the project involves low-level technology, as determined by the Secretary of State.
(b) Exception
Subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to any diplomatic construction or design project in a foreign country whose statutes prohibit the use of United States contractors on such projects. The exception contained in this subsection shall only become effective with respect to a foreign country 30 days after the Secretary of State certifies to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate what specific actions he has taken to urge such foreign country to permit the use of United States contractors on such projects, and what actions he shall take with respect to that country as authorized by title II of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (
(c) Definitions
For the purposes of this section—
(1) the term "adequate competition" means with respect to a construction or design project, the presence of two or more qualified bidders submitting responsive bids for that project;
(2) the term "United States person" means a person which—
(A) is incorporated or legally organized under the laws of the United States, including State, the District of Columbia, and local laws;
(B) has its principal place of business in the United States;
(C) has been incorporated or legally organized in the United States—
(i) for more than 5 years before the issuance date of the invitation for bids or request for proposals with respect to a construction project under subsection (a)(1); and
(ii) for more than 2 years before the issuance date of the invitation for bids or request for proposals with respect to a construction or design project which involves physical or technical security under subsection (a)(2);
(D) has performed within the United States or at a United States diplomatic or consular establishment abroad administrative and technical, professional, or construction services similar in complexity, type of construction, and value to the project being bid;
(E) with respect to a construction project under subsection (a)(1), has achieved total business volume equal to or greater than the value of the project being bid cumulatively over 3 years of the 5-year period before the date specified in subparagraph (C)(i);
(F)(i) employs United States citizens in at least 80 percent of its principal management positions in the United States,
(ii) employs United States citizens in more than half of its permanent, full-time positions in the United States, and
(iii) will employ United States citizens in at least 80 percent of the supervisory positions on the foreign buildings office project site; and
(G) has the existing technical and financial resources in the United States to perform the contract; and
(3) the term "qualified United States joint venture person" means a joint venture in which a United States person or persons owns at least 51 percent of the assets of the joint venture.
(d) American minority contractors
Not less than 10 percent of the amount appropriated pursuant to
(e) American small business contractors
Not less than 10 percent of the amount appropriated pursuant to
(f) Limitation on subcontracting
With respect to a diplomatic construction project, a prime contractor may not subcontract more than 50 percent of the total value of its contract for that project.
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Title II of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956, referred to in subsec. (b), is title II of act Aug. 1, 1956, ch. 841, as added Aug. 24, 1982,
Amendments
2021—Subsec. (c)(2)(E).
2002—Subsec. (c)(2)(D).
1994—Subsec. (a)(2).
1991—Subsec. (a)(1).
Subsec. (a)(2).
"(A) involves nonsophisticated, low-level technology, as determined by the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security;
"(B) is for the design or construction of a facility that does not process or store classified material; and
"(C) does not exceed a total value of $500,000."
1990—Subsec. (a)(2).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1994 Amendment
Amendment by
Construction of United States Embassy in Ottawa
§4853. Security requirements for contractors
Not later than 90 days after August 27, 1986, the Secretary of State shall issue regulations to—
(1) strengthen the security procedures applicable to contractors and subcontractors involved in any way with any diplomatic construction or design project; and
(2) permit a contractor or subcontractor to have access to any design or blueprint relating to such a project only in accordance with those procedures.
(
§4854. Qualifications of persons hired for diplomatic construction program
In carrying out the diplomatic construction program referred to in
(
§4855. Cost overruns
Any amount required to complete any capital project described in the Department of State's Supplemental Diplomatic Security Program, as justified to the Congress for the respective fiscal year, which is in excess of the amount made available for that project pursuant to section 4851(a)(1) or (3) 1 shall be treated as a reprogramming of funds under
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
1 See References in Text note below.
§4856. Efficiency in contracting
(a) Bonuses and penalties
The Director of the Office of Foreign Buildings shall provide for a contract system of bonuses and penalties for the diplomatic construction program funded pursuant to the authorizations of appropriations provided in this subchapter. Not later than 3 months after August 27, 1986, the Director shall submit a report to the Congress on the implementation of this section.
(b) Surety bonds and guarantees
The Director of the Office of Foreign Buildings shall require each person awarded a contract for work under the diplomatic construction program to post a surety bond or guarantee, in such amount as the Director may determine, to assure performance under such contract.
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
This subchapter, referred to in subsec. (a), was in the original "this title", meaning title IV of
Amendments
2007—Subsec. (c).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Authority of Secretary of State
Except as otherwise provided, Secretary of State to have and exercise any authority vested by law in any official or office of Department of State and references to such officials or offices deemed to refer to Secretary of State or Department of State, as appropriate, see
§4857. Advisory Panel on Overseas Security
Not later than 90 days after August 27, 1986, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the Congress on the implementation of the 91 recommendations contained in the final report of the Advisory Panel on Overseas Security. If any such recommendation has been rejected, the Secretary shall provide the reasons why that recommendation was rejected.
(
§4858. Training to improve perimeter security at United States diplomatic missions abroad
(a) Training
It is the sense of Congress that the President should use the authority under
(b) Repealed. Pub. L. 103–236, title I, §139(20), Apr. 30, 1994, 108 Stat. 398 ; Pub. L. 103–415, §1(c), Oct. 25, 1994, 108 Stat. 4299
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, referred to in subsec. (a), is
Amendments
1994—Subsec. (b).
§4859. Protection of public entrances of United States diplomatic missions abroad
The Secretary of State shall install and maintain a walk-through metal detector or other advanced screening system at public entrances of each United States diplomatic mission abroad.
(
§4860. Reimbursement of Department of the Treasury
The Secretary of State shall reimburse the appropriate appropriations account of the Department of the Treasury out of funds appropriated pursuant to
(
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Transfer of Functions
For transfer of the functions, personnel, assets, and obligations of the United States Secret Service, including the functions of the Secretary of the Treasury relating thereto, to the Secretary of Homeland Security, and for treatment of related references, see
§4861. Inspector General for Department of State
(a) Direction to establish
The Congress directs the Secretary of State to proceed immediately to establish an Office of Inspector General of the Department of State not later than October 1, 1986. Not later than January 31, 1987, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on the progress in establishing that office. Such report shall include an accounting of the obligation of funds for fiscal year 1987 for that office.
(b) Duties and responsibilities
The Inspector General of the Department of State (as established by the amendment made by section 150(a) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987) is authorized to perform all duties and responsibilities, and to exercise the authorities, stated in
(c) Earmark
Of the amounts made available for fiscal year 1987 for salaries and expenses under the heading "Administration of Foreign Affairs", not less than $6,500,000 shall be used for the sole purpose of establishing and maintaining the Office of Inspector General of the Department of State.
(d) Limitation on appointment
No career member of the Foreign Service, as defined by
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Section 150(a) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987, referred to in subsec. (b), is section 150(a) of
Codification
Section is comprised of section 413 of
Amendments
2022—Subsec. (b).
1987—
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Evaluation of Policies and Procedures of Department of State on Protection of Classified Information at Department Headquarters
"(a)
"(b)
"(1) The congressional intelligence committees.
"(2) The Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations [now Committee on Foreign Affairs] of the House of Representatives.
"(c)
"(d)
"(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
"(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives."
[Reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director's capacity as the head of the intelligence community deemed to be a reference to the Director of National Intelligence. Reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director's capacity as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency deemed to be a reference to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. See section 1081(a), (b) of
§4862. Prohibition on use of funds for facilities in Israel, Jerusalem, or West Bank
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be obligated or expended for site acquisition, development, or construction of any facility in Israel, Jerusalem, or the West Bank.
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
This Act, referred to in text, is
§4863. Use of cleared personnel to ensure secure maintenance and repair of diplomatic facilities abroad
(a) Policies and regulations
The Secretary of State shall develop and implement policies and regulations to provide for the use of persons who have been granted an appropriate United States security clearance to ensure that the security of areas intended for the storage of classified materials or the conduct of classified activities in a United States diplomatic mission or consular post abroad is not compromised in the performance of maintenance and repair services in those areas.
(b) Study and report
The Secretary of State shall conduct a study of the feasibility and necessity of requiring that, in the case of certain United States diplomatic facilities abroad, no contractor shall be hired to perform maintenance or repair services in an area intended for the storage of classified materials or the conduct of classified activities unless such contractor has been granted an appropriate United States security clearance. Such study shall include, but is not limited to, United States facilities located in Cairo, New Delhi, Riyadh, and Tokyo. Not later than 180 days after February 16, 1990, the Secretary of State shall report the results of such study to the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(
§4864. Increased participation of United States contractors in local guard contracts abroad under diplomatic security program
(a) Findings
The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) State Department policy concerning the advertising of security contracts at Foreign Service buildings has been inconsistent over the years. In many cases, diplomatic and consular posts abroad have been given the responsibility to determine the manner in which the private sector was notified concerning an invitation for bids or a request for proposals with respect to a local guard contract. Some United States foreign missions have only chosen to advertise locally the availability of a local security guard contract abroad.
(2) As a result, many United States security firms that provide local guard services abroad have been unaware that local guard contracts were available for bidding abroad and such firms have been disadvantaged as a result.
(3) Undoubtedly, United States security firms would be interested in bidding on more local guard contracts abroad if such firms knew of the opportunity to bid on such contracts.
(b) Objective
It is the objective of this section to improve the efficiency of the local guard programs abroad administered by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the Department of State and to ensure maximum competition for local guard contracts abroad concerning Foreign Service buildings.
(c) Participation of United States contractors in local guard contracts abroad
With respect to local guard contracts for a Foreign Service building which exceed $250,000 and are entered into after February 16, 1990, the Secretary of State shall—
(1) establish procedures to ensure that all solicitations for such contracts are adequately advertised in the Commerce and Business Daily;
(2) absent compelling reasons, award such contracts through the competitive process;
(3) in evaluating proposals for such contracts, award contracts to the technically acceptable firm offering the lowest evaluated price, except that proposals of United States persons and qualified United States joint venture persons (as defined in subsection (d)) shall be evaluated by reducing the bid price by 10 percent;
(4) in countries where contract denomination and/or payment in local currencies constitutes a barrier to competition by United States firms—
(A) allow solicitations to be bid in United States dollars; and
(B) allow contracts awarded to United States firms to be paid in United States dollars;
(5) ensure that United States diplomatic and consular posts assist United States firms in obtaining local licenses and permits; and
(6) establish procedures to ensure that appropriate measures are taken by diplomatic and consular post management to assure that United States persons and qualified United States joint venture persons are not disadvantaged during the solicitation and bid evaluation process.
(d) Definitions
For the purposes of this section—
(1) the term "United States person" means a person which—
(A) is incorporated or legally organized under the laws of the United States, including the laws of any State, locality, or the District of Columbia;
(B) has its principal place of business in the United States;
(C) has been incorporated or legally organized in the United States for more than 2 years before the issuance date of the invitation for bids or request for proposals with respect to the contract under subsection (c);
(D) has performed within the United States or overseas security services similar in complexity to the contract being bid;
(E) with respect to the contract under subsection (c), has achieved a total business volume equal to or greater than the value of the project being bid in 3 years of the 5-year period before the date specified in subparagraph (C);
(F)(i) employs United States citizens in at least 80 percent of its principal management positions in the United States; and
(ii) employs United States citizens in more than half of its permanent, full-time positions in the United States; and
(G) has the existing technical and financial resources in the United States to perform the contract;
(2) the term "qualified United States joint venture person" means a joint venture in which a United States person or persons owns at least 51 percent of the assets of the joint venture;
(3) the term "Foreign Service building" means any building or grounds of the United States which is in a foreign country and is under the jurisdiction and control of the Secretary of State, including residences of United States personnel assigned overseas under the authority of the Ambassador; and
(4) the term "barrier to local competition" means—
(A) conditions of extreme currency volatility;
(B) restrictions on repatriation of profits;
(C) multiple exchange rates which significantly disadvantage United States firms;
(D) government restrictions inhibiting the free convertibility of foreign exchange; or
(E) conditions of extreme local political instability.
(e) United States minority contractors
Not less than 10 percent of the amount of funds obligated for local guard contracts for Foreign Service buildings subject to subsection (c) shall be allocated to the extent practicable for contracts with United States minority small business contractors.
(f) United States small business contractors
Not less than 10 percent of the amount of funds obligated for local guard contracts for Foreign Service buildings subject to subsection (c) shall be allocated to the extent practicable for contracts with United States small business contractors.
(g) Limitation of subcontracting
With respect to local guard contracts subject to subsection (c), a prime contractor may not subcontract more than 50 percent of the total value of its contract for that project.
(h) Award of local guard and protective service contracts
In evaluating proposals for local guard contracts under this section, the Secretary of State may award such contracts on the basis of best value as determined by a cost-technical tradeoff analysis (as described in Federal Acquisition Regulation part 15.101) and, with respect to such contracts for posts that are not high risk, high threat posts (as such term is defined in
(
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was enacted as part of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, and not as part of the Diplomatic Security Act which comprises this chapter.
Amendments
2016—Subsec. (h).
1998—Subsec. (c)(3).
Subsec. (c)(5).
Subsec. (c)(6).
Subsec. (c)(7).
1994—Subsec. (c).
Subsec. (d)(1)(D).
Subsec. (d)(4).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Strengthening Oversight
Authority of Secretary of State
Except as otherwise provided, Secretary of State to have and exercise any authority vested by law in any official or office of Department of State and references to such officials or offices deemed to refer to Secretary of State or Department of State, as appropriate, see
§4865. Security requirements for United States diplomatic facilities
(a) In general
The following security requirements shall apply with respect to United States diplomatic facilities and specified personnel:
(1) Threat assessment
(A) Emergency Action Plan
The Emergency Action Plan (EAP) of each United States mission shall address a range of threats, including that of large explosive attacks from vehicles and from complex attacks (as such term is defined in
(B) Security Environment Threat List
The Security Environment Threat List shall contain a section that addresses potential acts of international terrorism against United States diplomatic facilities based on threat identification criteria that emphasize the threat of transnational terrorism and include the local security environment, host government support, and other relevant factors such as cultural realities. Such plan shall be reviewed and updated every six months.
(2) Site selection
(A) In general
In selecting a site for any new United States diplomatic facility abroad in a location that has certain minimum ratings under the Security Environment Threat List as determined by the Secretary in his or her discretion, the Secretary shall ensure that all United States Government personnel at the post (except those under the command of an area military commander, personnel of the Peace Corps, and personnel of any other type or category of facility that the Secretary may identify) will be located on the site.
(B) Waiver authority
(i) In general
Subject to clause (ii), the Secretary of State may waive subparagraph (A) if the Secretary, in consultation with, as appropriate, the head of each agency employing personnel that would not be located at the site, if applicable, determines that it is in the national interest of the United States after taking account of any considerations the Secretary in his or her discretion considers relevant, which may include security conditions.
(ii) Chancery or consulate building
Prior to implementing the waiver authority under clause (i) with respect to a chancery or consulate building, the Secretary shall notify the appropriate congressional committees in writing of the waiver and the reasons for the determination.
(iii) Report to Congress
The Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an annual report of all waivers under this subparagraph.
(3) Perimeter distance
(A) Requirement
(i) In general
Each newly acquired United States diplomatic facility in a location that has certain minimum ratings under the Security Environment Threat List as determined by the Secretary of State in his or her discretion shall—
(I) be constructed or modified to meet the measured building blast performance standard applicable to a diplomatic facility sited not less than 100 feet from the perimeter of the property on which the facility is situated; or
(II) fulfill the criteria described in clause (ii).
(ii) Alternative engineering equivalency standard requirement
Each facility referred to in clause (i) may, instead of meeting the requirement under such clause, fulfill such other criteria as the Secretary is authorized to employ to achieve an engineering standard of security and degree of protection that is equivalent to the numerical perimeter distance setback described in such clause seeks to achieve.
(B) Waiver authority
(i) In general
Subject to clause (ii), the Secretary of State may waive subparagraph (A) if the Secretary determines that it is in the national interest of the United States after taking account of any considerations the Secretary in his or her discretion considers relevant, which may include security conditions.
(ii) Chancery or consulate building
Prior to implementing the waiver authority under subparagraph (A) with respect to a chancery or consulate building, the Secretary shall notify the appropriate congressional committees in writing of the waiver and the reasons for the determination.
(iii) Report to Congress
The Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a quarterly report of all waivers under this subparagraph.
(4) Crisis management training
(A) Training of headquarters staff
The appropriate personnel of the Department of State headquarters staff shall undertake crisis management training for mass casualty and mass destruction incidents relating to diplomatic facilities for the purpose of bringing about a rapid response to such incidents from Department of State headquarters in Washington, D.C.
(B) Training of personnel abroad
A program of appropriate instruction in crisis management shall be provided to personnel at United States diplomatic facilities abroad at least on an annual basis.
(5) Diplomatic security training
Not later than six months after November 29, 1999, the Secretary of State shall—
(A) develop annual physical fitness standards for all diplomatic security agents to ensure that the agents are prepared to carry out all of their official responsibilities; and
(B) provide for an independent evaluation by an outside entity of the overall adequacy of current new agent, in-service, and management training programs to prepare agents to carry out the full scope of diplomatic security responsibilities, including preventing attacks on United States personnel and facilities.
(6) State Department support
(A) Foreign Emergency Support Team
The Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) of the Department of State shall receive sufficient support from the Department, including—
(i) conducting routine training exercises of the FEST;
(ii) providing personnel identified to serve on the FEST as a collateral duty;
(iii) providing personnel to assist in activities such as security, medical relief, public affairs, engineering, and building safety; and
(iv) providing such additional support as may be necessary to enable the FEST to provide support in a post-crisis environment involving mass casualties and physical damage.
(B) FEST aircraft
(i) Replacement aircraft
The President shall develop a plan to replace on a priority basis the current FEST aircraft funded by the Department of Defense with a dedicated, capable, and reliable replacement aircraft and backup aircraft to be operated and maintained by the Department of Defense.
(ii) Report
Not later than 60 days after November 29, 1999, the President shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees describing the aircraft selected pursuant to clause (i) and the arrangements for the funding, operation, and maintenance of such aircraft.
(iii) Authority to lease aircraft to respond to a terrorist attack abroad
Subject to the availability of appropriations, when the Attorney General of the Department of Justice exercises the Attorney General's authority to lease commercial aircraft to transport equipment and personnel in response to a terrorist attack abroad if there have been reasonable efforts to obtain appropriate Department of Defense aircraft and such aircraft are unavailable, the Attorney General shall have the authority to obtain indemnification insurance or guarantees if necessary and appropriate.
(7) Rapid response procedures
The Secretary of State shall enter into a memorandum of understanding with the Secretary of Defense setting out rapid response procedures for mobilization of personnel and equipment of their respective departments to provide more effective assistance in times of emergency with respect to United States diplomatic facilities, including at high risk, high threat posts (as such term is defined in
(8) Storage of emergency equipment and records
All United States diplomatic facilities shall have emergency equipment and records required in case of an emergency situation stored at an off-site facility.
(b) Statutory construction
Nothing in this section alters or amends existing security requirements not addressed by this section.
(
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was enacted as part of the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999, and also as part of the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001, and not as part of the Diplomatic Security Act which comprises this chapter.
Amendments
2022—Subsec. (a)(1)(A).
Subsec. (a)(2)(A).
Subsec. (a)(2)(B)(i).
Subsec. (a)(2)(B)(ii).
Subsec. (a)(3)(A).
Subsec. (a)(3)(B)(i).
Subsec. (a)(3)(B)(ii).
Subsec. (a)(3)(B)(iii).
2016—Subsec. (a)(1)(A).
Subsec. (a)(7).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Crisis Response Operations
"(a)
"(1) The Department [of State]'s crisis response planning and operations shall conduct, maintain, and update on a regular basis contingency plans for posts and regions experiencing or vulnerable to conflict or emergency conditions, including armed conflict, natural disasters, significant political or military upheaval, and emergency evacuations.
"(2) The Department's crisis response efforts shall be led by an individual with significant experience responding to prior crises, who shall be so designated by the Secretary.
"(3) The Department's crisis response efforts shall provide at least quarterly updates to the Secretary and other relevant senior officials, including a plan and schedule to develop contingency planning for identified posts and regions consistent with paragraph (1).
"(4) The decision to develop contingency planning for any particular post or region shall be made independent of any regional bureau.
"(5) The crisis response team shall develop and maintain best practices for evacuations, closures, and emergency conditions.
"(b)
"(1)
"(2)
"(A) a list of the posts whose contingency plans, including any noncombatant evacuation contingencies, has been reviewed and updated as appropriate during the preceding 180 days; and
"(B) an assessment of the Secretary's confidence that each post—
"(i) has continuously reached out to United States persons in country to maintain and update contact information for as many such persons as practicable; and
"(ii) is prepared to communicate with such persons in an emergency or crisis situation.
"(3)
Inclusion of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities in United States Diplomatic Facilities in Cuba
"(a)
"(b)
"(1) determines that such waiver is in the national security interest of the United States; and
"(2) submits a written justification for such waiver to the appropriate congressional committees not later than 90 days before exercising such waiver.
"(c)
"(1) the congressional intelligence committees [Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives];
"(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
"(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives."
Inclusion of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities in United States Diplomatic Facilities in the Russian Federation and Adjacent Countries
"(a)
"(b)
"(c)
"(1) the congressional intelligence committees [Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives];
"(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
"(3) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives."
Capital Security Cost Sharing
"(a)
"(b)
Findings
"(1) The Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 (title VI of division A of appendix G of
"(2) Those bombings, followed by the expeditionary diplomatic efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, demonstrated the need to prioritize the security of United States posts and personnel abroad above other considerations.
"(3) Between 1999 and 2022, the risk calculus of the Department [of State] impacted the ability of United States diplomats around the world to advance the interests of the United States through access to local populations, leaders, and places.
"(4) America's competitors and adversaries do not have the same restrictions that United States diplomats have, especially in critically important medium-threat and high-threat posts.
"(5) The Department's 2021 Overseas Security Panel report states that—
"(A) the requirement for setback and collocation of diplomatic posts under paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 606(a) of the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 (
"(B) the locations of such posts have become less desirable, creating an extremely suboptimal nexus that further hinders United States diplomats who are willing to accept more risk in order to advance United States interests."
"(1) On August 7, 1998, the United States embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, were destroyed by simultaneously exploding bombs. The resulting explosions killed 220 persons and injured more than 4,000 others. Twelve Americans and 40 Kenyan and Tanzanian employees of the United States Foreign Service were killed in the attack.
"(2) The United States personnel in both Dar es Salaam and Nairobi showed leadership and personal courage in their response to the attacks. Despite the havoc wreaked upon the embassies, staff in both embassies provided rapid response in locating and rescuing victims, providing emergency assistance, and quickly restoring embassy operations during a crisis.
"(3) The bombs are believed to have been set by individuals associated with Osama bin Laden, leader of a known transnational terrorist organization. In February 1998, bin Laden issued a directive to his followers that called for attacks against United States interests anywhere in the world.
"(4) Threats continue to be made against United States diplomatic facilities.
"(5) Accountability Review Boards were convened following the bombings, as required by
"(6) The conclusions of the Crowe panels were strikingly similar to those stated by the Commission chaired by Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, which issued an extensive embassy security report in 1985.
"(7) The Crowe panels issued a report setting out many problems with security at United States diplomatic facilities, in particular the following:
"(A) The United States Government has devoted inadequate resources to security against terrorist attacks.
"(B) The United States Government places too low a priority on security concerns.
"(8) The result has been a failure to take adequate steps to prevent tragedies such as the bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.
"(9) The Crowe panels found that there was an institutional failure on the part of the Department of State to recognize threats posed by transnational terrorism and vehicular bombs.
"(10) Responsibility for ensuring adequate resources for security programs is widely shared throughout the United States Government, including Congress. Unless the vulnerabilities identified by the Crowe panels are addressed in a sustained and financially realistic manner, the lives and safety of United States employees in diplomatic facilities will continue to be at risk from further terrorist attacks.
"(11) Although service in the Foreign Service or other United States Government positions abroad can never be completely without risk, the United States Government must take all reasonable steps to minimize security risks."
Authorizations of Appropriations
"(a)
"(1) for fiscal year 2000, $900,000,000;
"(2) for fiscal year 2001, $900,000,000;
"(3) for fiscal year 2002, $900,000,000;
"(4) for fiscal year 2003, $1,000,000,000; and
"(5) for fiscal year 2004, $900,000,000.
"(b)
"(1) the acquisition of United States diplomatic facilities and, if necessary, any residences or other structures located in close physical proximity to such facilities, or
"(2) the provision of major security enhancements to United States diplomatic facilities,
to the extent necessary to bring the United States Government into compliance with all requirements applicable to the security of United States diplomatic facilities, including the relevant requirements set forth in section 606 [
"(c)
"(d)
"(e)
"(1)
"(2)
"(3)
Obligations and Expenditures
"(a)
"(1)
"(2)
"(A)
"(B)
"(b)
Definitions
For definitions of the terms "Secretary" and "appropriate congressional committees" used in this section and in section 1000(a)(7) [div. A, title VI, §605] of
"(1) is considered by the Secretary of State to be diplomatic or consular premises, consistent with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, done at Vienna April 18, 1961, and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, done at Vienna April 24, 1963, and was notified to the host government as such; or
"(2) is otherwise subject to a publicly available bilateral agreement with the host government (contained in the records of the United States Department of State) that recognizes the official status of the United States Government personnel present at the facility."
Executive Documents
Delegation of Authority
Memorandum of President of the United States, July 17, 2000, 65 F.R. 45511, provided:
Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense
By the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, I hereby delegate to the Secretary of Defense the responsibility of the President, under section 606 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001 (
You are hereby authorized and directed to publish this delegation in the Federal Register.
William J. Clinton.
§4866. Security training for personnel assigned to a high risk, high threat post
(a) In general
Individuals assigned permanently to or who are in long-term temporary duty status as designated by the Secretary of State at a high risk, high threat post shall receive security training described in subsection (b) on a mandatory basis in order to prepare such individuals for living and working at such posts.
(b) Security training described
Security training referred to in subsection (a)—
(1) is training to improve basic knowledge and skills; and
(2) may include—
(A) an ability to recognize, avoid, and respond to potential terrorist situations, including a complex attack;
(B) conducting surveillance detection;
(C) providing emergency medical care;
(D) ability to detect the presence of improvised explosive devices;
(E) minimal firearms familiarization; and
(F) defensive driving maneuvers.
(c) Effective date
The requirements of this section shall take effect upon December 16, 2016.
(d) Definitions
In this section and
(1) Complex attack
The term "complex attack" has the meaning given such term by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as follows: "An attack conducted by multiple hostile elements which employ at least two distinct classes of weapon systems (i.e., indirect fire and direct fire, improvised explosive devices, and surface to air fire).".
(2) High risk, high threat post
The term "high risk, high threat post" has the meaning given such term in
(
§4867. Security management training for officials assigned to a high risk, high threat post
(a) In general
Officials described in subsection (c) who are assigned to a high risk, high threat post shall receive security training described in subsection (b) on a mandatory basis in order to improve the ability of such officials to make security-related management decisions.
(b) Security training described
Security training referred to in subsection (a) may include—
(1) development of skills to better evaluate threats;
(2) effective use of security resources to mitigate such threats; and
(3) improved familiarity of available security resources.
(c) Officials described
Officials referred to in subsection (a) are the following:
(1) Members of the Senior Foreign Service appointed under
(2) Foreign Service officers appointed under
(3) Foreign Service Specialists appointed by the Secretary under
(4) Individuals holding a position in grades GS–14 or GS–15.
(5) Personal services contractors and other contractors serving in positions or capacities similar to the officials described in paragraphs (1) through (4).
(d) Effective date
The requirements of this section shall take effect beginning on the date that is 1 year after December 16, 2016.
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
GS–14 and GS–15, referred to in subsec. (c)(4), are contained in the General Schedule, which is set out under
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Definitions
For definition of "high risk, high threat post" as used in this section, see
§4868. Assignment of personnel at high risk, high threat posts
The Secretary to the extent practicable shall station key personnel for sustained periods of time at high risk, high threat posts (as such term is defined in
(1) establish institutional knowledge and situational awareness that would allow for a fuller familiarization of the local political and security environment in which such posts are located; and
(2) ensure that necessary security procedures are implemented.
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Codification
Section was enacted as part of the Department of State Authorities Act, Fiscal Year 2017, and not as part of the Diplomatic Security Act which comprises this chapter.
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Definitions
The term "Secretary" as used in this section means the Secretary of State, see section 2 of