SUBCHAPTER VIII—MILITARY APPLICATION OF ATOMIC ENERGY
§2121. Authority of Commission
(a) Research and development; weapons production; hazardous wastes; transfers of technologies
The Commission is authorized to—
(1) conduct experiments and do research and development work in the military application of atomic energy;
(2) engage in the production of atomic weapons, or atomic weapon parts, except that such activities shall be carried on only to the extent that the express consent and direction of the President of the United States has been obtained, which consent and direction shall be obtained at least once each year;
(3) provide for safe storage, processing, transportation, and disposal of hazardous waste (including radioactive waste) resulting from nuclear materials production, weapons production and surveillance programs, and naval nuclear propulsion programs;
(4) carry out research on and development of technologies needed for the effective negotiation and verification of international agreements on control of special nuclear materials and nuclear weapons; and
(5) under applicable law (other than this paragraph) and consistent with other missions of the Department of Energy, make transfers of federally owned or originated technology to State and local governments, private industry, and universities or other nonprofit organizations so that the prospects for commercialization of such technology are enhanced.
(b) Material for Department of Defense use
The President from time to time may direct the Commission (1) to deliver such quantities of special nuclear material or atomic weapons to the Department of Defense for such use as he deems necessary in the interest of national defense, or (2) to authorize the Department of Defense to manufacture, produce, or acquire any atomic weapon or utilization facility for military purposes: Provided, however, That such authorization shall not extend to the production of special nuclear material other than that incidental to the operation of such utilization facilities.
(c) Sale, lease, or loan to other Nations of materials for military applications
The President may authorize the Commission or the Department of Defense, with the assistance of the other, to cooperate with another nation and, notwithstanding the provisions of
(1) nonnuclear parts of atomic weapons provided that such nation has made substantial progress in the development of atomic weapons, and other nonnuclear parts of atomic weapons systems involving Restricted Data provided that such transfer will not contribute significantly to that nation's atomic weapon design, development, or fabrication capability; for the purpose of improving that nation's state of training and operational readiness;
(2) utilization facilities for military applications; and
(3) source, byproduct, or special nuclear material for research on, development of, production of, or use in utilization facilities for military applications; and
(4) source, byproduct, or special nuclear material for research on, development of, or use in atomic weapons: Provided, however, That the transfer of such material to that nation is necessary to improve its atomic weapon design, development, or fabrication capability: And provided further, That such nation has made substantial progress in the development of atomic weapons,
whenever the President determines that the proposed cooperation and each proposed transfer arrangement for the nonnuclear parts of atomic weapons and atomic weapons systems, utilization facilities or source, byproduct, or special nuclear material will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, while such other nation is participating with the United States pursuant to an international arrangement by substantial and material contributions to the mutual defense and security: Provided, however, That the cooperation is undertaken pursuant to an agreement entered into in accordance with
(Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, title I, §91, as added Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073, §1,
Prior Provisions
Provisions similar to this section were contained in
Amendments
1989—Subsec. (a)(3) to (5).
1958—Subsec. (c).
Transfer of Functions
Atomic Energy Commission abolished and functions transferred by
Delegation of Functions
Authority vested in President by subsec. (c) of this section delegated to Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Energy, see section 2(a)(1) of Ex. Ord. No. 10841, as amended, set out as a note under
Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Life Extension Program
"(a)
"(b)
"(2) For each budget submitted by the President to Congress under
"(c)
"(1) Mechanisms to provide for the remanufacture, refurbishment, and modernization of each weapon design designated by the Secretary for inclusion in the enduring nuclear weapons stockpile as of the date of the enactment of this Act [Oct. 5, 1999].
"(2) Mechanisms to expedite the collection of information necessary for carrying out the program, including information relating to the aging of materials and components, new manufacturing techniques, and the replacement or substitution of materials.
"(3) Mechanisms to ensure the appropriate assignment of roles and missions for each nuclear weapons laboratory and production plant of the Department, including mechanisms for allocation of workload, mechanisms to ensure the carrying out of appropriate modernization activities, and mechanisms to ensure the retention of skilled personnel.
"(4) Mechanisms for allocating funds for activities under the program, including allocations of funds by weapon type and facility.
"(5) An identification of the funds needed, in the current fiscal year and in each of the next five fiscal years, to carry out the program.
"(d)
"(2) The Secretary shall submit to the committees referred to in paragraph (1) each year after 2000, at the same time as the submission of the budget for the fiscal year beginning in such year under
"(e)
"(1) in the current fiscal year, given the budget for that fiscal year; and
"(2) in future fiscal years.
"(f)
Report on Stockpile Stewardship Criteria
"(a)
"(b)
"(c)
"(1) a description of the information needed to determine that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe and reliable and the relationship of the science-based tools to the collection of that information; and
"(2) a description of the criteria required by subsection (a) to the extent they have been developed as of the date of the submission of the report."
Panel To Assess the Reliability, Safety, and Security of the United States Nuclear Stockpile
"(a)
"(b)
"(2) The federally funded research and development center shall be responsible for establishing appropriate procedures for the panel, including selection of a panel chairman.
"(c)
"(1) The annual certification process, including the conclusions and recommendations resulting from the process, for the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States, as carried out by the directors of the national weapons laboratories.
"(2) The long-term adequacy of the process of certifying the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States.
"(3) The adequacy of the criteria established by the Secretary of Energy pursuant to section 3158 [set out as a note above] for achieving the purposes for which those criteria are established.
"(d)
"(e)
"(2) For carrying out its duties, the panel shall be provided full and timely cooperation by the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Defense, the Commander of United States Strategic Command, the Directors of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the Sandia National Laboratories, the Savannah River Site, the Y–12 Plant, the Pantex Facility, and the Kansas City Plant, and any other official of the United States that the chairman of the panel determines as having information described in paragraph (1).
"(3) The Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of Defense shall each designate at least one officer or employee of the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense, respectively, to serve as a liaison officer between the department and the panel.
"(f)
"(g)
"(h)
Commission on Maintaining United States Nuclear Weapons Expertise
"(a)
"(b)
"(i) Two shall be appointed by the majority leader of the Senate (in consultation with the minority leader of the Senate).
"(ii) One shall be appointed by the minority leader of the Senate (in consultation with the majority leader of the Senate).
"(iii) Two shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives (in consultation with the minority leader of the House of Representatives).
"(iv) One shall be appointed by the minority leader of the House of Representatives (in consultation with the Speaker of the House of Representatives).
"(v) Two shall be appointed by the Secretary of Energy.
"(B) Members shall be appointed for the life of the Commission. Any vacancy in the Commission shall not affect its powers, but shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment.
"(C) The chairman of the Commission shall be designated from among the members of the Commission appointed under subparagraph (A) by the majority leader of the Senate, in consultation with the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the minority leader of the Senate, and the minority leader of the House of Representatives. The chairman may be designated once five members of the Commission have been appointed under subparagraph (A).
"(D) Members shall be appointed not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act [Sept. 23, 1996].
"(E) The Commission may commence its activities under this section upon the designation of the chairman of the Commission under subparagraph (C).
"(2) The members of the Commission shall establish procedures for the activities of the Commission, including procedures for calling meetings, requirements for quorums, and the manner of taking votes.
"(c)
"(2) In developing the plan, the Commission shall—
"(A) identify actions that the Secretary may undertake to attract qualified scientific, engineering, and technical personnel to the nuclear weapons complex of the Department; and
"(B) review and recommend improvements to the on-going efforts of the Department to attract such personnel to the nuclear weapons complex.
"(d)
"(e)
"(2) The members of the Commission shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, at rates authorized for employees of agencies under subchapter I of
"(3) The Commission may, without regard to the civil service laws and regulations, appoint and terminate such personnel as may be necessary to enable the Commission to perform its duties. The Commission may fix the compensation of the personnel of the Commission without regard to the provisions of
"(4) Any Federal Government employee may be detailed to the Commission without reimbursement, and such detail shall be without interruption or loss of civil service status or privilege.
"(f)
"(g)
"(h)
[Section 3163(a) of
Tritium Production Program
"(a)
"(1) complete the tritium supply and recycling environmental impact statement in preparation by the Secretary as of the date of the enactment of this Act [Feb. 10, 1996]; and
"(2) assess alternative means for tritium production, including production through—
"(A) types of new and existing reactors, including multipurpose reactors (such as advanced light water reactors and gas turbine gas-cooled reactors) capable of meeting both the tritium production requirements and the plutonium disposition requirements of the United States for nuclear weapons;
"(B) an accelerator; and
"(C) multipurpose reactor projects carried out by the private sector and the Government.
"(b)
"(c)
"(d)
"(2) The statements referred to in paragraph (1) are—
"(A) the environmental impact statement referred to in subsection (a)(1);
"(B) the plutonium disposition environmental impact statement in preparation by the Secretary as of the date of the enactment of this Act [Feb. 10, 1996]; and
"(C) assessments related to the environmental impact statements referred to in subparagraphs (A) and (B).
"(e)
"(1) the planned expenditures of the Department during fiscal year 1996 for any of the alternative means for tritium production assessed under subsection (a)(2);
"(2) the amount of funds required to be expended by the Department, and the program milestones (including feasibility demonstrations) required to be met, during fiscal years 1997 through 2001 to ensure tritium production beginning not later than 2005 that is adequate to meet the tritium requirements of the United States for nuclear weapons; and
"(3) the amount of such funds to be expended and such program milestones to be met during such fiscal years to ensure such tritium production beginning not later than 2011.
"(f)
Manufacturing Infrastructure for Refabrication and Certification of Nuclear Weapons Stockpile
"(a)
"(A) To provide a stockpile surveillance engineering base.
"(B) To refabricate and certify weapon components and types in the enduring nuclear weapons stockpile, as necessary.
"(C) To fabricate and certify new nuclear warheads, as necessary.
"(D) To support nuclear weapons.
"(E) To supply sufficient tritium in support of nuclear weapons to ensure an upload hedge in the event circumstances require.
"(2) The purpose of the program carried out under paragraph (1) shall also be to develop manufacturing capabilities and capacities necessary to meet the requirements specified in the annual Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Review.
"(b)
"(1) The weapons assembly capabilities of the Pantex Plant.
"(2) The weapon secondary fabrication capabilities of the Y–12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
"(3) The capabilities of the Savannah River Site relating to tritium recycling and fissile materials components processing and fabrication.
"(4) The non-nuclear component capabilities of the Kansas City Plant.
"(c)
"(d)
"(1) $35,000,000 shall be available for activities at the Pantex Plant;
"(2) $30,000,000 shall be available for activities at the Y–12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee;
"(3) $35,000,000 shall be available for activities at the Savannah River Site; and
"(4) $43,000,000 shall be available for activities at the Kansas City Plant.
"(e)
Fellowship Program for Development of Skills Critical to Department of Energy Nuclear Weapons Complex
"(a)
"(b)
"(1) Students pursuing graduate degrees in fields of science or engineering that are related to nuclear weapons engineering or to the science and technology base of the Department of Energy.
"(2) Individuals engaged in postdoctoral studies in such fields.
"(c)
"(1) The Kansas City Plant, Kansas City, Missouri.
"(2) The Pantex Plant, Amarillo, Texas.
"(3) The Y–12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
"(4) The Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina.
"(5) The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California.
"(6) The Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico.
"(7) The Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, and Livermore, California.
"(d)
"(e)
"(f)
"(2) An agreement referred to in paragraph (1) shall be in writing, shall be signed by the participant, and shall include the participant's agreement to serve, after completion of the course of study for which the assistance was provided, as a full-time employee in a position in the Department of Energy for a period of time to be established by the Secretary of Energy of not less than one year, if such a position is offered to the participant."
Plan for Stewardship, Management, and Certification of Warheads in the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile
"(a)
"(b)
"(1) The number of warheads (including active and inactive warheads) for each warhead type in the nuclear weapons stockpile.
"(2) The current age of each warhead type, and any plans for stockpile lifetime extensions and modifications or replacement of each warhead type.
"(3) The process by which the Secretary of Energy is assessing the lifetime, and requirements for lifetime extension or replacement, of the nuclear and nonnuclear components of the warheads (including active and inactive warheads) in the nuclear weapons stockpile.
"(4) The process used in recertifying the safety, security, and reliability of each warhead type in the nuclear weapons stockpile.
"(5) Any concerns which would affect the ability of the Secretary of Energy to recertify the safety, security, or reliability of warheads in the nuclear weapons stockpile (including active and inactive warheads).
"(c)
Similar provisions were contained in the following prior authorization act:
Report on Waste Streams Generated by Nuclear Weapons Production Cycle
Prohibition on Research and Development of Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons
"(a)
"(b)
"(c)
"(1) to design a testing device that has a yield of less than five kilotons;
"(2) to modify an existing weapon for the purpose of addressing safety and reliability concerns; or
"(3) to address proliferation concerns.
"(d)
Stockpile Stewardship Program
"(a)
"(b)
"(1) An increased level of effort for advanced computational capabilities to enhance the simulation and modeling capabilities of the United States with respect to the detonation of nuclear weapons.
"(2) An increased level of effort for above-ground experimental programs, such as hydrotesting, high-energy lasers, inertial confinement fusion, plasma physics, and materials research.
"(3) Support for new facilities construction projects that contribute to the experimental capabilities of the United States, such as an advanced hydrodynamics facility, the National Ignition Facility, and other facilities for above-ground experiments to assess nuclear weapons effects.
"(c)
"[(d) Repealed.
[Section 3152(e) of
Limitations on United States Nuclear Weapons Testing
"(a)
"(b)
"(1) proceeding with underground nuclear test tunnel deactivation and environmental cleanup; or
"(2) expending funds for infrastructure activities not covered by the limitation in subsection (a).
"(c)
"(a)
"(b)
"(a) Hereafter, funds made available by this Act or any other Act for fiscal year 1993 or for any other fiscal year may be available for conducting a test of a nuclear explosive device only if the conduct of that test is permitted in accordance with the provisions of this section.
"(b) No underground test of a nuclear weapon may be conducted by the United States after September 30, 1992, and before July 1, 1993.
"(c) On and after July 1, 1993, and before January 1, 1997, an underground test of a nuclear weapon may be conducted by the United States—
"(1) only if—
"(A) the President has submitted the annual report required under subsection (d);
"(B) 90 days have elapsed after the submittal of that report in accordance with that subsection; and
"(C) Congress has not agreed to a joint resolution described in subsection (d)(3) within that 90-day period; and
"(2) only if the test is conducted during the period covered by the report.
"(d)(1) Not later than March 1, of each year beginning after 1992, the President shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives, in classified and unclassified forms, a report containing the following matters:
"(A) A schedule for resumption of the Nuclear Testing Talks with Russia.
"(B) A plan for achieving a multilateral comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons on or before September 30, 1996.
"(C) An assessment of the number and type of nuclear warheads that will remain in the United States stockpile of active nuclear weapons on September 30, 1996.
"(D) For each fiscal year after fiscal year 1992, an assessment of the number and type of nuclear warheads that will remain in the United States stockpile of nuclear weapons and that—
"(i) will not be in the United States stockpile of active nuclear weapons;
"(ii) will remain under the control of the Department of Defense; and
"(iii) will not be transferred to the Department of Energy for dismantlement.
"(E) A description of the safety features of each warhead that is covered by an assessment referred to in subparagraph (C) or (D).
"(F) A plan for installing one or more modern safety features in each warhead identified in the assessment referred to in subparagraph (C), as determined after an analysis of the costs and benefits of installing such feature or features in the warhead, should have one or more of such features.
"(G) An assessment of the number and type of nuclear weapons tests, not to exceed 5 tests in any period covered by an annual report under this paragraph and a total of 15 tests in the 4-fiscal year period beginning with fiscal year 1993, that are necessary in order to ensure the safety of each nuclear warhead in which one or more modern safety features are installed pursuant to the plan referred to in subparagraph (F).
"(H) A schedule, in accordance with subparagraph (G), for conducting at the Nevada test site, each of the tests enumerated in the assessment pursuant to subparagraph (G).
"(2) The first annual report shall cover the period beginning on the date on which a resumption of testing of nuclear weapons is permitted under subsection (c) and ending on September 30, 1994. Each annual report thereafter shall cover the fiscal year following the fiscal year in which the report is submitted.
"(3) For the purposes of paragraph (1), 'joint resolution' means only a joint resolution introduced after the date on which the Committees referred to in that paragraph receive the report required by that paragraph the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: 'The Congress disapproves the report of the President on nuclear weapons testing, dated .' (the blank space being appropriately filled in).
"(4) No report is required under this subsection after 1996.
"(e)(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), during a period covered by an annual report submitted pursuant to subsection (d), nuclear weapons may be tested only as follows:
"(A) Only those nuclear explosive devices in which modern safety features have been installed pursuant to the plan referred to in subsection (d)(1)(F) may be tested.
"(B) Only the number and types of tests specified in the report pursuant to subsection (d)(1)(G) may be conducted.
"(2)(A) One test of the reliability of a nuclear weapon other than one referred to in paragraph (1)(A) may be conducted during any period covered by an annual report, but only if—
"(i) within the first 60 days after the beginning of that period, the President certifies to Congress that it is vital to the national security interests of the United States to test the reliability of such a nuclear weapon; and
"(ii) within the 60-day period beginning on the date that Congress receives the certification, Congress does not agree to a joint resolution described in subparagraph (B).
"(B) For the purposes of subparagraph (A), 'joint resolution' means only a joint resolution introduced after the date on which the Congress receives the certification referred to in that subparagraph the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: 'The Congress disapproves the testing of a nuclear weapon covered by the certification of the President dated .' (the blank space being appropriately filled in).
"(3) The President may authorize the United Kingdom to conduct in the United States, within a period covered by an annual report, one test of a nuclear weapon if the President determines that it is in the national interests of the United States to do so. Such a test shall be considered as one of the tests within the maximum number of tests that the United States is permitted to conduct during that period under paragraph (1)(B).
"(f) No underground test of nuclear weapons may be conducted by the United States after September 30, 1996, unless a foreign state conducts a nuclear test after this date, at which time the prohibition on United States nuclear testing is lifted.
"(g) In the computation of the 90-day period referred to in subsection (c)(1) and the 60-day period referred to in subsection (e)(2)(A)(ii), the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than 3 days to a day certain shall be excluded.
"(h) In this section, the term 'modern safety feature' means any of the following features:
"(1) An insensitive high explosive (IHE).
"(2) Fire resistant pits (FRP).
"(3) An enhanced detonation safety (ENDS) system."
Nuclear Test Ban Readiness Program
"(a)
"(1) On September 17, 1987, the United States and the Soviet Union announced that they would resume full-scale, stage-by-stage negotiations on issues relating to nuclear testing, including further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing leading to the ultimate objective of a comprehensive nuclear test ban.
"(2) It was agreed that the first step in these negotiations would be to reach agreement on verification measures that will make possible the ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976.
"(3) To achieve the agreement on verification measures, the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to design and conduct a Joint Verification Experiment at the test sites of each country during the summer of 1988.
"(4) At the Moscow summit in May 1988, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev reaffirmed their commitment to negotiations on 'effective verification measures which will make it possible to ratify the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976, and proceed to negotiating further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing leading to the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of nuclear testing as part of an effective disarmament process'.
"(b)
"(c)
"(1) To assure that the United States maintains a vigorous program of stockpile inspection and non-explosive testing so that, if a low-threshold or comprehensive test ban is entered into, the United States remains able to detect and identify potential problems in stockpile reliability and safety in existing designs of nuclear weapons.
"(2) To assure that the specific materials, components, processes, and personnel needed for the remanufacture of existing nuclear weapons or the substitution of alternative nuclear warheads are available to support such remanufacture or substitution if such action becomes necessary in order to satisfy reliability and safety requirements under a low-threshold or comprehensive test ban agreement.
"(3) To assure that a vigorous program of research in areas related to nuclear weapons science and engineering is supported so that, if a low-threshold or comprehensive test ban agreement is entered into, the United States is able to maintain a base of technical knowledge about nuclear weapons design and nuclear weapons effects.
"(d)
Section Referred to in Other Sections
This section is referred to in
§2122. Prohibitions governing atomic weapons
It shall be unlawful, except as provided in
(Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, title I, §92, as added Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073, §1,
Prior Provisions
Provisions similar to this section were contained in
Amendments
1958—
Transfer of Functions
Atomic Energy Commission abolished and functions transferred by
Section Referred to in Other Sections
This section is referred to in
§2122a. Repealed. Pub. L. 106–65, div. C, title XXXII, §3294(e)(1)(A), Oct. 5, 1999, 113 Stat. 970
Section, act Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, title I, §93, as added
Effective Date of Repeal
Repeal effective Mar. 1, 2000, see section 3299 of
§2123. Critical technology partnerships
(a) Partnerships
For the purpose of facilitating the transfer of technology, the Secretary of Energy shall ensure, to the maximum extent practicable, that atomic energy defense activities research on, and development of, any dual-use critical technology is conducted through cooperative research and development agreements, or other arrangements, that involve laboratories of the Department of Energy and other entities.
(b) Definitions
In this section:
(1) The term "dual-use critical technology" means a technology—
(A) that is critical to atomic energy defense activities, as determined by the Secretary of Energy;
(B) that has military applications and nonmilitary applications; and
(C) that either—
(i)(I) appears on the list of national critical technologies contained in a biennial report on national critical technologies submitted to Congress by the President pursuant to
(II) has not been expressly deleted from such list by such a report subsequently submitted to Congress by the President; or
(ii)(I) appears on the list of critical technologies contained in an annual defense critical technologies plan submitted to Congress by the Secretary of Defense pursuant to section 2506 1 of title 10; and
(II) has not been expressly deleted from such list by such a plan subsequently submitted to Congress by the Secretary.
(2) The term "cooperative research and development agreement" has the meaning given that term by
(3) The term "other entities" means—
(A) firms, or a consortium of firms, that are eligible to participate in a partnership or other arrangement with a laboratory of the Department of Energy, as determined in accordance with applicable law and regulations; or
(B) firms, or a consortium of firms, described in subparagraph (A) in combination with one or more of the following:
(i) Institutions of higher education in the United States.
(ii) Departments and agencies of the Federal Government other than the Department of Energy.
(iii) Agencies of State Governments.
(iv) Any other persons or entities that may be eligible and appropriate, as determined in accordance with applicable laws and regulations.
(4) The term "atomic energy defense activities" does not include activities covered by Executive Order No. 12344, dated February 1, 1982, pertaining to the Naval nuclear propulsion program.
(
References in Text
Executive Order No. 12344, dated February 1, 1982, referred to in subsec. (b)(4), is set out as a note under
Codification
Section was enacted as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, and not as part of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 which comprises this chapter.
Amendments
1993—Subsec. (b)(1)(C)(ii)(I).