CHAPTER 58 —DIPLOMATIC SECURITY
SUBCHAPTER I—GENERALLY
SUBCHAPTER II—PERSONNEL
SUBCHAPTER III—PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
SUBCHAPTER IV—DIPLOMATIC SECURITY PROGRAM
SUBCHAPTER I—GENERALLY
§4801. Findings and purposes
(a) Findings
The Congress finds and declares that—
(1) the United States has a crucial stake in the presence of United States Government personnel representing United States interests abroad;
(2) conditions confronting United States Government personnel and missions abroad are fraught with security concerns which will continue for the foreseeable future; and
(3) the resources now available to counter acts of terrorism and protect and secure United States Government personnel and missions abroad, as well as foreign officials and missions in the United States, are inadequate to meet the mounting threat to such personnel and facilities.
(b) Purposes
The purposes of this chapter are—
(1) to set forth the responsibility of the Secretary of State with respect to the security of diplomatic operations in the United States and abroad;
(2) to maximize coordination by the Department of State with Federal, State, and local agencies and agencies of foreign governments in order to enhance security programs;
(3) to promote strengthened security measures, institutionalize a culture of learning, and, in the case of apparent gross negligence or breach of duty, recommend that the Secretary investigate accountability for United States Government personnel with security-related responsibilities under chief of mission authority;
(4) to support a culture of risk management, instead of risk avoidance, that enables the Department of State to pursue its vital goals with full knowledge that it is neither desirable nor possible for the Department to avoid all risks;
(5) to set forth the responsibility of the Secretary of State with respect to the safe and efficient evacuation of United States Government personnel, their dependents, and private United States citizens when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster; and
(6) to provide authorization of appropriations for the Department of State to carry out its responsibilities in the area of security and counterterrorism, and in particular to finance the acquisition and improvements of United States Government missions abroad, including real property, buildings, facilities, and communications, information, and security systems.
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
This chapter, referred to in subsec. (b), was in the original "titles I through IV", meaning titles I through IV of
Amendments
2022—Subsec. (b)(3).
Subsec. (b)(4) to (6).
1994—Subsec. (b)(2) to (6).
1990—Subsec. (b)(5), (6).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1994 Amendment
Amendment by
Short Title of 2022 Amendment
Short Title of 1999 Amendment
Short Title
Findings
"(1) A robust overseas diplomatic presence is part of an effective foreign policy, particularly in volatile environments where a flexible and timely diplomatic response can be decisive in preventing and addressing conflict.
"(2) Diplomats routinely put themselves and their families at great personal risk to serve their country overseas where they face threats related to international terrorism, violent conflict, and public health.
"(3) The Department [of State] has a remarkable record of protecting personnel while enabling an enormous amount of global diplomatic activity, often in unsecure and remote places and facing a variety of evolving risks and threats. With support from Congress, the Department has revised policy, improved physical security through retrofitting and replacing old facilities, deployed additional security personnel and armored vehicles, and greatly enhanced training requirements and training facilities, including the new Foreign Affairs Security Training Center in Blackstone, Virginia.
"(4) Diplomatic missions rely on robust staffing and ambitious external engagement to advance United States interests as diverse as competing with China's malign influence around the world, fighting terrorism and transnational organized crime, preventing and addressing violent conflict and humanitarian disasters, promoting United States businesses and trade, protecting the rights of marginalized groups, addressing climate change, and preventing pandemic disease.
"(5) Efforts to protect personnel overseas have often resulted in inhibiting diplomatic activity and limiting engagement between embassy personnel and local governments and populations.
"(6) Given that Congress currently provides annual appropriations in excess of $1,900,000,000 for embassy security, construction, and maintenance, the Department should be able to ensure a robust overseas presence without inhibiting the ability of diplomats to—
"(A) meet outside United States secured facilities with foreign leaders to explain, defend, and advance United States priorities;
"(B) understand and report on foreign political, social, and economic conditions through meeting and interacting with community officials outside of United States facilities;
"(C) provide United States citizen services; and
"(D) collaborate and, at times, compete with other diplomatic missions, particularly those, such as that of the People's Republic of China, that do not have restrictions on meeting locations.
"(7) Given these stakes, Congress has a responsibility to empower, support, and hold the Department accountable for implementing an aggressive strategy to ensure a robust overseas presence that mitigates potential risks and adequately considers the myriad direct and indirect consequences of a lack of diplomatic presence."
§4802. Responsibility of Secretary of State
(a) Security functions
(1) The Secretary of State shall develop and implement (in consultation with the heads of other Federal agencies having personnel or missions abroad where appropriate and within the scope of the resources made available) policies and programs, including funding levels and standards, to provide for the security of United States Government operations of a diplomatic nature and foreign government operations of a diplomatic nature in the United States. Such policies and programs shall include—
(A) protection of all United States Government personnel on official duty abroad (other than Voice of America correspondents on official assignment and those personnel under the command of a United States area military commander) and their accompanying dependents;
(B) establishment and operation of security functions at all United States Government missions abroad (other than facilities or installations subject to the control of a United States area military commander);
(C) establishment and operation of security functions at all Department of State facilities in the United States; and
(D) protection of foreign missions, international organizations, and foreign officials and other foreign persons in the United States, as authorized by law.
(2) Security responsibilities shall include the following:
(A) Former Office of Security functions
Functions and responsibilities exercised by the Office of Security, Department of State, before November 11, 1985.
(B) Security and protective operations
(i) Establishment and operation of post security and protective functions abroad.
(ii) Development and implementation of communications, computer, and information security.
(iii) Emergency planning.
(iv) Establishment and operation of local guard services abroad.
(v) Supervision of the United States Marine Corps security guard program.
(vi) Liaison with American overseas private sector security interests.
(vii) Protection of foreign missions and international organizations, foreign officials, and diplomatic personnel in the United States, as authorized by law.
(viii) Protection of the Secretary of State and other persons designated by the Secretary of State, as authorized by law.
(ix) Physical protection of Department of State facilities, communications, and computer and information systems in the United States.
(x) Conduct of investigations relating to protection of foreign officials and diplomatic personnel and foreign missions in the United States, suitability for employment, employee security, illegal passport and visa issuance or use, and other investigations, as authorized by law.
(xi) Carrying out the rewards program for information concerning international terrorism authorized by section 2708(a) 1 of this title.
(xii) Performance of other security, investigative, and protective matters as authorized by law.
(C) Counterterrorism planning and coordination
Development and coordination of counterterrorism planning, emergency action planning, threat analysis programs, and liaison with other Federal agencies to carry out this paragraph.
(D) Security technology
Development and implementation of technical and physical security programs, including security-related construction, radio and personnel security communications, armored vehicles, computer and communications security, and research programs necessary to develop such measures.
(E) Diplomatic courier service
Management of the diplomatic courier service.
(F) Personnel training
Development of facilities, methods, and materials to develop and upgrade necessary skills in order to carry out this section.
(G) Foreign government training
Management and development of antiterrorism assistance programs to assist foreign government security training which are administered by the Department of State under
(b) Overseas evacuations
The Secretary of State shall develop and implement policies and programs to provide for the safe and efficient evacuation of United States Government personnel, dependents, and private United States citizens when their lives are endangered. Such policies shall include measures to identify high risk areas where evacuation may be necessary and, where appropriate, providing staff to United States Government missions abroad to assist in those evacuations. In carrying out these responsibilities, the Secretary shall—
(1) develop a model contingency plan for evacuation of personnel, dependents, and United States citizens from foreign countries;
(2) develop a mechanism whereby United States citizens can voluntarily request to be placed on a list in order to be contacted in the event of an evacuation, or which, in the event of an evacuation, can maintain information on the location of United States citizens in high risk areas submitted by their relatives;
(3) assess the transportation and communications resources in the area being evacuated and determine the logistic support needed for the evacuation; and
(4) develop a plan for coordinating communications between embassy staff, Department of State personnel, and families of United States citizens abroad regarding the whereabouts of those citizens.
(c) Oversight of posts abroad
The Secretary of State shall—
(1) have full responsibility for the coordination of all United States Government personnel assigned to diplomatic or consular posts or other United States missions abroad pursuant to United States Government authorization (except for facilities, installations, or personnel under the command of a United States area military commander) 2
(2) establish appropriate overseas staffing levels for all such posts or missions for all Federal agencies with activities abroad (except for personnel and activities under the command of a United States area military commander or regional inspector general offices under the jurisdiction of the inspector 3 General, Agency for International Development).
(d) Federal agency
As used in this subchapter and subchapter III, the term "Federal agency" includes any department or agency of the United States Government.
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, referred to in subsec. (a)(2)(G), is
Amendments
2002—Subsec. (a)(1)(A).
1994—Subsec. (a).
1990—Subsecs. (b) to (d).
1988—Subsec. (b)(2).
Subsec. (b)(3).
1987—Subsec. (b)(3).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1994 Amendment
Amendment by
Overseas Security Briefings
Direct Reporting
Marine Corps Security Guard Program
"(a)
"(1) An evaluation of whether the size and composition of the Marine Corps Security Guard Program is adequate to meet global diplomatic security requirements.
"(2) An assessment of whether the Marine Corps security guards are appropriately deployed among United States embassies, consulates, and other diplomatic facilities to respond to evolving security developments and potential threats to United States interests abroad.
"(3) An assessment of the mission objectives of the Marine Corps Security Guard Program and the procedural rules of engagement to protect diplomatic personnel under the Program.
"(b)
Congressional Notification and Briefing Requirement on Ordered Evacuations of United States Embassies and Consulates Involving Support Provided by the Department of Defense
"(a)
"(b)
"(c)
"(1) the congressional defense committees [Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives]; and
"(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives."
Personnel Security Program for Embassies in High Intelligence Threat Countries
"(a)
"(1) selection criteria and screening to ensure suitability for assignment to high intelligence threat countries;
"(2) counterintelligence awareness and related training;
"(3) security reporting and command arrangements designed to counter intelligence threats; and
"(4) length of duty criteria and policies regarding rest and recuperative absences.
"(b)
"(c)
"(1) a country listed as a Communist country in section 620(f) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 [
"(2) any other country designated as a high intelligence threat country for purposes of this section by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, or the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation."
[Reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director's capacity as the head of the intelligence community deemed to be a reference to the Director of National Intelligence. Reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director's capacity as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency deemed to be a reference to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. See section 1081(a), (b) of
1 See References in Text note below.
2 So in original. Probably should be followed by "; and".
3 So in original. Probably should be capitalized.
§4803. Designation of high risk, high threat posts
(a) Initial designation
Not later than 30 days after December 16, 2016, the Department of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report, in classified form, that contains a list of diplomatic and consular posts designated as high risk, high threat posts.
(b) Designations before opening or reopening posts
Before opening or reopening a diplomatic or consular post, the Secretary shall determine if such post should be designated as a high risk, high threat post.
(c) Designating existing posts
The Secretary shall regularly review existing diplomatic and consular posts to determine if any such post should be designated as a high risk, high threat post if conditions at such post or the surrounding security environment require such a designation.
(d) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees
The term "appropriate congressional committees" means the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(2) High risk, high threat post
The term "high risk, high threat post" means a United States diplomatic or consular post or other United States mission abroad, as determined by the Secretary, that, among other factors—
(A) is located in a country—
(i) with high to critical levels of political violence and terrorism; and
(ii) the government of which lacks the ability or willingness to provide adequate security; and
(B) has mission physical security platforms that fall below the Department of State's established standards.
(
Editorial Notes
Prior Provisions
A prior section 4803,
A prior section 104 of
Amendments
2017—Subsec. (a).
§4804. Briefings on embassy security
(a) Briefing
The Secretary shall provide monthly briefings to the appropriate congressional committees on—
(1) progress towards opening or reopening a high risk, high threat post, and the risk to national security of the continued closure or any suspension of operations and remaining barriers to doing so, including—
(A) the importance and appropriateness of the objectives of the proposed post to the national security of the United States, the risk to United States national security of the post's continued closure or suspension of operations, and the type and level of security threats such post could encounter;
(B) working plans to expedite the approval and funding for establishing and operating such post, implementing physical security measures, providing necessary security and management personnel, and the provision of necessary equipment;
(C) the type and level of security threats such post could encounter, and security "tripwires" that would determine specific action, including enhanced security measures or evacuation of such post, based on the improvement or deterioration of the local security environment; and
(D) in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, an evaluation of available United States military assets and operational plans to respond to such posts in extremis;
(2) personnel staffing and rotation cycles at high risk, high threat posts;
(3) the current security posture at posts of particular concern as determined by such committees; and
(4) the progress towards implementation of the provisions specified in title I of the Department of State Authorities Act, Fiscal Year 2017.
(b) Congressional notification
(1) In general
Except as provided in paragraph (2), not later than 30 days before opening or reopening a high risk, high threat post, the Secretary shall notify the appropriate congressional committees of the decision to open or reopen such post.
(2) Emergency circumstances
If the Secretary determines that the national security interests of the United States require the opening or reopening of a high risk, high threat post in fewer than 30 days, then as soon as possible, but not later than 48 hours before such opening or reopening, the Secretary shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a notification detailing the decision to open or reopen such post, the nature of the critical national security interests at stake, and the circumstances that prevented the normal 30-day notice under paragraph (1).
(c) Appropriate congressional committees
In this section, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means—
(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Title I of the Department of State Authorities Act, Fiscal Year 2017, referred to in subsec. (a)(4), is title I of
Prior Provisions
A prior section 4804,
Amendments
2022—Subsec. (a)(1).
Subsec. (a)(1)(A).
Subsec. (a)(1)(C).
§4805. Cooperation of other Federal agencies
(a) Assistance
In order to facilitate fulfillment of the responsibilities described in
(b) Other agencies
Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to limit or impair the authority or responsibility of any other Federal, State, or local agency with respect to law enforcement, domestic security operations, or intelligence activities as defined in Executive Order 12333.
(c) Certain lease arrangements
The Administrator of General Services is authorized to lease (to such extent or in such amounts as are provided in appropriation Acts) such amount of space in the United States as may be necessary for the Department of State to accommodate the personnel required to carry out this subchapter. The Department of State shall pay for such space at the rate established by the Administrator of General Services for space and related services.
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
This chapter, referred to in subsec. (b), was in the original "titles I through IV", meaning titles I through IV of
Executive Order 12333, referred to in subsec. (b), is Ex. Ord. No. 12333, Dec. 4, 1981, 46 F.R. 59941, which is set out as a note under
§4806. Protection of foreign consulates
The Secretary of State shall take into account security considerations in making determinations with respect to accreditation of all foreign consular personnel in the United States.
(
Editorial Notes
Amendments
1994—
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1994 Amendment
Amendment by
§4807. Establishment of Visa and Passport Security Program in the Department of State
(a) Establishment
There is established, within the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the Department of State, the Visa and Passport Security Program (in this section referred to as the "Program").
(b) Preparation of strategic plan
(1) In general
The Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, in coordination with the appropriate officials of the Bureau of Consular Affairs, the coordinator for counterterrorism, the National Counterterrorism Center, and the Department of Homeland Security, and consistent with the strategy mandated by section 7201,1 shall ensure the preparation of a strategic plan to target and disrupt individuals and organizations, within the United States and in foreign countries, that are involved in the fraudulent production, distribution, use, or other similar activity—
(A) of a United States visa or United States passport;
(B) of documents intended to help fraudulently procure a United States visa or United States passport, or other documents intended to gain unlawful entry into the United States; or
(C) of passports and visas issued by foreign countries intended to gain unlawful entry into the United States.
(2) Emphasis
The strategic plan shall—
(A) focus particular emphasis on individuals and organizations that may have links to domestic terrorist organizations or foreign terrorist organizations (as such term is defined in
(B) require the development of a strategic training course under the Antiterrorism Assistance Training (ATA) program of the Department of State (or any successor or related program) under
(C) determine the benefits and costs of providing technical assistance to foreign governments to ensure the security of passports, visas, and related documents and to investigate, arrest, and prosecute individuals who facilitate travel by the creation of false passports and visas, documents to obtain such passports and visas, and other types of travel documents.
(c) Program
(1) Individual in charge
(A) Designation
The Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security shall designate an individual to be in charge of the Program.
(B) Qualification
The individual designated under subparagraph (A) shall have expertise and experience in the investigation and prosecution of visa and passport fraud.
(2) Program components
The Program shall include the following:
(A) Analysis of methods
Analyze, in coordination with other appropriate government agencies, methods used by terrorists to travel internationally, particularly the use of false or altered travel documents to illegally enter foreign countries and the United States, and consult with the Bureau of Consular Affairs and the Secretary of Homeland Security on recommended changes to the visa issuance process that could combat such methods, including the introduction of new technologies into such process.
(B) Identification of individuals and documents
Identify, in cooperation with the Human Trafficking and Smuggling Center, individuals who facilitate travel by the creation of false passports and visas, documents used to obtain such passports and visas, and other types of travel documents, and ensure that the appropriate agency is notified for further investigation and prosecution or, in the case of such individuals abroad for which no further investigation or prosecution is initiated, ensure that all appropriate information is shared with foreign governments in order to facilitate investigation, arrest, and prosecution of such individuals.
(C) Identification of foreign countries needing assistance
Identify foreign countries that need technical assistance, such as law reform, administrative reform, prosecutorial training, or assistance to police and other investigative services, to ensure passport, visa, and related document security and to investigate, arrest, and prosecute individuals who facilitate travel by the creation of false passports and visas, documents used to obtain such passports and visas, and other types of travel documents.
(D) Inspection of applications
Randomly inspect visa and passport applications for accuracy, efficiency, and fraud, especially at high terrorist threat posts, in order to prevent a recurrence of the issuance of visas to those who submit incomplete, fraudulent, or otherwise irregular or incomplete applications.
(d) Report
Not later than 90 days after the date on which the strategy required under section 7201 1 is submitted to Congress, the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security shall submit to Congress a report containing—
(1) a description of the strategic plan prepared under subsection (b); and
(2) an evaluation of the feasibility of establishing civil service positions in field offices of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to investigate visa and passport fraud, including an evaluation of whether to allow diplomatic security agents to convert to civil service officers to fill such positions.
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Section 7201, referred to in subsecs. (b)(1) and (d), is section 7201 of
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, referred to in subsec. (b)(2)(B), is
Codification
Section was enacted as part of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, and also as part of the 9/11 Commission Implementation Act of 2004, and not as part of the Diplomatic Security Act which comprises this chapter.
1 See References in Text note below.
SUBCHAPTER II—PERSONNEL
§4821. Diplomatic Security Service
The Secretary of State may establish a Diplomatic Security Service, which shall perform such functions as the Secretary may determine.
(
Editorial Notes
Amendments
1994—
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1994 Amendment
Amendment by
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Victim Advocates
"(1) is appropriately staffed by advocates who are physically present at—
"(A) the headquarters of the Department [of State]; and
"(B) major domestic and international facilities and embassies, as determined by the Secretary;
"(2) considers the logistics that are necessary to allow for the expedient travel of victims from Department facilities that do not have advocates; and
"(3) uses funds available to the Department to provide emergency food, shelter, clothing, and transportation for victims involved in matters being investigated by the Diplomatic Security Service."
§4822. Director of Diplomatic Security Service
Any such Diplomatic Security Service should be headed by a Director designated by the Secretary of State. The Director should be a career member of the Senior Foreign Service or the Senior Executive Service and should be qualified for the position by virtue of demonstrated ability in the areas of security, law enforcement, management, and public administration. Experience in management or operations abroad should be considered an affirmative factor in the selection of the Director.
(
Editorial Notes
Amendments
1994—
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1994 Amendment
Amendment by
§4823. Special agents
Special agent positions shall be filled in accordance with the provisions of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Foreign Service Act of 1980, referred to in text, is
Amendments
1994—
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1994 Amendment
Amendment by
§4824. Contracting authority
The Secretary of State is authorized to employ individuals or organizations by contract to carry out the purposes of this Act, and individuals employed by contract to perform such services shall not by virtue of such employment be considered to be employees of the United States Government for purposes of any law administered by the Office of Personnel Management (except that the Secretary may determine the applicability to such individuals of any law administered by the Secretary concerning the employment of such individuals); and such contracts are authorized to be negotiated, the terms of the contracts to be prescribed, and the work to be performed, where necessary, without regard to such statutory provisions as relate to the negotiation, making and performance of contracts and performance of work in the United States.
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
This Act, referred to in text, is
SUBCHAPTER III—PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
§4831. Security Review Committees
(a) In general
(1) Convening the Security Review Committee
In any case of a serious security incident involving loss of life, serious injury, or significant destruction of property at, or related to, a United States Government diplomatic mission abroad (referred to in this subchapter as a "Serious Security Incident"), and in any case of a serious breach of security involving intelligence activities of a foreign government directed at a United States Government mission abroad, the Secretary of State shall convene a Security Review Committee, which shall issue a report providing a full account of what occurred, consistent with
(2) Committee composition
The Secretary shall designate a Chairperson and may designate additional personnel of commensurate seniority to serve on the Security Review Committee, which shall include—
(A) the Director of the Office of Management Strategy and Solutions;
(B) the Assistant Secretary responsible for the region where the incident occurred;
(C) the Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security;
(D) the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research;
(E) an Assistant Secretary-level representative from any involved United States Government department or agency; and
(F) other personnel determined to be necessary or appropriate.
(3) Exceptions to convening a Security Review Committee
(A) In general
The Secretary of State is not required to convene a Security Review Committee—
(i) if the Secretary determines that the incident involves only causes unrelated to security, such as when the security at issue is outside of the scope of the Secretary of State's security responsibilities under
(ii) if operational control of overseas security functions has been delegated to another agency in accordance with
(iii) if the incident is a cybersecurity incident and is covered by other review mechanisms; or
(iv) in the case of an incident described in paragraph (1) that involves any facility, installation, or personnel of the Department of Defense with respect to which the Secretary has delegated operational control of overseas security functions to the Secretary of Defense pursuant to
(B) Department of Defense investigations
In the case of an incident described in subparagraph (A)(iv), the Secretary of Defense shall conduct an appropriate inquiry. The Secretary of Defense shall report the findings and recommendations of such inquiry, and the action taken with respect to such recommendations, to the Secretary of State and Congress.
(4) Facilities in Afghanistan, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq
(A) Limited exemptions from requirement to convene Board
The Secretary of State is not required to convene a Board in the case of an incident that—
(i) involves serious injury, loss of life, or significant destruction of property at, or related to, a United States Government mission in Afghanistan, Yemen, Syria, or Iraq; and
(ii) occurs during the period beginning on October 1, 2020, and ending on September 30, 2022.
(B) Reporting requirements
In the case of an incident described in subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall—
(i) promptly notify the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate of the incident;
(ii) conduct an inquiry of the incident; and
(iii) upon completion of the inquiry required by clause (ii), submit to each such Committee a report on the findings and recommendations related to such inquiry and the actions taken with respect to such recommendations.
(5) Rulemaking
The Secretary of State shall promulgate regulations defining the membership and operating procedures for the Security Review Committee and provide such guidance to the Chair and ranking members of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(b) Deadlines for convening Security Review Committees
(1) In general
The Secretary of State shall convene a Security Review Committee not later than 60 days after the occurrence of an incident described in subsection (a)(1), or 60 days after the Department first becomes aware of such an incident, whichever is earlier, except that the 60-day period for convening a Security Review Committee may be extended for one additional 60-day period if the Secretary determines that the additional period is necessary.
(2) Delay in cases involving intelligence activities
With respect to breaches of security involving intelligence activities, the Secretary of State may delay the establishment of a Board if, after consultation with the chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, the Secretary determines that the establishment of a Board would compromise intelligence sources or methods. The Secretary shall promptly advise the chairmen of such committees of each determination pursuant to this paragraph to delay the establishment of a Board.
(c) Congressional notification
Whenever the Secretary of State convenes a Security Review Committee, the Secretary shall promptly inform the chair and ranking member of—
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;
(5) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and
(6) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
This chapter, referred to in subsec. (a)(1), was in the original "titles I through IV", meaning titles I through IV of
Amendments
2022—
Subsec. (a)(1).
Subsec. (a)(2).
Subsec. (a)(3).
Subsec. (a)(4).
Subsec. (a)(5).
Subsec. (b).
Subsec. (b)(1).
Subsec. (c).
"(1) that a Board has been convened;
"(2) of the membership of the Board; and
"(3) of other appropriate information about the Board."
2021—Subsec. (a)(3).
Subsec. (a)(3)(A)(i).
Subsec. (a)(3)(A)(ii).
2005—Subsec. (a)(1).
Subsec. (a)(3).
1999—
1987—
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Change of Name
Committee on International Relations of House of Representatives changed to Committee on Foreign Affairs of House of Representatives by House Resolution No. 6, One Hundred Tenth Congress, Jan. 5, 2007.
Security Review Committees for Certain Facilities
Similar provisions were contained in the following prior acts:
§4832. Security Review Committee
(a) Membership
A Security Review Committee shall consist of five members, 4 appointed by the Secretary of State, and 1 appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence. The Secretary of State shall designate the Chairperson of the Security Review Committee. Members of the Security Review Committee who are not Federal officers or employees shall each be paid at a rate not to exceed the maximum rate of basic pay payable for level GS–18 of the General Schedule for each day (including travel time) during which they are engaged in the actual performance of duties vested in the Security Review Committee. Members of the Security Review Committee who are Federal officers or employees shall receive no additional pay by reason of such membership.
(b) Facilities, services, supplies, and staff
(1) Supplied by Department of State
A Security Review Committee shall obtain facilities, services, and supplies through the Department of State. All expenses of the Security Review Committee, including necessary costs of travel, shall be paid by the Department of State. Travel expenses authorized under this paragraph shall be paid in accordance with subchapter I of
(2) Detail
At the request of a Security Review Committee, employees of the Department of State or other Federal agencies, members of the Foreign Service, or members of the uniformed services may be temporarily assigned, with or without reimbursement, to assist the Security Review Committee.
(3) Experts and consultants
A Security Review Committee may employ and compensate (in accordance with
(
Editorial Notes
Amendments
2022—
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Change of Name
Reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director's capacity as the head of the intelligence community deemed to be a reference to the Director of National Intelligence. Reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director's capacity as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency deemed to be a reference to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. See section 1081(a), (b) of
References in Other Laws to GS–16, 17, or 18 Pay Rates
References in laws to the rates of pay for GS–16, 17, or 18, or to maximum rates of pay under the General Schedule, to be considered references to rates payable under specified sections of Title 5, Government Organization and Employees, see section 529 [title I, §101(c)(1)] of
§4833. Serious Security Incident investigation process
(a) Investigation process
(1) Initiation upon reported incident
A United States mission shall submit an initial report of a Serious Security Incident not later than 3 days after such incident occurs, whenever feasible, at which time an investigation of the incident shall be initiated.
(2) Investigation
Not later than 10 days after the submission of a report pursuant to paragraph (1), the Secretary shall direct the Diplomatic Security Service to assemble an investigative team to investigate the incident and independently establish what occurred. Each investigation under this subsection shall cover—
(A) an assessment of what occurred, who perpetrated or is suspected of having perpetrated the Serious Security Incident, and whether applicable security procedures were followed;
(B) in the event the Serious Security Incident involved a United States diplomatic compound, motorcade, residence, or other facility, an assessment of whether adequate security countermeasures were in effect based on a known threat at the time of the incident;
(C) if the incident involved an individual or group of officers, employees, or family members under Chief of Mission security responsibility conducting approved operations or movements outside the United States mission, an assessment of whether proper security briefings and procedures were in place and whether weighing of risk of the operation or movement took place; and
(D) an assessment of whether the failure of any officials or employees to follow procedures or perform their duties contributed to the security incident.
(3) Investigative team
The investigative team assembled pursuant to paragraph (2) shall consist of individuals from the Diplomatic Security Service who shall provide an independent examination of the facts surrounding the incident and what occurred. The Secretary, or the Secretary's designee, shall review the makeup of the investigative team for a conflict, appearance of conflict, or lack of independence that could undermine the results of the investigation and may remove or replace any members of the team to avoid such an outcome.
(b) Report of Investigation
Not later than 90 days after the occurrence of a Serious Security Incident, the investigative team investigating the incident shall prepare and submit a Report of Investigation to the Security Review Committee that includes—
(1) a detailed description of the matters set forth in subparagraphs (A) through (D) of subsection (a)(2), including all related findings;
(2) a complete and accurate account of the casualties, injuries, and damage resulting from the incident; and
(3) a review of security procedures and directives in place at the time of the incident.
(c) Confidentiality
The investigative team investigating a Serious Security Incident shall adopt such procedures with respect to confidentiality as determined necessary, including procedures relating to the conduct of closed proceedings or the submission and use of evidence in camera, to ensure in particular the protection of classified information relating to national defense, foreign policy, or intelligence matters. The Director of National Intelligence shall establish the level of protection required for intelligence information and for information relating to intelligence personnel included in the report required under subsection (b). The Security Review Committee shall determine the level of classification of the final report prepared pursuant to
(
Editorial Notes
Amendments
2022—
Subsec. (d).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Change of Name
Reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director's capacity as the head of the intelligence community deemed to be a reference to the Director of National Intelligence. Reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director's capacity as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency deemed to be a reference to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. See section 1081(a), (b) of
§4834. Security Review Committee findings and report
(a) Findings
The Security Review Committee shall—
(1) review the Report of Investigation prepared pursuant to
(2) determine, in writing—
(A) whether the incident was security related and constituted a Serious Security Incident;
(B) if the incident involved a diplomatic compound, motorcade, residence, or other mission facility—
(i) whether the security systems, security countermeasures, and security procedures operated as intended; and
(ii) whether such systems worked to materially mitigate the attack or were found to be inadequate to mitigate the threat and attack;
(C) if the incident involved an individual or group of officers conducting an approved operation outside the mission, whether a valid process was followed in evaluating the requested operation and weighing the risk of the operation, which determination shall not seek to assign accountability for the incident unless the Security Review Committee determines that an official breached his or her duty;
(D) the impact of intelligence and information availability, and whether the mission was aware of the general operating threat environment or any more specific threat intelligence or information and took that into account in ongoing and specific operations; and
(E) any other facts and circumstances that may be relevant to the appropriate security management of United States missions abroad.
(b) Report
(1) Submission to Secretary of State
Not later than 60 days after receiving the Report of Investigation prepared pursuant to
(A) the findings described in subsection (a); and
(B) any related recommendations.
(2) Submission to Congress
Not later than 90 days after receiving the report pursuant to paragraph (1), the Secretary of State shall submit a copy of the report to—
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;
(E) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and
(F) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(c) Personnel recommendations
If in the course of conducting an investigation under
(
Editorial Notes
Amendments
2022—
2016—Subsec. (c).
Subsec. (c)(2).
1987—Subsec. (a).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2016 Amendment
§4835. Relation to other proceedings
(a) No effect on existing remedies or defenses
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to create administrative or judicial review remedies or rights of action not otherwise available by law, nor shall any provision of this subchapter be construed to deprive any person of any right or legal defense which would otherwise be available to that person under any law, rule, or regulation.
(b) Future inquiries
Nothing in this subchapter may be construed to preclude the Secretary of State from convening a follow-up public board of inquiry to investigate any security incident if the incident was of such magnitude or significance that an internal process is deemed insufficient to understand and investigate the incident. All materials gathered during the procedures provided under this subchapter shall be provided to any related board of inquiry convened by the Secretary.
(
Editorial Notes
Amendments
2022—
SUBCHAPTER IV—DIPLOMATIC SECURITY PROGRAM
§4851. Authorization
(a) Diplomatic security program
(1) In general
In addition to amounts otherwise available for such purposes, the following amounts are authorized to be appropriated for fiscal years 1986 and 1987, for the Department of State to carry out diplomatic security construction, acquisition, and operations pursuant to the Department of State's Supplemental Diplomatic Security Program, as justified to the Congress for the respective fiscal year for "Administration of Foreign Affairs", as follows:
(A) For "Salaries and Expenses", $308,104,000.
(B) For "Acquisition and Maintenance of Buildings Abroad", $857,806,000.
(C) For "Counterterrorism Research and Development", $15,000,000.
(2) Omitted
(3) Repealed. Pub. L. 103–236, title I, §101(c), Apr. 30, 1994, 108 Stat. 388
(4) Allocation of amounts authorized to be appropriated
Amounts authorized to be appropriated by this subsection, and by the amendment made by paragraph (2), shall be allocated as provided in the table entitled "Diplomatic Security Program" relating to this section which appears in the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference to accompany H.R. 4151 of the 99th Congress (the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986).
(b) Notification to authorizing Committees of requests for appropriations
In any fiscal year, whenever the Secretary of State submits to the Congress a request for appropriations to carry out the program described in subsection (a), the Secretary shall notify the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate of such request, together with a justification of each item listed in such request.
(c) Repealed. Pub. L. 103–236, title I, §122(b), Apr. 30, 1994, 108 Stat. 392
(d) Prohibition on reallocations of authorizations
(e) Security requirements of other foreign affairs agencies
Based solely on security requirements and within the total amount of funds available for security, the Secretary of State shall ensure that an equitable level of funding is provided for the security requirements of other foreign affairs agencies.
(f) Insufficiency of funds
In the event that sufficient funds are not available in any fiscal year for all of the diplomatic security construction, acquisition, and operations pursuant to the Department of State's Supplemental Diplomatic Security Program, as justified to the Congress for such fiscal year, the Secretary of State shall report to the Congress the effect that the insufficiency of funds will have with respect to the Department of State and each of the other foreign affairs agencies.
(g) Allocation of funds for certain security programs
Of the amount of funds authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a)(1)(A), $34,537,000 shall be available to the Secretary of State only for the protection of classified office equipment, the expansion of information systems security, and the hiring of American systems managers and operators for computers at high threat locations.
(h) Furniture, furnishings, and equipment
(1) Use of existing furniture, furnishings, and equipment
If physically possible, facilities constructed or acquired pursuant to subsection (a) shall be furnished and equipped with the furniture, furnishings, and equipment that were being used in the facilities being replaced, rather than with newly acquired furniture, furnishings, and equipment.
(2) Omitted
(3) Repealed. Pub. L. 103–236, title I, §122(b), Apr. 30, 1994, 108 Stat. 392
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The amendment made by paragraph (2), referred to in subsec. (a)(4), is the amendment made by section 401(a)(2) of
H.R. 4151 of the 99th Congress (the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986), referred to in subsec. (a)(4), as enacted into law, is
Codification
Section is comprised of section 401 of
Amendments
1994—Subsec. (a)(3).
Subsec. (c).
Subsec. (h)(3).
1987—Subsec. (a)(3).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1994 Amendment
Embassy Security Requests and Deficiencies
"(1) Requests made over the previous year by United States diplomatic posts for security upgrades.
"(2) Significant security deficiencies at United States diplomatic posts that are not operating out of a new embassy compound or new consulate compound."
[For definition of "appropriate congressional committees" as used in section 5209 of
Construction Security Certification
"(a)
"(1) appropriate and adequate steps have been taken to ensure the security of the construction project (including an evaluation of how all security-related factors with respect to such project are being addressed);
"(2) the facility resulting from such project incorporates—
"(A) adequate measures for protecting classified information and national security-related activities; and
"(B) adequate protection for the personnel working in the diplomatic facility; and
"(3) a plan has been put into place for the continued evaluation and maintenance of adequate security at such facility, which plan shall specify the physical security methods and technical countermeasures necessary to ensure secure operations, including any personnel requirements for such purposes.
"(b)
"(c)
"(d)
[Reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director's capacity as the head of the intelligence community deemed to be a reference to the Director of National Intelligence. Reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director's capacity as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency deemed to be a reference to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. See section 1081(a), (b) of
Report to Congress on Obligation of Funds
Similar provisions were contained in the following prior appropriation acts:
§4852. Diplomatic construction program
(a) Preference for United States contractors
Notwithstanding
(1) bid on a diplomatic construction or design project which has an estimated total project value exceeding $10,000,000; and
(2) bid on a diplomatic construction or design project which involves technical security, unless the project involves low-level technology, as determined by the Secretary of State.
(b) Exception
Subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to any diplomatic construction or design project in a foreign country whose statutes prohibit the use of United States contractors on such projects. The exception contained in this subsection shall only become effective with respect to a foreign country 30 days after the Secretary of State certifies to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate what specific actions he has taken to urge such foreign country to permit the use of United States contractors on such projects, and what actions he shall take with respect to that country as authorized by title II of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (
(c) Definitions
For the purposes of this section—
(1) the term "adequate competition" means with respect to a construction or design project, the presence of two or more qualified bidders submitting responsive bids for that project;
(2) the term "United States person" means a person which—
(A) is incorporated or legally organized under the laws of the United States, including State, the District of Columbia, and local laws;
(B) has its principal place of business in the United States;
(C) has been incorporated or legally organized in the United States—
(i) for more than 5 years before the issuance date of the invitation for bids or request for proposals with respect to a construction project under subsection (a)(1); and
(ii) for more than 2 years before the issuance date of the invitation for bids or request for proposals with respect to a construction or design project which involves physical or technical security under subsection (a)(2);
(D) has performed within the United States or at a United States diplomatic or consular establishment abroad administrative and technical, professional, or construction services similar in complexity, type of construction, and value to the project being bid;
(E) with respect to a construction project under subsection (a)(1), has achieved total business volume equal to or greater than the value of the project being bid cumulatively over 3 years of the 5-year period before the date specified in subparagraph (C)(i);
(F)(i) employs United States citizens in at least 80 percent of its principal management positions in the United States,
(ii) employs United States citizens in more than half of its permanent, full-time positions in the United States, and
(iii) will employ United States citizens in at least 80 percent of the supervisory positions on the foreign buildings office project site; and
(G) has the existing technical and financial resources in the United States to perform the contract; and
(3) the term "qualified United States joint venture person" means a joint venture in which a United States person or persons owns at least 51 percent of the assets of the joint venture.
(d) American minority contractors
Not less than 10 percent of the amount appropriated pursuant to
(e) American small business contractors
Not less than 10 percent of the amount appropriated pursuant to
(f) Limitation on subcontracting
With respect to a diplomatic construction project, a prime contractor may not subcontract more than 50 percent of the total value of its contract for that project.
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Title II of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956, referred to in subsec. (b), is title II of act Aug. 1, 1956, ch. 841, as added Aug. 24, 1982,
Amendments
2021—Subsec. (c)(2)(E).
2002—Subsec. (c)(2)(D).
1994—Subsec. (a)(2).
1991—Subsec. (a)(1).
Subsec. (a)(2).
"(A) involves nonsophisticated, low-level technology, as determined by the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security;
"(B) is for the design or construction of a facility that does not process or store classified material; and
"(C) does not exceed a total value of $500,000."
1990—Subsec. (a)(2).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1994 Amendment
Amendment by
Construction of United States Embassy in Ottawa
§4853. Security requirements for contractors
Not later than 90 days after August 27, 1986, the Secretary of State shall issue regulations to—
(1) strengthen the security procedures applicable to contractors and subcontractors involved in any way with any diplomatic construction or design project; and
(2) permit a contractor or subcontractor to have access to any design or blueprint relating to such a project only in accordance with those procedures.
(
§4854. Qualifications of persons hired for diplomatic construction program
In carrying out the diplomatic construction program referred to in
(
§4855. Cost overruns
Any amount required to complete any capital project described in the Department of State's Supplemental Diplomatic Security Program, as justified to the Congress for the respective fiscal year, which is in excess of the amount made available for that project pursuant to section 4851(a)(1) or (3) 1 shall be treated as a reprogramming of funds under
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
1 See References in Text note below.
§4856. Efficiency in contracting
(a) Bonuses and penalties
The Director of the Office of Foreign Buildings shall provide for a contract system of bonuses and penalties for the diplomatic construction program funded pursuant to the authorizations of appropriations provided in this subchapter. Not later than 3 months after August 27, 1986, the Director shall submit a report to the Congress on the implementation of this section.
(b) Surety bonds and guarantees
The Director of the Office of Foreign Buildings shall require each person awarded a contract for work under the diplomatic construction program to post a surety bond or guarantee, in such amount as the Director may determine, to assure performance under such contract.
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
This subchapter, referred to in subsec. (a), was in the original "this title", meaning title IV of
Amendments
2007—Subsec. (c).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Authority of Secretary of State
Except as otherwise provided, Secretary of State to have and exercise any authority vested by law in any official or office of Department of State and references to such officials or offices deemed to refer to Secretary of State or Department of State, as appropriate, see
§4857. Advisory Panel on Overseas Security
Not later than 90 days after August 27, 1986, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the Congress on the implementation of the 91 recommendations contained in the final report of the Advisory Panel on Overseas Security. If any such recommendation has been rejected, the Secretary shall provide the reasons why that recommendation was rejected.
(
§4858. Training to improve perimeter security at United States diplomatic missions abroad
(a) Training
It is the sense of Congress that the President should use the authority under
(b) Repealed. Pub. L. 103–236, title I, §139(20), Apr. 30, 1994, 108 Stat. 398 ; Pub. L. 103–415, §1(c), Oct. 25, 1994, 108 Stat. 4299
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, referred to in subsec. (a), is
Amendments
1994—Subsec. (b).
§4859. Protection of public entrances of United States diplomatic missions abroad
The Secretary of State shall install and maintain a walk-through metal detector or other advanced screening system at public entrances of each United States diplomatic mission abroad.
(
§4860. Reimbursement of Department of the Treasury
The Secretary of State shall reimburse the appropriate appropriations account of the Department of the Treasury out of funds appropriated pursuant to
(
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Transfer of Functions
For transfer of the functions, personnel, assets, and obligations of the United States Secret Service, including the functions of the Secretary of the Treasury relating thereto, to the Secretary of Homeland Security, and for treatment of related references, see
§4861. Inspector General for Department of State
(a) Direction to establish
The Congress directs the Secretary of State to proceed immediately to establish an Office of Inspector General of the Department of State not later than October 1, 1986. Not later than January 31, 1987, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on the progress in establishing that office. Such report shall include an accounting of the obligation of funds for fiscal year 1987 for that office.
(b) Duties and responsibilities
The Inspector General of the Department of State (as established by the amendment made by section 150(a) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987) is authorized to perform all duties and responsibilities, and to exercise the authorities, stated in
(c) Earmark
Of the amounts made available for fiscal year 1987 for salaries and expenses under the heading "Administration of Foreign Affairs", not less than $6,500,000 shall be used for the sole purpose of establishing and maintaining the Office of Inspector General of the Department of State.
(d) Limitation on appointment
No career member of the Foreign Service, as defined by
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Section 150(a) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987, referred to in subsec. (b), is section 150(a) of
Codification
Section is comprised of section 413 of
Amendments
2022—Subsec. (b).
1987—
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Evaluation of Policies and Procedures of Department of State on Protection of Classified Information at Department Headquarters
"(a)
"(b)
"(1) The congressional intelligence committees.
"(2) The Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations [now Committee on Foreign Affairs] of the House of Representatives.
"(c)
"(d)
"(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
"(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives."
[Reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director's capacity as the head of the intelligence community deemed to be a reference to the Director of National Intelligence. Reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director's capacity as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency deemed to be a reference to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. See section 1081(a), (b) of
§4862. Prohibition on use of funds for facilities in Israel, Jerusalem, or West Bank
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be obligated or expended for site acquisition, development, or construction of any facility in Israel, Jerusalem, or the West Bank.
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
This Act, referred to in text, is
§4863. Use of cleared personnel to ensure secure maintenance and repair of diplomatic facilities abroad
(a) Policies and regulations
The Secretary of State shall develop and implement policies and regulations to provide for the use of persons who have been granted an appropriate United States security clearance to ensure that the security of areas intended for the storage of classified materials or the conduct of classified activities in a United States diplomatic mission or consular post abroad is not compromised in the performance of maintenance and repair services in those areas.
(b) Study and report
The Secretary of State shall conduct a study of the feasibility and necessity of requiring that, in the case of certain United States diplomatic facilities abroad, no contractor shall be hired to perform maintenance or repair services in an area intended for the storage of classified materials or the conduct of classified activities unless such contractor has been granted an appropriate United States security clearance. Such study shall include, but is not limited to, United States facilities located in Cairo, New Delhi, Riyadh, and Tokyo. Not later than 180 days after February 16, 1990, the Secretary of State shall report the results of such study to the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(
§4864. Increased participation of United States contractors in local guard contracts abroad under diplomatic security program
(a) Findings
The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) State Department policy concerning the advertising of security contracts at Foreign Service buildings has been inconsistent over the years. In many cases, diplomatic and consular posts abroad have been given the responsibility to determine the manner in which the private sector was notified concerning an invitation for bids or a request for proposals with respect to a local guard contract. Some United States foreign missions have only chosen to advertise locally the availability of a local security guard contract abroad.
(2) As a result, many United States security firms that provide local guard services abroad have been unaware that local guard contracts were available for bidding abroad and such firms have been disadvantaged as a result.
(3) Undoubtedly, United States security firms would be interested in bidding on more local guard contracts abroad if such firms knew of the opportunity to bid on such contracts.
(b) Objective
It is the objective of this section to improve the efficiency of the local guard programs abroad administered by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the Department of State and to ensure maximum competition for local guard contracts abroad concerning Foreign Service buildings.
(c) Participation of United States contractors in local guard contracts abroad
With respect to local guard contracts for a Foreign Service building which exceed $250,000 and are entered into after February 16, 1990, the Secretary of State shall—
(1) establish procedures to ensure that all solicitations for such contracts are adequately advertised in the Commerce and Business Daily;
(2) absent compelling reasons, award such contracts through the competitive process;
(3) in evaluating proposals for such contracts, award contracts to the technically acceptable firm offering the lowest evaluated price, except that proposals of United States persons and qualified United States joint venture persons (as defined in subsection (d)) shall be evaluated by reducing the bid price by 10 percent;
(4) in countries where contract denomination and/or payment in local currencies constitutes a barrier to competition by United States firms—
(A) allow solicitations to be bid in United States dollars; and
(B) allow contracts awarded to United States firms to be paid in United States dollars;
(5) ensure that United States diplomatic and consular posts assist United States firms in obtaining local licenses and permits; and
(6) establish procedures to ensure that appropriate measures are taken by diplomatic and consular post management to assure that United States persons and qualified United States joint venture persons are not disadvantaged during the solicitation and bid evaluation process.
(d) Definitions
For the purposes of this section—
(1) the term "United States person" means a person which—
(A) is incorporated or legally organized under the laws of the United States, including the laws of any State, locality, or the District of Columbia;
(B) has its principal place of business in the United States;
(C) has been incorporated or legally organized in the United States for more than 2 years before the issuance date of the invitation for bids or request for proposals with respect to the contract under subsection (c);
(D) has performed within the United States or overseas security services similar in complexity to the contract being bid;
(E) with respect to the contract under subsection (c), has achieved a total business volume equal to or greater than the value of the project being bid in 3 years of the 5-year period before the date specified in subparagraph (C);
(F)(i) employs United States citizens in at least 80 percent of its principal management positions in the United States; and
(ii) employs United States citizens in more than half of its permanent, full-time positions in the United States; and
(G) has the existing technical and financial resources in the United States to perform the contract;
(2) the term "qualified United States joint venture person" means a joint venture in which a United States person or persons owns at least 51 percent of the assets of the joint venture;
(3) the term "Foreign Service building" means any building or grounds of the United States which is in a foreign country and is under the jurisdiction and control of the Secretary of State, including residences of United States personnel assigned overseas under the authority of the Ambassador; and
(4) the term "barrier to local competition" means—
(A) conditions of extreme currency volatility;
(B) restrictions on repatriation of profits;
(C) multiple exchange rates which significantly disadvantage United States firms;
(D) government restrictions inhibiting the free convertibility of foreign exchange; or
(E) conditions of extreme local political instability.
(e) United States minority contractors
Not less than 10 percent of the amount of funds obligated for local guard contracts for Foreign Service buildings subject to subsection (c) shall be allocated to the extent practicable for contracts with United States minority small business contractors.
(f) United States small business contractors
Not less than 10 percent of the amount of funds obligated for local guard contracts for Foreign Service buildings subject to subsection (c) shall be allocated to the extent practicable for contracts with United States small business contractors.
(g) Limitation of subcontracting
With respect to local guard contracts subject to subsection (c), a prime contractor may not subcontract more than 50 percent of the total value of its contract for that project.
(h) Award of local guard and protective service contracts
In evaluating proposals for local guard contracts under this section, the Secretary of State may award such contracts on the basis of best value as determined by a cost-technical tradeoff analysis (as described in Federal Acquisition Regulation part 15.101) and, with respect to such contracts for posts that are not high risk, high threat posts (as such term is defined in
(
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was enacted as part of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, and not as part of the Diplomatic Security Act which comprises this chapter.
Amendments
2016—Subsec. (h).
1998—Subsec. (c)(3).
Subsec. (c)(5).
Subsec. (c)(6).
Subsec. (c)(7).
1994—Subsec. (c).
Subsec. (d)(1)(D).
Subsec. (d)(4).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Strengthening Oversight
Authority of Secretary of State
Except as otherwise provided, Secretary of State to have and exercise any authority vested by law in any official or office of Department of State and references to such officials or offices deemed to refer to Secretary of State or Department of State, as appropriate, see
§4865. Security requirements for United States diplomatic facilities
(a) In general
The following security requirements shall apply with respect to United States diplomatic facilities and specified personnel:
(1) Threat assessment
(A) Emergency Action Plan
The Emergency Action Plan (EAP) of each United States mission shall address a range of threats, including that of large explosive attacks from vehicles and from complex attacks (as such term is defined in
(B) Security Environment Threat List
The Security Environment Threat List shall contain a section that addresses potential acts of international terrorism against United States diplomatic facilities based on threat identification criteria that emphasize the threat of transnational terrorism and include the local security environment, host government support, and other relevant factors such as cultural realities. Such plan shall be reviewed and updated every six months.
(2) Site selection
(A) In general
In selecting a site for any new United States diplomatic facility abroad in a location that has certain minimum ratings under the Security Environment Threat List as determined by the Secretary in his or her discretion, the Secretary shall ensure that all United States Government personnel at the post (except those under the command of an area military commander, personnel of the Peace Corps, and personnel of any other type or category of facility that the Secretary may identify) will be located on the site.
(B) Waiver authority
(i) In general
Subject to clause (ii), the Secretary of State may waive subparagraph (A) if the Secretary, in consultation with, as appropriate, the head of each agency employing personnel that would not be located at the site, if applicable, determines that it is in the national interest of the United States after taking account of any considerations the Secretary in his or her discretion considers relevant, which may include security conditions.
(ii) Chancery or consulate building
Prior to implementing the waiver authority under clause (i) with respect to a chancery or consulate building, the Secretary shall notify the appropriate congressional committees in writing of the waiver and the reasons for the determination.
(iii) Report to Congress
The Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an annual report of all waivers under this subparagraph.
(3) Perimeter distance
(A) Requirement
(i) In general
Each newly acquired United States diplomatic facility in a location that has certain minimum ratings under the Security Environment Threat List as determined by the Secretary of State in his or her discretion shall—
(I) be constructed or modified to meet the measured building blast performance standard applicable to a diplomatic facility sited not less than 100 feet from the perimeter of the property on which the facility is situated; or
(II) fulfill the criteria described in clause (ii).
(ii) Alternative engineering equivalency standard requirement
Each facility referred to in clause (i) may, instead of meeting the requirement under such clause, fulfill such other criteria as the Secretary is authorized to employ to achieve an engineering standard of security and degree of protection that is equivalent to the numerical perimeter distance setback described in such clause seeks to achieve.
(B) Waiver authority
(i) In general
Subject to clause (ii), the Secretary of State may waive subparagraph (A) if the Secretary determines that it is in the national interest of the United States after taking account of any considerations the Secretary in his or her discretion considers relevant, which may include security conditions.
(ii) Chancery or consulate building
Prior to implementing the waiver authority under subparagraph (A) with respect to a chancery or consulate building, the Secretary shall notify the appropriate congressional committees in writing of the waiver and the reasons for the determination.
(iii) Report to Congress
The Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a quarterly report of all waivers under this subparagraph.
(4) Crisis management training
(A) Training of headquarters staff
The appropriate personnel of the Department of State headquarters staff shall undertake crisis management training for mass casualty and mass destruction incidents relating to diplomatic facilities for the purpose of bringing about a rapid response to such incidents from Department of State headquarters in Washington, D.C.
(B) Training of personnel abroad
A program of appropriate instruction in crisis management shall be provided to personnel at United States diplomatic facilities abroad at least on an annual basis.
(5) Diplomatic security training
Not later than six months after November 29, 1999, the Secretary of State shall—
(A) develop annual physical fitness standards for all diplomatic security agents to ensure that the agents are prepared to carry out all of their official responsibilities; and
(B) provide for an independent evaluation by an outside entity of the overall adequacy of current new agent, in-service, and management training programs to prepare agents to carry out the full scope of diplomatic security responsibilities, including preventing attacks on United States personnel and facilities.
(6) State Department support
(A) Foreign Emergency Support Team
The Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) of the Department of State shall receive sufficient support from the Department, including—
(i) conducting routine training exercises of the FEST;
(ii) providing personnel identified to serve on the FEST as a collateral duty;
(iii) providing personnel to assist in activities such as security, medical relief, public affairs, engineering, and building safety; and
(iv) providing such additional support as may be necessary to enable the FEST to provide support in a post-crisis environment involving mass casualties and physical damage.
(B) FEST aircraft
(i) Replacement aircraft
The President shall develop a plan to replace on a priority basis the current FEST aircraft funded by the Department of Defense with a dedicated, capable, and reliable replacement aircraft and backup aircraft to be operated and maintained by the Department of Defense.
(ii) Report
Not later than 60 days after November 29, 1999, the President shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees describing the aircraft selected pursuant to clause (i) and the arrangements for the funding, operation, and maintenance of such aircraft.
(iii) Authority to lease aircraft to respond to a terrorist attack abroad
Subject to the availability of appropriations, when the Attorney General of the Department of Justice exercises the Attorney General's authority to lease commercial aircraft to transport equipment and personnel in response to a terrorist attack abroad if there have been reasonable efforts to obtain appropriate Department of Defense aircraft and such aircraft are unavailable, the Attorney General shall have the authority to obtain indemnification insurance or guarantees if necessary and appropriate.
(7) Rapid response procedures
The Secretary of State shall enter into a memorandum of understanding with the Secretary of Defense setting out rapid response procedures for mobilization of personnel and equipment of their respective departments to provide more effective assistance in times of emergency with respect to United States diplomatic facilities, including at high risk, high threat posts (as such term is defined in
(8) Storage of emergency equipment and records
All United States diplomatic facilities shall have emergency equipment and records required in case of an emergency situation stored at an off-site facility.
(b) Statutory construction
Nothing in this section alters or amends existing security requirements not addressed by this section.
(
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was enacted as part of the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999, and also as part of the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001, and not as part of the Diplomatic Security Act which comprises this chapter.
Amendments
2022—Subsec. (a)(1)(A).
Subsec. (a)(2)(A).
Subsec. (a)(2)(B)(i).
Subsec. (a)(2)(B)(ii).
Subsec. (a)(3)(A).
Subsec. (a)(3)(B)(i).
Subsec. (a)(3)(B)(ii).
Subsec. (a)(3)(B)(iii).
2016—Subsec. (a)(1)(A).
Subsec. (a)(7).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Crisis Response Operations
"(a)
"(1) The Department [of State]'s crisis response planning and operations shall conduct, maintain, and update on a regular basis contingency plans for posts and regions experiencing or vulnerable to conflict or emergency conditions, including armed conflict, natural disasters, significant political or military upheaval, and emergency evacuations.
"(2) The Department's crisis response efforts shall be led by an individual with significant experience responding to prior crises, who shall be so designated by the Secretary.
"(3) The Department's crisis response efforts shall provide at least quarterly updates to the Secretary and other relevant senior officials, including a plan and schedule to develop contingency planning for identified posts and regions consistent with paragraph (1).
"(4) The decision to develop contingency planning for any particular post or region shall be made independent of any regional bureau.
"(5) The crisis response team shall develop and maintain best practices for evacuations, closures, and emergency conditions.
"(b)
"(1)
"(2)
"(A) a list of the posts whose contingency plans, including any noncombatant evacuation contingencies, has been reviewed and updated as appropriate during the preceding 180 days; and
"(B) an assessment of the Secretary's confidence that each post—
"(i) has continuously reached out to United States persons in country to maintain and update contact information for as many such persons as practicable; and
"(ii) is prepared to communicate with such persons in an emergency or crisis situation.
"(3)
Inclusion of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities in United States Diplomatic Facilities in Cuba
"(a)
"(b)
"(1) determines that such waiver is in the national security interest of the United States; and
"(2) submits a written justification for such waiver to the appropriate congressional committees not later than 90 days before exercising such waiver.
"(c)
"(1) the congressional intelligence committees [Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives];
"(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
"(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives."
Inclusion of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities in United States Diplomatic Facilities in the Russian Federation and Adjacent Countries
"(a)
"(b)
"(c)
"(1) the congressional intelligence committees [Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives];
"(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
"(3) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives."
Capital Security Cost Sharing
"(a)
"(b)
Findings
"(1) The Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 (title VI of division A of appendix G of
"(2) Those bombings, followed by the expeditionary diplomatic efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, demonstrated the need to prioritize the security of United States posts and personnel abroad above other considerations.
"(3) Between 1999 and 2022, the risk calculus of the Department [of State] impacted the ability of United States diplomats around the world to advance the interests of the United States through access to local populations, leaders, and places.
"(4) America's competitors and adversaries do not have the same restrictions that United States diplomats have, especially in critically important medium-threat and high-threat posts.
"(5) The Department's 2021 Overseas Security Panel report states that—
"(A) the requirement for setback and collocation of diplomatic posts under paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 606(a) of the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 (
"(B) the locations of such posts have become less desirable, creating an extremely suboptimal nexus that further hinders United States diplomats who are willing to accept more risk in order to advance United States interests."
"(1) On August 7, 1998, the United States embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, were destroyed by simultaneously exploding bombs. The resulting explosions killed 220 persons and injured more than 4,000 others. Twelve Americans and 40 Kenyan and Tanzanian employees of the United States Foreign Service were killed in the attack.
"(2) The United States personnel in both Dar es Salaam and Nairobi showed leadership and personal courage in their response to the attacks. Despite the havoc wreaked upon the embassies, staff in both embassies provided rapid response in locating and rescuing victims, providing emergency assistance, and quickly restoring embassy operations during a crisis.
"(3) The bombs are believed to have been set by individuals associated with Osama bin Laden, leader of a known transnational terrorist organization. In February 1998, bin Laden issued a directive to his followers that called for attacks against United States interests anywhere in the world.
"(4) Threats continue to be made against United States diplomatic facilities.
"(5) Accountability Review Boards were convened following the bombings, as required by
"(6) The conclusions of the Crowe panels were strikingly similar to those stated by the Commission chaired by Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, which issued an extensive embassy security report in 1985.
"(7) The Crowe panels issued a report setting out many problems with security at United States diplomatic facilities, in particular the following:
"(A) The United States Government has devoted inadequate resources to security against terrorist attacks.
"(B) The United States Government places too low a priority on security concerns.
"(8) The result has been a failure to take adequate steps to prevent tragedies such as the bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.
"(9) The Crowe panels found that there was an institutional failure on the part of the Department of State to recognize threats posed by transnational terrorism and vehicular bombs.
"(10) Responsibility for ensuring adequate resources for security programs is widely shared throughout the United States Government, including Congress. Unless the vulnerabilities identified by the Crowe panels are addressed in a sustained and financially realistic manner, the lives and safety of United States employees in diplomatic facilities will continue to be at risk from further terrorist attacks.
"(11) Although service in the Foreign Service or other United States Government positions abroad can never be completely without risk, the United States Government must take all reasonable steps to minimize security risks."
Authorizations of Appropriations
"(a)
"(1) for fiscal year 2000, $900,000,000;
"(2) for fiscal year 2001, $900,000,000;
"(3) for fiscal year 2002, $900,000,000;
"(4) for fiscal year 2003, $1,000,000,000; and
"(5) for fiscal year 2004, $900,000,000.
"(b)
"(1) the acquisition of United States diplomatic facilities and, if necessary, any residences or other structures located in close physical proximity to such facilities, or
"(2) the provision of major security enhancements to United States diplomatic facilities,
to the extent necessary to bring the United States Government into compliance with all requirements applicable to the security of United States diplomatic facilities, including the relevant requirements set forth in section 606 [
"(c)
"(d)
"(e)
"(1)
"(2)
"(3)
Obligations and Expenditures
"(a)
"(1)
"(2)
"(A)
"(B)
"(b)
Definitions
For definitions of the terms "Secretary" and "appropriate congressional committees" used in this section and in section 1000(a)(7) [div. A, title VI, §605] of
"(1) is considered by the Secretary of State to be diplomatic or consular premises, consistent with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, done at Vienna April 18, 1961, and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, done at Vienna April 24, 1963, and was notified to the host government as such; or
"(2) is otherwise subject to a publicly available bilateral agreement with the host government (contained in the records of the United States Department of State) that recognizes the official status of the United States Government personnel present at the facility."
Executive Documents
Delegation of Authority
Memorandum of President of the United States, July 17, 2000, 65 F.R. 45511, provided:
Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense
By the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, I hereby delegate to the Secretary of Defense the responsibility of the President, under section 606 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001 (
You are hereby authorized and directed to publish this delegation in the Federal Register.
William J. Clinton.
§4866. Security training for personnel assigned to a high risk, high threat post
(a) In general
Individuals assigned permanently to or who are in long-term temporary duty status as designated by the Secretary of State at a high risk, high threat post shall receive security training described in subsection (b) on a mandatory basis in order to prepare such individuals for living and working at such posts.
(b) Security training described
Security training referred to in subsection (a)—
(1) is training to improve basic knowledge and skills; and
(2) may include—
(A) an ability to recognize, avoid, and respond to potential terrorist situations, including a complex attack;
(B) conducting surveillance detection;
(C) providing emergency medical care;
(D) ability to detect the presence of improvised explosive devices;
(E) minimal firearms familiarization; and
(F) defensive driving maneuvers.
(c) Effective date
The requirements of this section shall take effect upon December 16, 2016.
(d) Definitions
In this section and
(1) Complex attack
The term "complex attack" has the meaning given such term by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as follows: "An attack conducted by multiple hostile elements which employ at least two distinct classes of weapon systems (i.e., indirect fire and direct fire, improvised explosive devices, and surface to air fire).".
(2) High risk, high threat post
The term "high risk, high threat post" has the meaning given such term in
(
§4867. Security management training for officials assigned to a high risk, high threat post
(a) In general
Officials described in subsection (c) who are assigned to a high risk, high threat post shall receive security training described in subsection (b) on a mandatory basis in order to improve the ability of such officials to make security-related management decisions.
(b) Security training described
Security training referred to in subsection (a) may include—
(1) development of skills to better evaluate threats;
(2) effective use of security resources to mitigate such threats; and
(3) improved familiarity of available security resources.
(c) Officials described
Officials referred to in subsection (a) are the following:
(1) Members of the Senior Foreign Service appointed under
(2) Foreign Service officers appointed under
(3) Foreign Service Specialists appointed by the Secretary under
(4) Individuals holding a position in grades GS–14 or GS–15.
(5) Personal services contractors and other contractors serving in positions or capacities similar to the officials described in paragraphs (1) through (4).
(d) Effective date
The requirements of this section shall take effect beginning on the date that is 1 year after December 16, 2016.
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
GS–14 and GS–15, referred to in subsec. (c)(4), are contained in the General Schedule, which is set out under
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Definitions
For definition of "high risk, high threat post" as used in this section, see
§4868. Assignment of personnel at high risk, high threat posts
The Secretary to the extent practicable shall station key personnel for sustained periods of time at high risk, high threat posts (as such term is defined in
(1) establish institutional knowledge and situational awareness that would allow for a fuller familiarization of the local political and security environment in which such posts are located; and
(2) ensure that necessary security procedures are implemented.
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Codification
Section was enacted as part of the Department of State Authorities Act, Fiscal Year 2017, and not as part of the Diplomatic Security Act which comprises this chapter.
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Definitions
The term "Secretary" as used in this section means the Secretary of State, see section 2 of