CHAPTER 42 —ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE PROVISIONS
SUBCHAPTER I—ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS
SUBCHAPTER II—NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE MATTERS
Part A—Stockpile Stewardship and Weapons Production
Part B—Tritium
SUBCHAPTER III—PROLIFERATION MATTERS
SUBCHAPTER IV—DEFENSE ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP MATTERS
Part A—Defense Environmental Cleanup
Part B—Closure of Facilities
Part C—Hanford Reservation, Washington
Part D—Savannah River Site, South Carolina
SUBCHAPTER V—SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY MATTERS
Part A—Safeguards and Security
Part B—Classified Information
SUBCHAPTER VI—PERSONNEL MATTERS
Part A—Personnel Management
Part B—Education and Training
Part C—Worker Safety
SUBCHAPTER VII—BUDGET AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT MATTERS
Part A—Recurring National Security Authorization Provisions
Part B—Penalties
Part C—Other Matters
SUBCHAPTER VIII—ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS
Part A—Contracts
Part B—Research and Development
Part C—Facilities Management
Part D—Other Matters
§2501. Definitions
Except as otherwise provided, in this chapter:
(1) The term "Administration" means the National Nuclear Security Administration.
(2) The term "Administrator" means the Administrator for Nuclear Security.
(3) The term "classified information" means any information that has been determined pursuant to Executive Order No. 12333 of December 4, 1981 (
(4) The term "congressional defense committees" means—
(A) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(5) The terms "defense nuclear facility" and "Department of Energy defense nuclear facility" have the meaning given the term "Department of Energy defense nuclear facility" in
(6) The term "nuclear security enterprise" means the physical facilities, technology, and human capital of the national security laboratories and the nuclear weapons production facilities.
(7) The term "national security laboratory" means any of the following:
(A) Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico.
(B) Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, and Livermore, California.
(C) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California.
(8) The term "Nuclear Weapons Council" means the Nuclear Weapons Council established by
(9) The term "nuclear weapons production facility" means any of the following:
(A) The Kansas City National Security Campus, Kansas City, Missouri.
(B) The Pantex Plant, Amarillo, Texas.
(C) The Y–12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
(D) The Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina.
(E) The Nevada National Security Site, Nevada.
(F) Any facility of the Department of Energy that the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Administrator and Congress, determines to be consistent with the mission of the Administration.
(10) The term "Restricted Data" has the meaning given such term in
(
References in Text
Executive Order No. 12958, referred to in par. (3), which was formerly set out as a note under section 435 (now section 3161) of this title, was revoked by Ex. Ord. No. 13526, §6.2(g), Dec. 29, 2009, 75 F.R. 731.
Amendments
2019—Par. (9)(A).
2014—Par. (3).
2013—
Pars. (5) to (10).
Short Title
Transfer and Consolidation of Recurring and General Provisions on Department of Energy National Security Programs
"(1)
"(2)
"(3)
"(4)
SUBCHAPTER I—ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS
§2511. Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program
The provisions of Executive Order Numbered 12344, dated February 1, 1982, pertaining to the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, shall remain in force until changed by law.
(
References in Text
Executive Order Numbered 12344, referred to in text, is set out as a note below.
Codification
Section was formerly set out as a note under
Transfer of Functions
All national security functions and activities performed immediately before Oct. 5, 1999, by the Office of Naval Reactors transferred to the Administrator for Nuclear Security of the National Nuclear Security Administration of the Department of Energy, and the Deputy Administrator for Naval Reactors of the Administration to be assigned the responsibilities, authorities, and accountability for all functions of the Office of Naval Reactors under Executive Order No. 12344, set out below, see
Executive Order No. 12344 To Remain in Force
Except as otherwise specified in
Ex. Ord. No. 12344. Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program
Ex. Ord. No. 12344, Feb. 1, 1982, 47 F.R. 4979, provided:
By the authority vested in me as President and as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States of America, with recognition of the crucial importance to national security of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, and for the purpose of preserving the basic structure, policies, and practices developed for this Program in the past and assuring that the Program will continue to function with excellence, it is hereby ordered as follows:
(a) direct supervision over the Bettis and Knolls Atomic Power Laboratories, the Expended Core Facility and naval reactor prototype plants;
(b) research, development, design, acquisition, specification, construction, inspection, installation, certification, testing, overhaul, refueling, operating practices and procedures, maintenance, supply support, and ultimate disposition, of naval nuclear propulsion plants, including components thereof, and any special maintenance and service facilities related thereto;
(c) the safety of reactors and associated navel [naval] nuclear propulsion plants, and control of radiation and radioactivity associated with naval nuclear propulsion activities, including prescribing and enforcing standards and regulations for these areas as they affect the environment and the safety and health of workers, operators, and the general public;
(d) training, including training conducted at the naval prototype reactors of the Department of Energy, and assistance and concurrence in the selection, training, qualification, and assignment of personnel reporting to the director and of personnel who supervise, operate, or maintain naval nuclear propulsion plants; and
(e) administration of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, including oversight of program support in areas such as security, nuclear safeguards and transportation, public information, procurement, logistics and fiscal management.
(a) research, development, design, procurement, specification, construction, inspection, installation, certification, testing, overhaul, refueling, operating practices and procedures, maintenance, supply support, and ultimate disposition, of naval nuclear propulsion plants, including components thereof, and any special maintenance and service facilities related thereto; and
(b) training programs, including Nuclear Power Schools of the Navy, and assistance and concurrence in the selection, training, qualification, and assignment of personnel reporting to the director and of Government personnel who supervise, operate, or maintain naval nuclear propulsion plants.
(a) the safety of reactors and associated naval nuclear propulsion plants, and control of radiation and radioactivity associated with naval nuclear propulsion activities, including prescribing and enforcing standards and regulations for these areas as they affect the environment and the safety and health of workers, operators, and the general public.
(b) administration of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, including oversight of program support in areas such as security, nuclear safeguards and transportation, public information, procurement, logistics, and fiscal management.
Ronald Reagan.
§2512. Management structure for nuclear security enterprise
(a) In general
The Administrator shall establish a management structure for the nuclear security enterprise in accordance with the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (
(b) National Nuclear Security Administration Council
(1) The Administrator shall establish a council to be known as the "National Nuclear Security Administration Council". The Council may advise the Administrator on—
(A) scientific and technical issues relating to policy matters;
(B) operational concerns;
(C) strategic planning;
(D) the development of priorities relating to the mission and operations of the Administration and the nuclear security enterprise; and
(E) such other matters as the Administrator determines appropriate.
(2) The Council shall be composed of the directors of the national security laboratories and the nuclear weapons production facilities.
(3) The Council may provide the Administrator or the Secretary of Energy recommendations—
(A) for improving the governance, management, effectiveness, and efficiency of the Administration; and
(B) relating to any other matter in accordance with paragraph (1).
(4) Not later than 60 days after the date on which any recommendation under paragraph (3) is received, the Administrator or the Secretary, as the case may be, shall respond to the Council with respect to whether such recommendation will be implemented and the reasoning for implementing or not implementing such recommendation.
(
References in Text
The National Nuclear Security Administration Act, referred to in subsec. (a), is
Codification
Section was formerly set out as a note under
Amendments
2014—Subsec. (b)(3).
Subsec. (b)(3)(A).
Subsec. (b)(3)(B).
2013—
2003—Subsec. (d)(2).
Common Financial Reporting System for the Nuclear Security Enterprise
"(a)
"(b)
"(1) Common data reporting requirements for work performed using funds of the National Nuclear Security Administration, including reporting of financial data by standardized labor categories, labor hours, functional elements, and cost elements.
"(2) A common work breakdown structure for the Administration that aligns contractor work breakdown structures with the budget structure of the Administration.
"(3) Definitions and methodologies for identifying and reporting costs for programs of records and base capabilities within the Administration.
"(4) A capability to leverage, where appropriate, the Defense Cost Analysis Resource Center of the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation of the Department of Defense using historical costing data by the Administration.
"(c)
"(1)
"(2)
"(A) A summary of activities, accomplishments, challenges, benefits, and costs related to the implementation of a common financial reporting system for the nuclear security enterprise during the year preceding the year in which such report is submitted.
"(B) A summary of planned activities in connection with the implementation of a common financial reporting system for the nuclear security enterprise in the year in which such report is submitted.
"(C) A description of any anticipated modifications to the schedule for implementing a common financial reporting system for the nuclear security enterprise, including an update on possible risks, challenges, and costs related to such implementation.
"(3)
"(d)
Industry Best Practices in Operations at National Nuclear Security Administration Facilities and Sites
"(a)
"(1) improving mission performance and effectiveness;
"(2) lowering costs and administrative burdens; and
"(3) also both—
"(A) maintaining or reducing risks; and
"(B) preserving and protecting health, safety, and security.
"(b)
"(1) The Principal Deputy Administrator for Nuclear Security, who shall serve as chair of the committee.
"(2) Government personnel representing the headquarters of the Administration.
"(3) Government personnel representing offices of facilities and sites of the Administration.
"(4) Contractor personnel representing the national security laboratories and the nuclear weapons production facilities (as those terms are defined in section 4002 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (
"(5) Such other personnel as the Administrator considers appropriate.
"(c)
"(1) To identify and oversee the implementation of best practices of industry in the operations of the facilities and sites of the Administration for the purposes described in subsection (a).
"(2) To conduct surveys of the facilities and sites of the Administration in order to assess the adoption, implementation, and use by such facilities and sites of best practices of industry described in subsection (a).
"(3) To carry out such other activities consistent with the duties of the committee under this subsection as the Administrator may specify for purposes of this section.
"(d)
"(1)
"(2)
"(A) A description of the activities of the committee.
"(B) The results of the surveys undertaken pursuant to subsection (c)(2).
"(C) As a result of the surveys, recommendations for modifications to the scope or applicability of regulations and orders of the Department of Energy to particular facilities and sites of the Administration in order to implement best practices of industry in the operation of such facilities and sites, including—
"(i) a list of the facilities and sites at which such regulations and orders could be so modified; and
"(ii) for each such facility and site, the manner in which the scope or applicability of such regulations and orders could be so modified.
"(D) An assessment of the progress of the Administration in implementing best practices of industry in the operations of the facilities and sites of the Administration.
"(E) An estimate of the costs to be saved as a result of the best practices of industry implemented by the Administration at the facilities and sites of the Administration, set forth by fiscal year.
"(3)
"(A) the congressional defense committees [Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives]; and
"(B) the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives.
"(e)
Governance and Management of Nuclear Security Enterprise
"(a)
"(1) correcting the longstanding problems with the governance and management of the nuclear security enterprise will require robust, personal, and long-term engagement by the President, the Secretary of Energy, the Administrator for Nuclear Security, and leaders from the appropriate congressional committees;
"(2) recent and past studies of the governance and management of the nuclear security enterprise have provided a list of reasonable, practical, and actionable steps that the Secretary and the Administrator should take to make the nuclear security enterprise more efficient and more effective; and
"(3) lasting and effective change to the nuclear security enterprise will require personal engagement by senior leaders, a clear plan, and mechanisms for ensuring follow-through and accountability.
"(b)
"(1)
"(B) The team established under paragraph (1) shall be co-chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Energy and the Administrator.
"(C) In developing and carrying out the implementation plan, the team shall consult with the implementation assessment panel established under subsection (c)(1).
"(2)
"(3)
"(c)
"(1)
"(2)
"(A) provide guidance to the Secretary and the Administrator with respect to the implementation plan developed under subsection (b)(1)(A), including how such plan compares or contrasts with the covered study;
"(B) track the implementation of such plan; and
"(C) assess the effectiveness of such plan.
"(3)
"(B) Beginning February 28, 2017, and semiannually thereafter through 2020, the panel established under paragraph (1) shall brief the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary, and the Administrator on the efforts of the Secretary and the Administrator to implement the implementation plan developed under subsection (b)(1)(A).
"(C) Not later than September 30, 2020, the panel established under paragraph (1) shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary, and the Administrator a final report on the efforts of the Secretary and the Administrator to implement the implementation plan developed under subsection (b)(1)(A), including an assessment of the effectiveness of the reform efforts under such plan and whether further action is needed.
"(4)
"(d)
"(1)
"(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate; and
"(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives.
"(2)
"(A) The final report of the Congressional Advisory Panel on the Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise established by section 3166 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (
"(B) Any other study not conducted by the Secretary or the Administrator that the Secretary determines appropriate for purposes of this section.
"(3)
"(e)
"(1) in contravention of section 3220 of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (
"(2) that would undermine or weaken health, safety, or security."
Clarification of Role of Secretary of Energy
§2513. Restriction on licensing requirement for certain defense activities and facilities
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by the Department of Energy National Security and Military Applications of Nuclear Energy Authorization Act of 1981 (
(
References in Text
The Department of Energy National Security and Military Applications of Nuclear Energy Authorization Act of 1981, referred to in text, is
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Prior Provisions
Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in the following appropriations act:
Amendments
2013—
2003—
Transfer of Functions
For transfer of certain functions from Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Chairman thereof, see Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1980, 45 F.R. 40561,
§2514. Transferred
Codification
Section,
§2515. Establishment of Center for Security Technology, Analysis, Response, and Testing
(a) Establishment
The Administrator for Nuclear Security shall establish within the nuclear security enterprise (as defined in
(b) Duties
The center established under subsection (a) shall carry out the following:
(1) Provide to the Administrator, the Chief of Defense Nuclear Security, and the management and operating contractors of the nuclear security enterprise a wide range of objective expertise on security technologies, systems, analysis, testing, and response forces.
(2) Assist the Administrator in developing standards, requirements, analysis methods, and testing criteria with respect to security.
(3) Collect, analyze, and distribute lessons learned with respect to security.
(4) Support inspections and oversight activities with respect to security.
(5) Promote professional development and training for security professionals.
(6) Provide for advance and bulk procurement for security-related acquisitions that affect multiple facilities of the nuclear security enterprise.
(7) Advocate for continual improvement and security excellence throughout the nuclear security enterprise.
(8) Such other duties as the Administrator may assign.
(
Codification
Section was enacted as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, and not as part of the Atomic Energy Defense Act which comprises this chapter.
SUBCHAPTER II—NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE MATTERS
Part A—Stockpile Stewardship and Weapons Production
§2521. Stockpile stewardship program
(a) Establishment
The Secretary of Energy, acting through the Administrator, shall establish a stewardship program to ensure—
(1) the preservation of the core intellectual and technical competencies of the United States in nuclear weapons, including weapons design, system integration, manufacturing, security, use control, reliability assessment, and certification; and
(2) that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable without the use of underground nuclear weapons testing.
(b) Program elements
The program shall include the following:
(1) An increased level of effort for advanced computational capabilities to enhance the simulation and modeling capabilities of the United States with respect to the performance over time of nuclear weapons.
(2) An increased level of effort for above-ground experimental programs, such as hydrotesting, high-energy lasers, inertial confinement fusion, plasma physics, and materials research.
(3) Support for new facilities construction projects that contribute to the experimental capabilities of the United States, such as an advanced hydrodynamics facility, the National Ignition Facility, and other facilities for above-ground experiments to assess nuclear weapons effects.
(4) Support for the use of, and experiments facilitated by, the advanced experimental facilities of the United States, including—
(A) the National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory;
(B) the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory;
(C) the Z Machine at Sandia National Laboratories; and
(D) the experimental facilities at the Nevada National Security Site.
(5) Support for the sustainment and modernization of facilities with production and manufacturing capabilities that are necessary to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile, including—
(A) the nuclear weapons production facilities; and
(B) production and manufacturing capabilities resident in the national security laboratories.
(
Codification
Section was formerly set out as a note under
Amendments
2013—Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (b)(4)(D).
Subsec. (b)(5).
"(A) the Pantex Plant;
"(B) the Y–12 National Security Complex;
"(C) the Kansas City Plant;
"(D) the Savannah River Site; and".
Subsec. (b)(5)(E).
2009—Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (b)(1).
Subsec. (b)(4), (5).
Subsec. (c).
1997—Subsec. (d).
Nuclear Warhead Design Competition
"(a)
"(1) In January 2016, the co-chairs of a congressionally mandated study panel from the National Academies of Science testified to the following before the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives:
"(A) 'The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) complex must engage in robust design competitions in order to exercise the design and production skills that underpin stockpile stewardship and are necessary to meet evolving threats.'.
"(B) 'To exercise the full set of design skills necessary for an effective nuclear deterrent, the NNSA should develop and conduct the first in what the committee envisions to be a series of design competitions that integrate the full end-to-end process from novel design conception through engineering, building, and non-nuclear testing of a prototype.'.
"(2) In March 2016 testimony before the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives regarding a December 2016 Defense Science Board report entitled, 'Seven Defense Priorities for the New Administration', members of that Board said the following:
"(A) 'A key contributor to nuclear deterrence is the continuous, adaptable exercise of the development, design, and production functions for nuclear weapons in both the DOD and DOE. . . . Yet the DOE laboratories and DOD contractor community have done little integrated design and development work outside of life extension for 25 years, let alone concept development that could serve as a hedge to surprise.'.
"(B) 'The Defense Science Board believes that the triad's complementary features remain robust tenets for the design of a future force. Replacing our current, aging force is essential, but not sufficient in the more complex nuclear environment we now face to provide the adaptability or flexibility to confidently hold at risk what adversaries value. In particular, if the threat evolves in ways that favorably change the cost/benefit calculus in the view of an adversary's leadership, then we should be in a position to quickly restore a credible deterrence posture.'.
"(3) In a memorandum dated May 9, 2014, then-Secretary of Energy Ernie Moniz said the following:
"(A) 'If nuclear military capabilities are to provide deterrence for the nation they need to be relevant to the emerging global strategic environment. The current stockpile was designed to meet the needs of a bipolar world with roots in the Cold War era. A more complex, chaotic, and dynamic security environment is emerging. In order to uphold the Department's mission to ensure an effective nuclear deterrent. . . . we must ensure our nuclear capabilities meet the challenges of known and potential geopolitical and technological trends. Therefore we must look ahead, using the expertise of our laboratories, to how the capabilities that may be employed by other nations could impact deterrence over the next several decades.'.
"(B) 'We must challenge our thinking about our programs of record in order to permit foresighted actions that may reduce, in the coming decades, the chances for surprise and that buttress deterrence.'.
"(b)
"(1)
"(A) examine options for warhead design and related delivery system requirements in the 2030s, including—
"(i) life extension of existing weapons;
"(ii) new capabilities; and
"(iii) such other concepts as the Administrator and the Chairman determine necessary to fully exercise and create responsive design capabilities in the enterprise and ensure a robust nuclear deterrent into the 2030s;
"(B) assess how the capabilities and defenses that may be employed by other countries could impact deterrence in 2030 and beyond and how such threats could be addressed or mitigated in the warhead and related delivery systems;
"(C) exercise the full set of design skills necessary for an effective nuclear deterrent and responsive enterprise through production of conceptual designs and, as the Administrator determines appropriate, production of non-nuclear prototypes of components or subsystems; and
"(D) examine and recommend actions for significantly shortening timelines and significantly reducing costs associated with design, development, certification, and production of the warhead, without reducing worker or public health and safety.
"(2)
"(A) during fiscal year 2018, develop a plan to carry out paragraph (1); and
"(B) during fiscal year 2019, implement such plan.
"(c)
Plan for Developing Exascale Computing and Incorporating Such Computing Into the Stockpile Stewardship Program
"(a)
"(b)
"(1) the development of a prototype exascale computer for the stockpile stewardship program; and
"(2) mitigating disruptions resulting from the transition to exascale computing.
"(c)
"(d)
"(1) address, in the estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations reflected in each future-years nuclear security program submitted under section 3253 of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (
"(A) developing exascale computing and incorporating such computing into the stockpile stewardship program; and
"(B) mitigating potential disruptions resulting from the transition to exascale computing; and
"(2) include in each such future-years nuclear security program a description of the costs of efforts to develop exascale computing borne by the National Nuclear Security Administration, the Office of Science of the Department of Energy, other Federal agencies, and private industry.
"(e)
"(f)
§2522. Stockpile stewardship criteria
(a) Requirement for criteria
The Secretary of Energy shall develop clear and specific criteria for judging whether the science-based tools being used by the Department of Energy for determining the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile are performing in a manner that will provide an adequate degree of certainty that the stockpile is safe and reliable.
(b) Coordination with Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Energy, in developing the criteria required by subsection (a), shall coordinate with the Secretary of Defense.
(
Codification
Section was formerly set out as a note under
Amendments
2013—
Subsecs. (c), (d).
2009—Subsec. (c).
Subsec. (d).
1999—Subsec. (c).
§2523. Nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship, management, and responsiveness plan
(a) Plan requirement
The Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and other appropriate officials of the departments and agencies of the Federal Government, shall develop and annually update a plan for sustaining the nuclear weapons stockpile. The plan shall cover, at a minimum, stockpile stewardship, stockpile management, stockpile responsiveness, stockpile surveillance, program direction, infrastructure modernization, human capital, and nuclear test readiness. The plan shall be consistent with the programmatic and technical requirements of the most recent annual Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum.
(b) Submissions to Congress
(1) In accordance with subsection (c), not later than March 15 of each even-numbered year, the Administrator shall submit to the congressional defense committees a summary of the plan developed under subsection (a).
(2) In accordance with subsection (d), not later than March 15 of each odd-numbered year, the Administrator shall submit to the congressional defense committees a detailed report on the plan developed under subsection (a).
(3) The summaries and reports required by this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(c) Elements of biennial plan summary
Each summary of the plan submitted under subsection (b)(1) shall include, at a minimum, the following:
(1) A summary of the status of the nuclear weapons stockpile, including the number and age of warheads (including both active and inactive) for each warhead type.
(2) A summary of the status, plans, budgets, and schedules for warhead life extension programs and any other programs to modify, update, or replace warhead types.
(3) A summary of the methods and information used to determine that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe and reliable, as well as the relationship of science-based tools to the collection and interpretation of such information.
(4) A summary of the status of the nuclear security enterprise, including programs and plans for infrastructure modernization and retention of human capital, as well as associated budgets and schedules.
(5) A summary of the status, plans, and budgets for carrying out the stockpile responsiveness program under
(6) A summary of the plan regarding the research and development, deployment, and lifecycle sustainment of technologies described in subsection (d)(7).
(7) A summary of the assessment under subsection (d)(8) regarding the execution of programs with current and projected budgets and any associated risks.
(8) Identification of any modifications or updates to the plan since the previous summary or detailed report was submitted under subsection (b).
(9) Such other information as the Administrator considers appropriate.
(d) Elements of biennial detailed report
Each detailed report on the plan submitted under subsection (b)(2) shall include, at a minimum, the following:
(1) With respect to stockpile stewardship, stockpile management, and stockpile responsiveness—
(A) the status of the nuclear weapons stockpile, including the number and age of warheads (including both active and inactive) for each warhead type;
(B) for each five-year period occurring during the period beginning on the date of the report and ending on the date that is 20 years after the date of the report—
(i) the planned number of nuclear warheads (including active and inactive) for each warhead type in the nuclear weapons stockpile; and
(ii) the past and projected future total lifecycle cost of each type of nuclear weapon;
(C) the status, plans, budgets, and schedules for warhead life extension programs and any other programs to modify, update, or replace warhead types;
(D) a description of the process by which the Administrator assesses the lifetimes, and requirements for life extension or replacement, of the nuclear and non-nuclear components of the warheads (including active and inactive warheads) in the nuclear weapons stockpile;
(E) a description of the process used in recertifying the safety, security, and reliability of each warhead type in the nuclear weapons stockpile;
(F) any concerns of the Administrator that would affect the ability of the Administrator to recertify the safety, security, or reliability of warheads in the nuclear weapons stockpile (including active and inactive warheads);
(G) mechanisms to provide for the manufacture, maintenance, and modernization of each warhead type in the nuclear weapons stockpile, as needed;
(H) mechanisms to expedite the collection of information necessary for carrying out the stockpile management program required by
(I) mechanisms to ensure the appropriate assignment of roles and missions for each national security laboratory and nuclear weapons production facility, including mechanisms for allocation of workload, mechanisms to ensure the carrying out of appropriate modernization activities, and mechanisms to ensure the retention of skilled personnel;
(J) mechanisms to ensure that each national security laboratory has full and complete access to all weapons data to enable a rigorous peer-review process to support the annual assessment of the condition of the nuclear weapons stockpile required under
(K) mechanisms for allocating funds for activities under the stockpile management program required by
(L) for each of the five fiscal years following the fiscal year in which the report is submitted, an identification of the funds needed to carry out the program required under
(M) the status, plans, activities, budgets, and schedules for carrying out the stockpile responsiveness program under
(N) for each of the five fiscal years following the fiscal year in which the report is submitted, an identification of the funds needed to carry out the program required under
(O) as required, when assessing and developing prototype nuclear weapons of foreign countries, a report from the directors of the national security laboratories on the need and plan for such assessment and development that includes separate comments on the plan from the Secretary of Energy and the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) With respect to science-based tools—
(A) a description of the information needed to determine that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe and reliable;
(B) for each science-based tool used to collect information described in subparagraph (A), the relationship between such tool and such information and the effectiveness of such tool in providing such information based on the criteria developed pursuant to
(C) the criteria developed under
(3) An assessment of the stockpile stewardship program under
(A) an identification and description of—
(i) any key technical challenges to the stockpile stewardship program; and
(ii) the strategies to address such challenges without the use of nuclear testing;
(B) a strategy for using the science-based tools (including advanced simulation and computing capabilities) of each national security laboratory to ensure that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable without the use of nuclear testing;
(C) an assessment of the science-based tools (including advanced simulation and computing capabilities) of each national security laboratory that exist at the time of the assessment compared with the science-based tools expected to exist during the period covered by the future-years nuclear security program; and
(D) an assessment of the core scientific and technical competencies required to achieve the objectives of the stockpile stewardship program and other weapons activities and weapons-related activities of the Administration, including—
(i) the number of scientists, engineers, and technicians, by discipline, required to maintain such competencies; and
(ii) a description of any shortage of such individuals that exists at the time of the assessment compared with any shortage expected to exist during the period covered by the future-years nuclear security program.
(4) With respect to the nuclear security infrastructure—
(A) a description of the modernization and refurbishment measures the Administrator determines necessary to meet the requirements prescribed in—
(i) the national security strategy of the United States as set forth in the most recent national security strategy report of the President under
(ii) the most recent national defense strategy as of the date of the plan; and
(iii) the most recent Nuclear Posture Review as of the date of the plan;
(B) a schedule for implementing the measures described under subparagraph (A) during the 10-year period following the date of the plan;
(C) the estimated levels of annual funds the Administrator determines necessary to carry out the measures described under subparagraph (A), including a discussion of the criteria, evidence, and strategies on which such estimated levels of annual funds are based; and
(D)(i) a description of—
(I) the metrics (based on industry best practices) used by the Administrator to determine the infrastructure deferred maintenance and repair needs of the nuclear security enterprise; and
(II) the percentage of replacement plant value being spent on maintenance and repair needs of the nuclear security enterprise; and
(ii) an explanation of whether the annual spending on such needs complies with the recommendation of the National Research Council of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine that such spending be in an amount equal to four percent of the replacement plant value, and, if not, the reasons for such noncompliance and a plan for how the Administrator will ensure facilities of the nuclear security enterprise are being properly sustained.
(5) With respect to the nuclear test readiness of the United States—
(A) an estimate of the period of time that would be necessary for the Administrator to conduct an underground test of a nuclear weapon once directed by the President to conduct such a test;
(B) a description of the level of test readiness that the Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, determines to be appropriate;
(C) a list and description of the workforce skills and capabilities that are essential to carrying out an underground nuclear test at the Nevada National Security Site;
(D) a list and description of the infrastructure and physical plants that are essential to carrying out an underground nuclear test at the Nevada National Security Site; and
(E) an assessment of the readiness status of the skills and capabilities described in subparagraph (C) and the infrastructure and physical plants described in subparagraph (D).
(6) A strategy for the integrated management of plutonium for stockpile and stockpile stewardship needs over a 20-year period that includes the following:
(A) An assessment of the baseline science issues necessary to understand plutonium aging under static and dynamic conditions under manufactured and nonmanufactured plutonium geometries.
(B) An assessment of scientific and testing instrumentation for plutonium at elemental and bulk conditions.
(C) An assessment of manufacturing and handling technology for plutonium and plutonium components.
(D) An assessment of computational models of plutonium performance under static and dynamic loading, including manufactured and nonmanufactured conditions.
(E) An identification of any capability gaps with respect to the assessments described in subparagraphs (A) through (D).
(F) An estimate of costs relating to the issues, instrumentation, technology, and models described in subparagraphs (A) through (D) over the period covered by the future-years nuclear security program under
(G) An estimate of the cost of eliminating the capability gaps identified under subparagraph (E) over the period covered by the future-years nuclear security program.
(H) Such other items as the Administrator considers important for the integrated management of plutonium for stockpile and stockpile stewardship needs.
(7) A plan for the research and development, deployment, and lifecycle sustainment of the technologies employed within the nuclear security enterprise to address physical and cyber security threats during the five fiscal years following the date of the report, together with—
(A) for each site in the nuclear security enterprise, a description of the technologies deployed to address the physical and cybersecurity threats posed to that site;
(B) for each site and for the nuclear security enterprise, the methods used by the Administration to establish priorities among investments in physical and cybersecurity technologies; and
(C) a detailed description of how the funds identified for each program element specified pursuant to paragraph (1) in the budget for the Administration for each fiscal year during that five-fiscal-year period will help carry out that plan.
(8) An assessment of whether the programs described by the report can be executed with current and projected budgets and any associated risks.
(9) Identification of any modifications or updates to the plan since the previous summary or detailed report was submitted under subsection (b).
(e) Nuclear Weapons Council assessment
(1) For each detailed report on the plan submitted under subsection (b)(2), the Nuclear Weapons Council shall conduct an assessment that includes the following:
(A) An analysis of the plan, including—
(i) whether the plan supports the requirements of the national security strategy of the United States referred to in subsection (d)(4)(A)(i), the most recent the national defense strategy, and the most recent Nuclear Posture Review;
(ii) whether the modernization and refurbishment measures described under subparagraph (A) of subsection (d)(4) and the schedule described under subparagraph (B) of such subsection are adequate to support such requirements; and
(iii) whether the plan supports the stockpile responsiveness program under
(B) An analysis of whether the plan adequately addresses the requirements for infrastructure recapitalization of the facilities of the nuclear security enterprise.
(C) If the Nuclear Weapons Council determines that the plan does not adequately support modernization and refurbishment requirements under subparagraph (A) or the nuclear security enterprise facilities infrastructure recapitalization requirements under subparagraph (B), a risk assessment with respect to—
(i) supporting the annual certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile; and
(ii) maintaining the long-term safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.
(2) Not later than 180 days after the date on which the Administrator submits the plan under subsection (b)(2), the Nuclear Weapons Council shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report detailing the assessment required under paragraph (1).
(f) Definitions
In this section:
(1) The term "budget", with respect to a fiscal year, means the budget for that fiscal year that is submitted to Congress by the President under
(2) The term "future-years nuclear security program" means the program required by
(3) The term "national defense strategy" means the review of the defense programs and policies of the United States that is carried out every four years under
(4) The term "nuclear security budget materials", with respect to a fiscal year, means the materials submitted to Congress by the Administrator in support of the budget for that fiscal year.
(5) The term "weapons activities" means each activity within the budget category of weapons activities in the budget of the Administration.
(6) The term "weapons-related activities" means each activity under the Department of Energy that involves nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons technology, or fissile or radioactive materials, including activities related to—
(A) nuclear nonproliferation;
(B) nuclear forensics;
(C) nuclear intelligence;
(D) nuclear safety; and
(E) nuclear incident response.
(
Codification
Section was formerly set out as a note under
Prior Provisions
Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in the following prior authorization act:
Amendments
2019—Subsec. (d)(4)(A)(ii).
Subsec. (e)(1)(A)(i).
Subsec. (f)(3), (4).
2017—Subsec. (c)(6).
Subsec. (c)(7).
Subsec. (c)(8), (9).
Subsec. (d)(1)(O).
Subsec. (d)(4)(D).
Subsec. (d)(7).
Subsec. (d)(8).
Subsec. (d)(9).
2015—
Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (c)(5) to (7).
Subsec. (d)(1).
Subsec. (d)(1)(M), (N).
Subsec. (e)(1)(A)(iii).
2014—Subsec. (d)(4)(A)(i).
2013—
Subsec. (d)(6), (7).
Subsec. (e)(1).
2004—Subsec. (c).
Report on the Plan for the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, Nuclear Weapons Complex, and Delivery Platforms and Sense of Congress on Follow-on Negotiations to START Treaty
"(a)
"(1)
"(A) enhance the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States;
"(B) modernize the nuclear weapons complex; and
"(C) maintain the delivery platforms for nuclear weapons.
"(2)
"(A) A description of the plan to enhance the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States.
"(B) A description of the plan to modernize the nuclear weapons complex, including improving the safety of facilities, modernizing the infrastructure, and maintaining the key capabilities and competencies of the nuclear weapons workforce, including designers and technicians.
"(C) A description of the plan to maintain delivery platforms for nuclear weapons.
"(D) An estimate of budget requirements, including the costs associated with the plans outlined under subparagraphs (A) through (C), over a 10-year period.
"(b)
"(1) the President should maintain the stated position of the United States that the follow-on treaty to the START Treaty not include any limitations on the ballistic missile defense systems, space capabilities, or advanced conventional weapons systems of the United States;
"(2) the enhanced safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile, modernization of the nuclear weapons complex, and maintenance of the nuclear delivery systems are key to enabling further reductions in the nuclear forces of the United States; and
"(3) the President should submit budget requests for fiscal year 2011 and subsequent fiscal years for the programs of the National Nuclear Security Administration of the Department of Energy that are adequate to sustain the needed capabilities to support the long-term maintenance of the nuclear stockpile of the United States."
Inclusion in 2005 Stockpile Stewardship Plan of Certain Information Relating to Stockpile Stewardship Criteria
"(a)
"(b)
"(1) An update of any information or criteria described in the report on stockpile stewardship criteria submitted under section 4202 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act [
"(2) A description of any additional information identified, or criteria established, on matters covered by such section 4202 during the period beginning on the date of the submittal of the report under such section 4202 and ending on the date of the submittal of the updated version of the plan under subsection (a) of this section.
"(3) For each science-based tool developed by the Department of Energy during such period—
"(A) a description of the relationship of such science-based tool to the collection of information needed to determine that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe and reliable; and
"(B) a description of the criteria for judging whether or not such science-based tool provides for the collection of such information.
"(c) 2005
Annual Update to the Report Specified in Section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111–84 )
Memorandum of President of the United States, Feb. 7, 2011, 76 F.R. 7477, provided:
Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense [and] the Secretary of Energy
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, I hereby direct the Secretaries of Defense and Energy to jointly provide annual updates to the report specified in section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (
The Secretary of Defense is authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register.
Barack Obama.
§2523a. Repealed. Pub. L. 112–239, div. C, title XXXI, §3133(c)(1), Jan. 2, 2013, 126 Stat. 2192
Section,
§2523b. Transferred
Codification
Section,
§2523c. Major warhead refurbishment program
In fiscal year 2015 and subsequent fiscal years, the Secretary of Energy shall submit to the congressional defense committees (as defined in U.S.C. 101(a)(16) 1) a report, on each major warhead refurbishment program that reaches the Phase 6.3 milestone, that provides an analysis of alternatives. Such report shall include—
(1) a full description of alternatives considered prior to the award of Phase 6.3;
(2) a comparison of the costs and benefits of each of those alternatives, to include an analysis of trade-offs among cost, schedule, and performance objectives against each alternative considered;
(3) identification of the cost and risk of critical technology elements associated with each alternative, including technology maturity, integration risk, manufacturing feasibility, and demonstration needs;
(4) identification of the cost and risk of additional capital asset and infrastructure capabilities required to support production and certification of each alternative;
(5) a comparative analysis of the risks, costs, and scheduling needs for any military requirement intended to enhance warhead safety, security, or maintainability, including any requirement to consolidate and/or integrate warhead systems or mods as compared to at least one other feasible refurbishment alternative the Nuclear Weapons Council considers appropriate; and
(6) a life-cycle cost estimate for the alternative selected that details the overall cost, scope, and schedule planning assumptions.
(
Codification
Section was enacted as part of the Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2015, and also as part of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, and not as part of the Atomic Energy Defense Act which comprises this chapter.
1 So in original. Probably should be "
§2524. Stockpile management program
(a) Program required
The Secretary of Energy, acting through the Administrator and in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall carry out a program, in support of the stockpile stewardship program, to provide for the effective management of the weapons in the nuclear weapons stockpile, including the extension of the effective life of such weapons. The program shall have the following objectives:
(1) To increase the reliability, safety, and security of the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States.
(2) To further reduce the likelihood of the resumption of underground nuclear weapons testing.
(3) To achieve reductions in the future size of the nuclear weapons stockpile.
(4) To reduce the risk of an accidental detonation of an element of the stockpile.
(5) To reduce the risk of an element of the stockpile being used by a person or entity hostile to the United States, its vital interests, or its allies.
(b) Program limitations
In carrying out the stockpile management program under subsection (a), the Secretary of Energy shall ensure that—
(1) any changes made to the stockpile shall be made to achieve the objectives identified in subsection (a); and
(2) any such changes made to the stockpile shall—
(A) remain consistent with basic design parameters by including, to the maximum extent feasible, components that are well understood or are certifiable without the need to resume underground nuclear weapons testing; and
(B) use the design, certification, and production expertise resident in the nuclear security enterprise to fulfill current mission requirements of the existing stockpile.
(c) Program budget
In accordance with the requirements under
(
Codification
Section was formerly set out as a note under
Amendments
2013—Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (b)(2)(B).
Subsecs. (c) to (e).
2009—
2003—Subsec. (c).
Subsec. (c)(1).
Subsecs. (d) to (f).
Effective Date of 2003 Amendment
§2524a. Repealed. Pub. L. 111–84, div. C, title XXXI, §3113(a)(1), Oct. 28, 2009, 123 Stat. 2704
Section,
§2525. Annual assessments and reports to the President and Congress regarding the condition of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile
(a) Annual assessments required
For each nuclear weapon type in the stockpile of the United States, each official specified in subsection (b) on an annual basis shall, to the extent such official is directly responsible for the safety, reliability, performance, or military effectiveness of that nuclear weapon type, complete an assessment of the safety, reliability, performance, or military effectiveness (as the case may be) of that nuclear weapon type.
(b) Covered officials
The officials referred to in subsection (a) are the following:
(1) The head of each national security laboratory.
(2) The Commander of the United States Strategic Command.
(c) Dual validation teams in support of assessments
In support of the assessments required by subsection (a), the Administrator may establish teams, known as "dual validation teams", to provide each national security laboratory responsible for weapons design with independent evaluations of the condition of each warhead for which such laboratory has lead responsibility. A dual validation team established by the Administrator shall—
(1) be comprised of weapons experts from the laboratory that does not have lead responsibility for fielding the warhead being evaluated;
(2) have access to all surveillance and underground test data for all stockpile systems for use in the independent evaluations;
(3) use all relevant available data to conduct independent calculations; and
(4) pursue independent experiments to support the independent evaluations.
(d) Use of teams of experts for assessments
The head of each national security laboratory shall establish and use one or more teams of experts, known as "red teams", to assist in the assessments required by subsection (a). Each such team shall include experts from both of the other national security laboratories. Each such team for a national security laboratory shall—
(1) review both the matters covered by the assessments under subsection (a) performed by the head of that laboratory and any independent evaluations conducted by a dual validation team under subsection (c);
(2) subject such matters to challenge; and
(3) submit the results of such review and challenge, together with the findings and recommendations of such team with respect to such review and challenge, to the head of that laboratory.
(e) Report on assessments
Not later than December 1 of each year, each official specified in subsection (b) shall submit to the Secretary concerned, and to the Nuclear Weapons Council, a report on the assessments that such official was required by subsection (a) to complete. The report shall include the following:
(1) The results of each such assessment.
(2)(A) Such official's determination as to whether or not one or more underground nuclear tests are necessary to resolve any issues identified in the assessments and, if so—
(i) an identification of the specific underground nuclear tests that are necessary to resolve such issues; and
(ii) a discussion of why options other than an underground nuclear test are not available or would not resolve such issues.
(B) An identification of the specific underground nuclear tests which, while not necessary, might have value in resolving any such issues and a discussion of the anticipated value of conducting such tests.
(C) Such official's determination as to the readiness of the United States to conduct the underground nuclear tests identified under subparagraphs (A)(i) and (B), if directed by the President to do so.
(3) In the case of a report submitted by the head of a national security laboratory—
(A) a concise statement regarding the adequacy of the science-based tools and methods being used to determine the matters covered by the assessments;
(B) a concise statement regarding the adequacy of the tools and methods employed by the manufacturing infrastructure required by
(C) a concise summary of the findings and recommendations of any teams under subsection (d) that relate to the assessments, together with a discussion of those findings and recommendations;
(D) a concise summary of the results of any independent evaluation conducted by a dual validation team under subsection (c); and
(E) a concise summary of any significant finding investigations initiated or active during the previous year for which the head of the national security laboratory has full or partial responsibility.
(4) In the case of a report submitted by the Commander of the United States Strategic Command—
(A) a discussion of the relative merits of other nuclear weapon types (if any), or compensatory measures (if any) that could be taken, that could enable accomplishment of the missions of the nuclear weapon types to which the assessments relate, should such assessments identify any deficiency with respect to such nuclear weapon types;
(B) a summary of all major assembly releases in place as of the date of the report for the active and inactive nuclear weapon stockpiles; and
(C) the views of the Commander on the stockpile responsiveness program under
(5) An identification and discussion of any matter having an adverse effect on the capability of the official submitting the report to accurately determine the matters covered by the assessments.
(f) Submittals to the President and Congress
(1) Not later than February 1 of each year, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy shall submit to the President—
(A) each report, without change, submitted to either Secretary under subsection (e) during the preceding year;
(B) any comments that the Secretaries individually or jointly consider appropriate with respect to each such report;
(C) the conclusions that the Secretaries individually or jointly reach as to the safety, reliability, performance, and military effectiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States; and
(D) any other information that the Secretaries individually or jointly consider appropriate.
(2) Not later than March 15 of each year, the President shall forward to Congress the matters received by the President under paragraph (1) for that year, together with any comments the President considers appropriate.
(3) If the President does not forward to Congress the matters required under paragraph (2) by the date required by such paragraph, the officials specified in subsection (b) shall provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees not later than March 30 on the report such officials submitted to the Secretary concerned under subsection (e).
(g) Classified form
Each submittal under subsection (f) shall be in classified form only, with the classification level required for each portion of such submittal marked appropriately.
(h) Definition
In this section, the term "Secretary concerned" means—
(1) the Secretary of Energy, with respect to matters concerning the Department of Energy; and
(2) the Secretary of Defense, with respect to matters concerning the Department of Defense.
(
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2015—Subsec. (e)(4)(C).
2014—Subsec. (b)(2).
2013—Subsec. (c).
Subsec. (e)(3)(E).
Subsec. (e)(4).
Subsec. (f)(1).
Subsec. (f)(3).
Subsec. (h).
Subsec. (i).
2009—Subsec. (c).
Subsec. (d).
Subsec. (d)(1).
Subsec. (e).
Subsec. (e)(3)(C).
Subsec. (e)(3)(D).
Subsec. (f).
Subsec. (f)(1)(A).
Subsec. (g).
Subsec. (h).
Subsec. (i).
Subsec. (i)(1).
Subsec. (i)(2).
2003—Subsec. (d)(3)(B).
§2526. Form of certifications regarding the safety or reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile
Any certification submitted to the President by the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of Energy regarding confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon type in the United States nuclear weapons stockpile shall be submitted in classified form only.
(
Codification
Section was formerly set out as a note under
§2527. Nuclear test ban readiness program
(a) Establishment of program
The Secretary of Energy shall establish and support a program to assure that the United States is in a position to maintain the reliability, safety, and continued deterrent effect of its stockpile of existing nuclear weapons designs in the event that a low-threshold or comprehensive ban on nuclear explosives testing is negotiated and ratified within the framework agreed to by the United States and the Russian Federation.
(b) Purposes of program
The purposes of the program under subsection (a) shall be the following:
(1) To assure that the United States maintains a vigorous program of stockpile inspection and non-explosive testing so that, if a low-threshold or comprehensive test ban is entered into, the United States remains able to detect and identify potential problems in stockpile reliability and safety in existing designs of nuclear weapons.
(2) To assure that the specific materials, components, processes, and personnel needed for the remanufacture of existing nuclear weapons or the substitution of alternative nuclear warheads are available to support such remanufacture or substitution if such action becomes necessary in order to satisfy reliability and safety requirements under a low-threshold or comprehensive test ban agreement.
(3) To assure that a vigorous program of research in areas related to nuclear weapons science and engineering is supported so that, if a low-threshold or comprehensive test ban agreement is entered into, the United States is able to maintain a base of technical knowledge about nuclear weapons design and nuclear weapons effects.
(c) Conduct of program
The Secretary of Energy shall carry out the program provided for in subsection (a). The program shall be carried out with the participation of representatives of the Department of Defense, the nuclear weapons production facilities, and the national security laboratories.
(
Codification
Section was formerly set out as a note under
Amendments
2013—Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (b).
Subsec. (c).
Subsec. (d).
2003—
1997—Subsec. (e).
§2528. Repealed. Pub. L. 112–239, div. C, title XXXI, §3133(e)(1)(A), (2), Jan. 2, 2013, 126 Stat. 2192 , 2193
Section,
Codification
Section 3133(e)(1)(A) of
§2528a. Repealed. Pub. L. 110–181, div. C, title XXXI, §3112(a), Jan. 28, 2008, 122 Stat. 577
Section,
§2529. Requirements for specific request for new or modified nuclear weapons
(a) Requirement for request for funds for development
(1) In any fiscal year after fiscal year 2002 in which the Secretary of Energy plans to carry out activities described in paragraph (2) relating to the development of a new nuclear weapon or modified nuclear weapon, the Secretary—
(A) shall specifically request funds for such activities in the budget of the President for that fiscal year under
(B) may carry out such activities only if amounts are authorized to be appropriated for such activities by an Act of Congress consistent with
(2) The activities described in this paragraph are as follows:
(A) The conduct, or provision for conduct, of research and development which could lead to the production of a new nuclear weapon by the United States.
(B) The conduct, or provision for conduct, of engineering or manufacturing to carry out the production of a new nuclear weapon by the United States.
(C) The conduct, or provision for conduct, of research and development which could lead to the production of a modified nuclear weapon by the United States.
(D) The conduct, or provision for conduct, of engineering or manufacturing to carry out the production of a modified nuclear weapon by the United States.
(b) Budget request format
The Secretary shall include in a request for funds under subsection (a) the following:
(1) In the case of funds for activities described in subparagraph (A) or (C) of subsection (a)(2), a single dedicated line item for all such activities for new nuclear weapons or modified nuclear weapons that are in phase 1, 2, or 2A or phase 6.1, 6.2, or 6.2A (as the case may be), or any concept work prior to phase 1 or 6.1 (as the case may be), of the nuclear weapons acquisition process.
(2) In the case of funds for activities described in subparagraph (B) or (D) of subsection (a)(2), a dedicated line item for each such activity for a new nuclear weapon or modified nuclear weapon that is in phase 3 or higher or phase 6.3 or higher (as the case may be) of the nuclear weapons acquisition process.
(c) Exception
Subsection (a) shall not apply to funds for purposes of conducting, or providing for the conduct of, research and development, or manufacturing and engineering, determined by the Secretary to be necessary to address proliferation concerns.
(d) Definitions
In this section:
(1) The term "modified nuclear weapon" means a nuclear weapon that contains a pit or canned subassembly, either of which—
(A) is in the nuclear weapons stockpile as of December 2, 2002; and
(B) is being modified in order to meet a military requirement that is other than the military requirements applicable to such nuclear weapon when first placed in the nuclear weapons stockpile.
(2) The term "new nuclear weapon" means a nuclear weapon that contains a pit or canned subassembly, either of which is neither—
(A) in the nuclear weapons stockpile on December 2, 2002; nor
(B) in production as of that date.
(
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2018—Subsec. (a)(1).
2013—Subsec. (d).
2009—Subsec. (c).
"(1) for the nuclear weapons life extension program;
"(2) to modify an existing nuclear weapon solely to address safety or reliability concerns; or
"(3) to address proliferation concerns."
Subsec. (d).
Development of Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons; Authorization and Limitation
§2530. Testing of nuclear weapons
(a) Underground testing
No underground test of nuclear weapons may be conducted by the United States after September 30, 1996, unless a foreign state conducts a nuclear test after this date, at which time the prohibition on United States nuclear testing is lifted.
(b) Atmospheric testing
None of the funds appropriated pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (
(
References in Text
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, referred to in subsec. (b), is
Codification
Section was formerly set out in a note under
Amendments
2013—
2003—
§2531. Repealed. Pub. L. 112–239, div. C, title XXXI, §3131(d)(3), Jan. 2, 2013, 126 Stat. 2181
Section,
§2532. Manufacturing infrastructure for refabrication and certification of nuclear weapons stockpile
(a) Manufacturing program
(1) The Secretary of Energy shall carry out a program for purposes of establishing within the Government a manufacturing infrastructure that has the capabilities of meeting the following objectives as specified in the most recent Nuclear Posture Review:
(A) To provide a stockpile surveillance engineering base.
(B) To refabricate and certify weapon components and types in the enduring nuclear weapons stockpile, as necessary.
(C) To fabricate and certify new nuclear warheads, as necessary.
(D) To support nuclear weapons.
(E) To supply sufficient tritium in support of nuclear weapons to ensure an upload hedge in the event circumstances require.
(2) The purpose of the program carried out under paragraph (1) shall also be to develop manufacturing capabilities and capacities necessary to meet the requirements specified in the annual Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum.
(b) Required capabilities
The manufacturing infrastructure established under the program under subsection (a) shall include the following capabilities (modernized to attain the objectives referred to in that subsection):
(1) The weapons assembly capabilities of the Pantex Plant.
(2) The weapon secondary fabrication capabilities of the Y–12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
(3) The capabilities of the Savannah River Site relating to tritium recycling and fissile materials components processing and fabrication.
(4) The non-nuclear component capabilities of the Kansas City National Security Campus, Kansas City, Missouri.
(c) Nuclear Posture Review
For purposes of subsection (a), the term "Nuclear Posture Review" means the Department of Defense Nuclear Posture Review as contained in the Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress dated February 19, 1995, or subsequent such reports.
(
Codification
Section was formerly set out as a note under
Amendments
2019—Subsec. (a)(1).
Subsec. (b)(2).
Subsec. (b)(4).
2013—Subsec. (a)(2).
Subsec. (c).
Subsecs. (d), (e).
2003—Subsec. (d).
1996—Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (b)(3).
§2533. Reports on critical difficulties at national security laboratories and nuclear weapons production facilities
(a) Reports by heads of laboratories and facilities
In the event of a difficulty at a national security laboratory or a nuclear weapons production facility that has a significant bearing on confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon or nuclear weapon type, the head of the laboratory or facility, as the case may be, shall submit to the Administrator a report on the difficulty. The head of the laboratory or facility shall submit the report as soon as practicable after discovery of the difficulty.
(b) Transmittal by Administrator
Not later than 10 days after receipt of a report under subsection (a), the Administrator shall transmit the report (together with the comments of the Administrator) to the congressional defense committees, to the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of Defense, and to the President.
(c) Omitted
(d) Inclusion of reports in annual stockpile assessment
Any report submitted pursuant to subsection (a) shall also be submitted to the President and Congress with the matters required to be submitted under
(
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Section is comprised in part of section 4213 of
Section is comprised of sections 4213 and 4218(b), (c) of
Amendments
2013—
Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (b).
Subsec. (d).
Subsec. (e).
1999—Subsecs. (d), (e).
1997—Subsec. (b).
Transfer of Functions
For transfer of functions, personnel, assets, and liabilities of the advanced scientific computing research program and activities at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, including the functions of the Secretary of Energy relating thereto, to the Secretary of Homeland Security, see
All national security functions and activities performed immediately before Oct. 5, 1999, by nuclear weapons laboratories and production facilities defined in this section, transferred to the Administrator for Nuclear Security of the National Nuclear Security Administration of the Department of Energy, see
§2534. Repealed. Pub. L. 113–66, div. C, title XXXI, §3146(c)(8)(A), Dec. 26, 2013, 127 Stat. 1075
Section,
§2535. Replacement project for Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building, Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico
(a) Replacement building required
The Secretary of Energy shall construct at Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico, a building to replace the functions of the existing Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building at Los Alamos National Laboratory associated with Department of Energy Hazard Category 2 special nuclear material operations.
(b) Limitation on cost
The cost of the building constructed under subsection (a) may not exceed $3,700,000,000. If the Secretary determines the cost will exceed such amount, the Secretary shall submit a detailed justification for such increase to the congressional defense committees.
(c) Project basis
The construction authorized by subsection (a) shall use as its basis the facility project in the Department of Energy Readiness and Technical Base designated 04–D–125 (chemistry and metallurgy facility replacement project at Los Alamos National Laboratory).
(d) Assistance
(1) In carrying out this section, the Secretary shall procure the services of the Commander of the Naval Facilities Engineering Command to assist the Secretary with respect to the program management, oversight, and design activities of the project authorized by subsection (a).
(2) The Secretary shall carry out this subsection using funds made available for the Administration.
(e) Deadline for commencement of operations
The building constructed under subsection (a) shall commence operations by not later than December 31, 2026.
(
Amendments
2013—Subsec. (d)(2).
Alternative Plutonium Strategy; Full Operational Capability of Replacement Project
"(c)
"(1)
"(2)
"(A) the modular building strategy—
"(i) meets requirements for maintaining the nuclear weapons stockpile over a 30-year period;
"(ii) meets requirements for implementation of a responsive infrastructure, including meeting plutonium pit production requirements; and
"(iii) will achieve full operating capability for not less than two modular structures by not later than 2027;
"(B) in fiscal year 2015, the National Nuclear Security Administration will begin the process of designing and building modular buildings in accordance with Department of Energy Order 413.3 (relating to relating to program management and project management for the acquisition of capital assets); and
"(C) the Administrator will include the costs of the modular building strategy in the estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations reflected in the future-years nuclear security program submitted under section 3253 of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (
"(3)
"(d)
"(1)
"(2)
"(3)
"(4)
"(e)
§2536. Reports on life extension programs
(a) Reports required
Before proceeding beyond phase 6.2 activities with respect to any life extension program, the Nuclear Weapons Council shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on such phase 6.2 activities, including—
(1) an assessment of the life extension options considered for the phase 6.2 activities, including whether the subsystems and components in each option are considered to be a refurbishment, reuse, or replacement of such subsystem or component; and
(2) an assessment of the option selected for the phase 6.2 activities, including—
(A) whether the subsystems and components will be refurbished, reused, or replaced; and
(B) the advantages and disadvantages of refurbishment, reuse, and replacement for each such subsystem and component.
(b) Phase 6.2 activities defined
In this section, the term "phase 6.2 activities" means, with respect to a life extension program, the phase 6.2 feasibility study and option down-select.
(
Amendments
2019—
2013—Subsec. (a).
§2537. Selected Acquisition Reports and independent cost estimates and reviews of certain programs and facilities
(a) Selected Acquisition Reports
(1) At the end of the first quarter of each fiscal year, the Secretary of Energy, acting through the Administrator, shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on each nuclear weapon system undergoing life extension and each major alteration project (as defined in
(2) The information contained in the Selected Acquisition Report for a fiscal year for a nuclear weapon system shall be the information contained in the Selected Acquisition Report for each fiscal-year quarter in that fiscal year for a major defense acquisition program under
(b) Independent cost estimates and reviews
(1) The Secretary, acting through the Administrator, shall submit to the congressional defense committees and the Nuclear Weapons Council the following:
(A) An independent cost estimate of the following:
(i) Each nuclear weapon system undergoing life extension at the completion of phase 6.2A, relating to design definition and cost study.
(ii) Each nuclear weapon system undergoing life extension at the completion of phase 6.3, relating to development engineering.
(iii) Each nuclear weapon system undergoing life extension at the completion of phase 6.4, relating to production engineering, and before the initiation of phase 6.5, relating to first production.
(iv) Each new nuclear facility within the nuclear security enterprise that is estimated to cost more than $500,000,000 before such facility achieves critical decision 1 and before such facility achieves critical decision 2 in the acquisition process.
(v) Each nuclear weapons system undergoing a major alteration project (as defined in
(B) An independent cost review of each nuclear weapon system undergoing life extension at the completion of phase 6.2, relating to study of feasibility and down-select.
(2) Each independent cost estimate and independent cost review under paragraph (1) shall include—
(A) whether the cost baseline or the budget estimate for the period covered by the future-years nuclear security program has changed, and the rationale for any such change; and
(B) any views of the Secretary or the Administrator regarding such estimate or review.
(3) The Administrator shall review and consider the results of any independent cost estimate or independent cost review of a nuclear weapon system or a nuclear facility, as the case may be, under this subsection before entering the next phase of the development process of such system or the acquisition process of such facility.
(4) Except as otherwise specified in paragraph (1), each independent cost estimate or independent cost review of a nuclear weapon system or a nuclear facility under this subsection shall be submitted not later than 30 days after the date on which—
(A) in the case of a nuclear weapons system, such system completes a phase specified in such paragraph; or
(B) in the case of a nuclear facility, such facility achieves critical decision 1 as specified in subparagraph (A)(iv) of such paragraph.
(5) Each independent cost estimate or independent cost review submitted under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex if necessary.
(c) Authority for further assessments
Upon the request of the Administrator, the Secretary of Defense, acting through the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation and in consultation with the Administrator, may conduct an independent cost assessment of any initiative or program of the Administration that is estimated to cost more than $500,000,000.
(
Amendments
2017—Subsec. (a)(1).
Subsec. (a)(2).
Subsec. (b).
2015—
Subsec. (a)(1).
Subsec. (b)(1)(A)(iv).
2014—
Subsec. (b).
Subsec. (b)(1).
Subsec. (b)(1)(A)(iii).
Subsec. (b)(2), (3).
2013—Subsec. (b)(1).
Subsec. (b)(2).
Subsec. (b)(3).
§2538. Advice to President and Congress regarding safety, security, and reliability of United States nuclear weapons stockpile
(a) Policy
(1) In general
It is the policy of the United States—
(A) to maintain a safe, secure, effective, and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile; and
(B) as long as other nations control or actively seek to acquire nuclear weapons, to retain a credible nuclear deterrent.
(2) Nuclear weapons stockpile
It is in the security interest of the United States to sustain the United States nuclear weapons stockpile through a program of stockpile stewardship, carried out at the national security laboratories and nuclear weapons production facilities.
(3) Sense of Congress
It is the sense of Congress that—
(A) the United States should retain a triad of strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from acting against the vital interests of the United States;
(B) the United States should continue to maintain nuclear forces of sufficient size and capability to implement an effective and robust deterrent strategy; and
(C) the advice of the persons required to provide the President and Congress with assurances of the safety, security, effectiveness, and reliability of the nuclear weapons force should be scientifically based, without regard for politics, and of the highest quality and integrity.
(b), (c) Omitted
(d) Advice and opinions regarding nuclear weapons stockpile
In addition to a director of a national security laboratory or a nuclear weapons production facility under
(e) Expression of individual views
(1) In general
No individual, including a representative of the President, may take any action against, or otherwise constrain, a director of a national security laboratory or a nuclear weapons production facility or a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council from presenting the professional views of the director or member, as the case may be, to the President, the National Security Council, or Congress regarding—
(A) the safety, security, reliability, or credibility of the nuclear weapons stockpile and nuclear forces; or
(B) the status of, and plans for, the capabilities and infrastructure that support and sustain the nuclear weapons stockpile and nuclear forces.
(2) Construction
Nothing in paragraph (1)(B) may be construed to affect the interagency budget process.
(f) Representative of the President defined
In this section, the term "representative of the President" means the following:
(1) Any official of the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy who is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
(2) Any member or official of the National Security Council.
(3) Any member or official of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
(4) Any official of the Office of Management and Budget.
(
References in Text
Codification
Section is comprised of section 4218 of
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2019—Subsec. (d).
Subsec. (e)(1).
2014—Subsec. (d).
Subsec. (e)(1).
2013—Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (a)(9).
Subsec. (a)(11).
Subsec. (b).
Subsec. (b)(2).
Subsec. (c).
Subsec. (d).
Subsec. (e).
Subsec. (f).
Subsec. (f)(1).
Subsec. (g).
Transfer of Functions
For transfer of functions, personnel, assets, and liabilities of the advanced scientific computing research program and activities at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, including the functions of the Secretary of Energy relating thereto, to the Secretary of Homeland Security, see
All national security functions and activities performed immediately before Oct. 5, 1999, by nuclear weapons laboratories and production plants defined in this section, transferred to the Administrator for Nuclear Security of the National Nuclear Security Administration of the Department of Energy, see
§2538a. Plutonium pit production capacity
(a) Requirement
Consistent with the requirements of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy shall ensure that the nuclear security enterprise—
(1) during 2021, begins production of qualification plutonium pits;
(2) during 2024, produces not less than 10 war reserve plutonium pits;
(3) during 2025, produces not less than 20 war reserve plutonium pits;
(4) during 2026, produces not less than 30 war reserve plutonium pits; and
(5) during 2030, produces not less than 80 war reserve plutonium pits.
(b) Annual certification
Not later than March 1, 2015, and each year thereafter through 2030, the Secretary of Energy shall certify to the congressional defense committees and the Secretary of Defense that the programs and budget of the Secretary of Energy will enable the nuclear security enterprise to meet the requirements under subsection (a).
(c) Plan
If the Secretary of Energy does not make a certification under subsection (b) by March 1 of any year in which a certification is required under that subsection, by not later than May 1 of such year, the Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council shall submit to the congressional defense committees a plan to enable the nuclear security enterprise to meet the requirements under subsection (a). Such plan shall include identification of the resources of the Department of Energy that the Chairman determines should be redirected to support the plan to meet such requirements.
(
Amendments
2019—Subsec. (a)(5).
Subsec. (b).
Subsec. (c).
Subsec. (d).
Sense of Congress Related to Modification to Certain Requirements Relating to Plutonium Pit Production Capacity
"(1) rebuilding a robust plutonium pit production infrastructure with a capacity of up to 80 pits per year is critical to maintaining the viability of the nuclear weapons stockpile;
"(2) that effort will require cooperation from experts across the nuclear security enterprise; and
"(3) any further delay to achieving a plutonium sustainment capability to support the planned stockpile life extension programs will result in an unacceptable capability gap to our deterrent posture."
§2538b. Stockpile responsiveness program
(a) Statement of policy
It is the policy of the United States to identify, sustain, enhance, integrate, and continually exercise all capabilities required to conceptualize, study, design, develop, engineer, certify, produce, and deploy nuclear weapons to ensure the nuclear deterrent of the United States remains safe, secure, reliable, credible, and responsive.
(b) Program required
The Secretary of Energy, acting through the Administrator and in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall carry out a stockpile responsiveness program, along with the stockpile stewardship program under
(c) Objectives
The program under subsection (b) shall have the following objectives:
(1) Identify, sustain, enhance, integrate, and continually exercise all of the capabilities, infrastructure, tools, and technologies across the science, engineering, design, certification, and manufacturing cycle required to carry out all phases of the joint nuclear weapons life cycle process, with respect to both the nuclear security enterprise and relevant elements of the Department of Defense.
(2) Identify, enhance, and transfer knowledge, skills, and direct experience with respect to all phases of the joint nuclear weapons life cycle process from one generation of nuclear weapon designers and engineers to the following generation.
(3) Periodically demonstrate stockpile responsiveness throughout the range of capabilities as required, such as through the use of prototypes, flight testing, and development of plans for certification without the need for nuclear explosive testing.
(4) Shorten design, certification, and manufacturing cycles and timelines to minimize the amount of time and costs leading to an engineering prototype and production.
(5) Continually exercise processes for the integration and coordination of all relevant elements and processes of the Administration and the Department of Defense required to ensure stockpile responsiveness.
(6) The retention of the ability, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, to assess and develop prototype nuclear weapons of foreign countries if needed to meet intelligence requirements and, if necessary, to conduct no-yield testing of those prototypes.
(d) Joint nuclear weapons life cycle process defined
In this section, the term "joint nuclear weapons life cycle process" means the process developed and maintained by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy for the development, production, maintenance, and retirement of nuclear weapons.
(
Amendments
2019—Subsec. (c)(3).
Subsec. (c)(6).
2017—Subsec. (c)(6).
§2538c. Long-term plan for meeting national security requirements for unencumbered uranium
(a) In general
Not later than December 31 of each even-numbered year through 2026, the Secretary of Energy shall submit to the congressional defense committees a plan for meeting national security requirements for unencumbered uranium through 2065.
(b) Plan requirements
The plan required by subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) An inventory of unencumbered uranium (other than depleted uranium), by program source and enrichment level, that, as of the date of the plan, is allocated to national security requirements.
(2) An inventory of unencumbered uranium (other than depleted uranium), by program source and enrichment level, that, as of the date of the plan, is not allocated to national security requirements but could be allocated to such requirements.
(3) An identification of national security requirements for unencumbered uranium, by program source and enrichment level.
(4) A description of any shortfall in obtaining unencumbered uranium to meet national security requirements and an assessment of whether that shortfall could be mitigated through the blending down of uranium that is of a higher enrichment level.
(5) An inventory of unencumbered depleted uranium, an assessment of the portion of that uranium that could be allocated to national security requirements through re-enrichment, and an estimate of the costs of re-enriching that uranium.
(6) A description of the swap and barter agreements involving unencumbered uranium needed to meet national security requirements that are in effect on the date of the plan.
(7) An assessment of whether additional enrichment of uranium will be required to meet national security requirements and an estimate of the time for production operations and the cost for each type of enrichment being considered.
(8) A description of changes in policy that would mitigate any shortfall in obtaining unencumbered uranium to meet national security requirements and the implications of those changes.
(c) Form of plan
The plan required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(d) Definitions
In this section:
(1) The term "depleted", with respect to uranium, means that the uranium is depleted in uranium-235 compared with natural uranium.
(2) The term "unencumbered", with respect to uranium, means that the United States has no obligation to foreign governments to use the uranium for only peaceful purposes.
(
Amendments
2017—Subsec. (a).
§2538d. Incorporation of integrated surety architecture
(a) Shipments
(1) The Administrator shall ensure that shipments described in paragraph (2) incorporate surety technologies relating to transportation and shipping developed by the Integrated Surety Architecture program of the Administration.
(2) A shipment described in this paragraph is an over-the-road shipment of the Administration that involves any nuclear weapon planned to be in the active stockpile after 2025.
(b) Certain programs
(1) The Administrator, in coordination with the Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council, shall ensure that each program described in paragraph (2) incorporates integrated designs compatible with the Integrated Surety Architecture program.
(2) A program described in this subsection is a program of the Administration that is a warhead development program, a life extension program, or a warhead major alteration program.
(c) Determination
(1) If, on a case-by-case basis, the Administrator determines that a shipment under subsection (a) will not incorporate some or all of the surety technologies described in such subsection, or that a program under subsection (b) will not incorporate some or all of the integrated designs described in such subsection, the Administrator shall submit such determination to the congressional defense committees, including the results of an analysis conducted pursuant to paragraph (2).
(2) Each determination made under paragraph (1) shall be based on a documented, system risk analysis that considers security risk reduction, operational impacts, and technical risk.
(d) Termination
The requirements of subsections (a) and (b) shall terminate on December 31, 2029.
(
Part B—Tritium
§2541. Tritium production program
(a) Establishment of program
The Secretary of Energy shall establish a tritium production program that is capable of meeting the tritium requirements of the United States for nuclear weapons.
(b) Location of tritium production facility
The Secretary shall locate any new tritium production facility of the Department of Energy at the Savannah River Site, South Carolina.
(c) In-reactor tests
The Secretary may perform in-reactor tests of tritium target rods as part of the activities carried out under the commercial light water reactor program.
(
Codification
Section was formerly set out as a note under
Subsec. (b) of
Amendments
2013—
Subsec. (c).
2003—Subsec. (a)(1).
Subsec. (b).
Subsecs. (d)(2)(B), (e).
§2542. Tritium recycling
(a) In general
Except as provided in subsection (b), the following activities shall be carried out at the Savannah River Site, South Carolina:
(1) All tritium recycling for weapons, including tritium refitting.
(2) All activities regarding tritium formerly carried out at the Mound Plant, Ohio.
(b) Exception
The following activities may be carried out at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico:
(1) Research on tritium.
(2) Work on tritium in support of the defense inertial confinement fusion program.
(3) Provision of technical assistance to the Savannah River Site regarding the weapons surveillance program.
(
§2543. Repealed. Pub. L. 113–66, div. C, title XXXI, §3146(c)(11)(B), Dec. 26, 2013, 127 Stat. 1075
Section,
§2544. Modernization and consolidation of tritium recycling facilities
The Secretary of Energy shall carry out activities at the Savannah River Site, South Carolina, to—
(1) modernize and consolidate the facilities for recycling tritium from weapons; and
(2) provide a modern tritium extraction facility so as to ensure that such facilities have a capacity to recycle tritium from weapons that is adequate to meet the requirements for tritium for weapons specified in the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum.
(
Amendments
2013—
2003—Subsec. (b).
§2545. Procedures for meeting tritium production requirements
(a) Production of new tritium
The Secretary of Energy shall produce new tritium to meet the requirements of the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum at the Tennessee Valley Authority Watts Bar or Sequoyah nuclear power plants consistent with the Secretary's December 22, 1998, decision document designating the Secretary's preferred tritium production technology.
(b) Support
To support the method of tritium production set forth in subsection (a), the Secretary shall design and construct a new tritium extraction facility in the H-Area of the Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina.
(c) Design and engineering development
The Secretary shall—
(1) complete preliminary design and engineering development of the Accelerator Production of Tritium technology design as a backup source of tritium to the source set forth in subsection (a) and consistent with the Secretary's December 22, 1998, decision document; and
(2) make available those funds necessary to complete engineering development and demonstration, preliminary design, and detailed design of key elements of the system consistent with the Secretary's decision document of December 22, 1998.
(
SUBCHAPTER III—PROLIFERATION MATTERS
§2561. Repealed. Pub. L. 111–84, div. C, title XXXI, §3117(a), Oct. 28, 2009, 123 Stat. 2709
Section,
§2562. Repealed. Pub. L. 113–66, div. C, title XXXI, §3146(d)(1)(A), Dec. 26, 2013, 127 Stat. 1075
Section,
§2563. Repealed. Pub. L. 115–91, div. C, title XXXI, §3133(a)(1), Dec. 12, 2017, 131 Stat. 1896
Section,
§2564. Repealed. Pub. L. 113–66, div. C, title XXXI, §3146(d)(2)(A), Dec. 26, 2013, 127 Stat. 1075
Section,
§2565. Authority to conduct program relating to fissile materials
The Secretary of Energy may conduct programs designed to improve the protection, control, and accountability of fissile materials in Russia.
(
Codification
Section was formerly set out as a note under
Amendments
2002—
Completion of Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Activities in the Russian Federation
"(1)
"(2)
§2566. Disposition of weapons-usable plutonium at Savannah River Site
(a) Plan for construction and operation of MOX facility
(1) Not later than February 1, 2003, the Secretary of Energy shall submit to Congress a plan for the construction and operation of the MOX facility at the Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina.
(2) The plan under paragraph (1) shall include—
(A) a schedule for construction and operations so as to achieve, as of January 1, 2012, and thereafter, the MOX production objective, and to produce 1 metric ton of mixed-oxide fuel by December 31, 2012; and
(B) a schedule of operations of the MOX facility designed so that 34 metric tons of defense plutonium and defense plutonium materials at the Savannah River Site will be processed into mixed-oxide fuel by January 1, 2019.
(3)(A) Not later than February 15 each year, beginning in 2004 and continuing for as long as the MOX facility is in use, the Secretary shall submit to Congress a report on the implementation of the plan required by paragraph (1).
(B) Each report under subparagraph (A) for years before 2010 shall include—
(i) an assessment of compliance with the schedules included with the plan under paragraph (2); and
(ii) a certification by the Secretary whether or not the MOX production objective can be met by January 2012.
(C) Each report under subparagraph (A) for years after 2014 shall—
(i) address whether the MOX production objective has been met; and
(ii) assess progress toward meeting the obligations of the United States under the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement.
(D) Each report under subparagraph (A) for years after 2019 shall also include an assessment of compliance with the MOX production objective and, if not in compliance, the plan of the Secretary for achieving one of the following:
(i) Compliance with such objective.
(ii) Removal of all remaining defense plutonium and defense plutonium materials from the State of South Carolina.
(b) Corrective actions
(1) If a report under subsection (a)(3) indicates that construction or operation of the MOX facility is behind the applicable schedule under subsection (g) by 12 months or more, the Secretary shall submit to Congress, not later than August 15 of the year in which such report is submitted, a plan for corrective actions to be implemented by the Secretary to ensure that the MOX facility project is capable of meeting the MOX production objective.
(2) If a plan is submitted under paragraph (1) in any year after 2008, the plan shall include corrective actions to be implemented by the Secretary to ensure that the MOX production objective is met.
(3) Any plan for corrective actions under paragraph (1) or (2) shall include established milestones under such plan for achieving compliance with the MOX production objective.
(4) If, before January 1, 2012, the Secretary determines that there is a substantial and material risk that the MOX production objective will not be achieved by 2012 because of a failure to achieve milestones set forth in the most recent corrective action plan under this subsection, the Secretary shall suspend further transfers of defense plutonium and defense plutonium materials to be processed by the MOX facility until such risk is addressed and the Secretary certifies that the MOX production objective can be met by 2012.
(5) If, after January 1, 2014, the Secretary determines that the MOX production objective has not been achieved because of a failure to achieve milestones set forth in the most recent corrective action plan under this subsection, the Secretary shall suspend further transfers of defense plutonium and defense plutonium materials to be processed by the MOX facility until the Secretary certifies that the MOX production objective can be met.
(6)(A) Upon making a determination under paragraph (4) or (5), the Secretary shall submit to Congress a report on the options for removing from the State of South Carolina an amount of defense plutonium or defense plutonium materials equal to the amount of defense plutonium or defense plutonium materials transferred to the State of South Carolina after April 15, 2002.
(B) Each report under subparagraph (A) shall include an analysis of each option set forth in the report, including the cost and schedule for implementation of such option, and any requirements under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (
(C) Upon submittal of a report under subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall commence any analysis that may be required under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 in order to select among the options set forth in the report.
(c) Contingent requirement for removal of plutonium and materials from Savannah River Site
If the MOX production objective is not achieved as of January 1, 2014, the Secretary shall, consistent with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 [
(1) not later than January 1, 2016, not less than 1 metric ton of defense plutonium or defense plutonium materials; and
(2) not later than January 1, 2022, an amount of defense plutonium or defense plutonium materials equal to the amount of defense plutonium or defense plutonium materials transferred to the Savannah River Site between April 15, 2002, and January 1, 2022, but not processed by the MOX facility.
(d) Economic and impact assistance
(1) If the MOX production objective is not achieved as of January 1, 2016, the Secretary shall, subject to the availability of appropriations, pay to the State of South Carolina each year beginning on or after that date through 2021 for economic and impact assistance an amount equal to $1,000,000 per day, not to exceed $100,000,000 per year, until the later of—
(A) the date on which the MOX production objective is achieved in such year; or
(B) the date on which the Secretary has removed from the State of South Carolina in such year at least 1 metric ton of defense plutonium or defense plutonium materials.
(2)(A) If, as of January 1, 2022, the MOX facility has not processed mixed-oxide fuel from defense plutonium and defense plutonium materials in the amount of not less than—
(i) one metric ton, in each of any two consecutive calendar years; and
(ii) three metric tons total,
the Secretary shall, from funds available to the Secretary, pay to the State of South Carolina for economic and impact assistance an amount equal to $1,000,000 per day, not to exceed $100,000,000 per year, until the removal by the Secretary from the State of South Carolina of an amount of defense plutonium or defense plutonium materials equal to the amount of defense plutonium or defense plutonium materials transferred to the Savannah River Site between April 15, 2002, and January 1, 2022, but not processed by the MOX facility.
(B) Nothing in this paragraph may be construed to terminate, supersede, or otherwise affect any other requirements of this section.
(3) If the State of South Carolina obtains an injunction that prohibits the Department of Energy from taking any action necessary for the Department to meet any deadline specified by this subsection, that deadline shall be extended for a period of time equal to the period of time during which the injunction is in effect.
(e) Failure to complete planned disposition program
If on July 1 each year beginning in 2025 and continuing for as long as the MOX facility is in use, less than 34 metric tons of defense plutonium or defense plutonium materials have been processed by the MOX facility, the Secretary shall submit to Congress a plan for—
(1) completing the processing of 34 metric tons of defense plutonium and defense plutonium material by the MOX facility; or
(2) removing from the State of South Carolina an amount of defense plutonium or defense plutonium materials equal to the amount of defense plutonium or defense plutonium materials transferred to the Savannah River Site after April 15, 2002, but not processed by the MOX facility.
(f) Removal of mixed-oxide fuel upon completion of operations of MOX facility
If, one year after the date on which operation of the MOX facility permanently ceases, any mixed-oxide fuel remains at the Savannah River Site, the Secretary shall submit to Congress—
(1) a report on when such fuel will be transferred for use in commercial nuclear reactors; or
(2) a plan for removing such fuel from the State of South Carolina.
(g) Baseline
Not later than December 31, 2006, the Secretary shall submit to Congress a report on the construction and operation of the MOX facility that includes a schedule for revising the requirements of this section during fiscal year 2007 to conform with the schedule established by the Secretary for the MOX facility, which shall be based on estimated funding levels for the fiscal year.
(h) Definitions
In this section:
(1) MOX production objective
The term "MOX production objective" means production at the MOX facility of mixed-oxide fuel from defense plutonium and defense plutonium materials at an average rate equivalent to not less than one metric ton of mixed-oxide fuel per year. The average rate shall be determined by measuring production at the MOX facility from the date the facility is declared operational to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission through the date of assessment.
(2) MOX facility
The term "MOX facility" means the mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facility at the Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina.
(3) Defense plutonium; defense plutonium materials
The terms "defense plutonium" and "defense plutonium materials" mean weapons-usable plutonium.
(
References in Text
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, referred to in subsecs. (b)(6)(B), (C) and (c), is
Amendments
2014—Subsec. (b)(6)(C).
Subsec. (c)(2).
Subsec. (d)(3).
2013—Subsec. (a)(3)(C).
Subsec. (a)(3)(D).
Subsec. (b)(1).
Subsec. (b)(5).
Subsec. (c).
Subsec. (c)(1).
Subsec. (c)(2).
Subsec. (d)(1).
Subsec. (d)(2)(A).
Subsec. (e).
2005—Subsec. (a)(2)(A).
Subsec. (a)(3)(B)(ii).
Subsec. (a)(3)(C).
Subsec. (b)(1).
Subsec. (b)(4).
Subsec. (b)(5).
Subsec. (c).
Subsec. (c)(1).
Subsec. (c)(2).
Subsec. (d)(1).
Subsec. (d)(2)(A).
Subsec. (e).
Subsecs. (g), (h).
§2567. Disposition of surplus defense plutonium at Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina
(a) Consultation required
The Secretary of Energy shall consult with the Governor of the State of South Carolina regarding any decisions or plans of the Secretary related to the disposition of surplus defense plutonium and defense plutonium materials located at the Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina.
(b) Notice required
For each shipment of defense plutonium or defense plutonium materials to the Savannah River Site, the Secretary shall, not less than 30 days before the commencement of such shipment, submit to the congressional defense committees a report providing notice of such shipment.
(c) Plan for disposition
The Secretary shall prepare a plan for disposal of the surplus defense plutonium and defense plutonium materials currently located at the Savannah River Site and for disposal of defense plutonium and defense plutonium materials to be shipped to the Savannah River Site in the future. The plan shall include the following:
(1) A review of each option considered for such disposal.
(2) An identification of the preferred option for such disposal.
(3) With respect to the facilities for such disposal that are required by the Department of Energy's Record of Decision for the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement dated January 14, 1997—
(A) a statement of the cost of construction and operation of such facilities;
(B) a schedule for the expeditious construction of such facilities, including milestones; and
(C) a firm schedule for funding the cost of such facilities.
(4) A specification of the means by which all such defense plutonium and defense plutonium materials will be removed in a timely manner from the Savannah River Site for storage or disposal elsewhere.
(d) Plan for alternative disposition
If the Secretary determines not to proceed at the Savannah River Site with construction of the plutonium immobilization plant, or with the mixed oxide fuel fabrication facility, the Secretary shall prepare a plan that identifies a disposition path for all defense plutonium and defense plutonium materials that would otherwise have been disposed of at such plant or such facility, as applicable.
(e) Submission of plans
Not later than February 1, 2002, the Secretary shall submit to Congress the plan required by subsection (c) (and the plan prepared under subsection (d), if applicable).
(f) Limitation on plutonium shipments
If the Secretary does not submit to Congress the plan required by subsection (c) (and the plan prepared under subsection (d), if applicable) by February 1, 2002, the Secretary shall be prohibited from shipping defense plutonium or defense plutonium materials to the Savannah River Site during the period beginning on February 1, 2002, and ending on the date on which such plans are submitted to Congress.
(g) Rule of construction
Nothing in this section may be construed to prohibit or limit the Secretary from shipping defense plutonium or defense plutonium materials to sites other than the Savannah River Site during the period referred to in subsection (f) or any other period.
(h) Annual report on funding for fissile materials disposition activities
The Secretary shall include with the budget justification materials submitted to Congress in support of the Department of Energy budget for each fiscal year (as submitted with the budget of the President under
(
§2568. Authority to use international nuclear materials protection and cooperation program funds outside the former Soviet Union
(a) Authority
Subject to the provisions of this section, the President may obligate and expend international nuclear materials protection and cooperation program funds for a fiscal year, and any such funds for a fiscal year before such fiscal year that remain available for obligation, for a defense nuclear nonproliferation project or activity outside the states of the former Soviet Union that has not previously been authorized by Congress if the President determines each of the following:
(1) That such project or activity will—
(A)(i) assist the United States in the resolution of a critical emerging proliferation threat; or
(ii) permit the United States to take advantage of opportunities to achieve long-standing nonproliferation goals; and
(B) be completed in a short period of time.
(2) That the Department of Energy is the entity of the Federal Government that is most capable of carrying out such project or activity.
(b) Scope of authority
The authority in subsection (a) to obligate and expend funds for a project or activity includes authority to provide equipment, goods, and services for such project or activity utilizing such funds, but does not include authority to provide cash directly to such project or activity.
(c) Limitation on availability of funds
(1) The President may not obligate funds for a project or activity under the authority in subsection (a) until the President makes each determination specified in that subsection with respect to such project or activity.
(2) Not later than 10 days after obligating funds under the authority in subsection (a) for a project or activity, the President shall notify Congress in writing of the determinations made under paragraph (1) with respect to such project or activity, together with—
(A) a justification for such determinations; and
(B) a description of the scope and duration of such project or activity.
(d) Additional limitations and requirements
Except as otherwise provided in subsections (a) and (b), the exercise of the authority in subsection (a) shall be subject to any requirement or limitation under another provision of law as follows:
(1) Any requirement for prior notice or other reports to Congress on the use of international nuclear materials protection and cooperation program funds or on international nuclear materials protection and cooperation program projects or activities.
(2) Any limitation on the obligation or expenditure of international nuclear materials protection and cooperation program funds.
(3) Any limitation on international nuclear materials protection and cooperation program projects or activities.
(e) Funds
As used in this section, the term "international nuclear materials protection and cooperation program funds" means the funds appropriated pursuant to an authorization of appropriations for the International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation Program.
(
Codification
Section was enacted as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, and not as part of the Atomic Energy Defense Act which comprises this chapter.
Amendments
2004—Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (c).
Subsec. (d).
Subsec. (e).
Subsec. (f).
§2569. Acceleration of removal or security of fissile materials, radiological materials, and related equipment at vulnerable sites worldwide
(a) Sense of Congress
(1) It is the sense of Congress that the security, including the rapid removal or secure storage, of high-risk, proliferation-attractive fissile materials, radiological materials, and related equipment at vulnerable sites worldwide should be a top priority among the activities to achieve the national security of the United States.
(2) It is the sense of Congress that the President may establish in the Department of Energy a task force to be known as the Task Force on Nuclear Materials to carry out the program authorized by subsection (b).
(b) Program authorized
The Secretary of Energy may carry out a program to undertake an accelerated, comprehensive worldwide effort to mitigate the threats posed by high-risk, proliferation-attractive fissile materials, radiological materials, and related equipment located at sites potentially vulnerable to theft or diversion.
(c) Program elements
(1) Activities under the program under subsection (b) may include the following:
(A) Accelerated efforts to secure, remove, or eliminate proliferation-attractive fissile materials or radiological materials in research reactors, other reactors, and other facilities worldwide.
(B) Arrangements for the secure shipment of proliferation-attractive fissile materials, radiological materials, and related equipment to other countries willing to accept such materials and equipment, or to the United States if such countries cannot be identified, and the provision of secure storage or disposition of such materials and equipment following shipment.
(C) The transportation of proliferation-attractive fissile materials, radiological materials, and related equipment from sites identified as proliferation risks to secure facilities in other countries or in the United States.
(D) The processing and packaging of proliferation-attractive fissile materials, radiological materials, and related equipment in accordance with required standards for transport, storage, and disposition.
(E) The provision of interim security upgrades for vulnerable, proliferation-attractive fissile materials, radiological materials, and related equipment pending their removal from their current sites.
(F) The utilization of funds to upgrade security and accounting at sites where proliferation-attractive fissile materials or radiological materials will remain for an extended period of time in order to ensure that such materials are secure against plausible potential threats and will remain so in the future.
(G) The management of proliferation-attractive fissile materials, radiological materials, and related equipment at secure facilities.
(H) Actions to ensure that security, including security upgrades at sites and facilities for the storage or disposition of proliferation-attractive fissile materials, radiological materials, and related equipment, continues to function as intended.
(I) The provision of technical support to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), other countries, and other entities to facilitate removal of, and security upgrades to facilities that contain, proliferation-attractive fissile materials, radiological materials, and related equipment worldwide.
(J) The development of alternative fuels and irradiation targets based on low-enriched uranium to convert research or other reactors fueled by highly-enriched uranium to such alternative fuels, as well as the conversion of reactors and irradiation targets employing highly-enriched uranium to employment of such alternative fuels and targets.
(K) Accelerated actions for the blend down of highly-enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium.
(L) The provision of assistance in the closure and decommissioning of sites identified as presenting risks of proliferation of proliferation-attractive fissile materials, radiological materials, and related equipment.
(M) Programs to—
(i) assist in the placement of employees displaced as a result of actions pursuant to the program in enterprises not representing a proliferation threat; and
(ii) convert sites identified as presenting risks of proliferation regarding proliferation-attractive fissile materials, radiological materials, and related equipment to purposes not representing a proliferation threat to the extent necessary to eliminate the proliferation threat.
(2) The Secretary of Energy shall, in coordination with the Secretary of State, carry out the program in consultation with, and with the assistance of, appropriate departments, agencies, and other entities of the United States Government.
(3) The Secretary of Energy shall, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, carry out activities under the program in collaboration with such foreign governments, non-governmental organizations, and other international entities as the Secretary of Energy considers appropriate for the program.
(d) Reports
(1) Not later than March 15, 2005, the Secretary of Energy shall submit to Congress a classified interim report on the program under subsection (b).
(2) Not later than January 1, 2006, the Secretary shall submit to Congress a classified final report on the program under subsection (b) that includes the following:
(A) A survey by the Secretary of the facilities and sites worldwide that contain proliferation-attractive fissile materials, radiological materials, or related equipment.
(B) A list of sites determined by the Secretary to be of the highest priority, taking into account risk of theft from such sites, for removal or security of proliferation-attractive fissile materials, radiological materials, or related equipment, organized by level of priority.
(C) A plan, including activities under the program under this section, for the removal, security, or both of proliferation-attractive fissile materials, radiological materials, or related equipment at vulnerable facilities and sites worldwide, including measurable milestones, metrics, and estimated costs for the implementation of the plan.
(3) A summary of each report under this subsection shall also be submitted to Congress in unclassified form.
(e) Funding
Amounts authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of Energy for defense nuclear nonproliferation activities shall be available for purposes of the program under this section.
(f) Participation by other governments and organizations
(1) In general
The Secretary of Energy may, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, enter into one or more agreements with any person (including a foreign government, international organization, or multinational entity) that the Secretary of Energy considers appropriate under which the person contributes funds for purposes of the programs described in paragraph (2).
(2) Programs covered
The programs described in this paragraph are any programs within the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation of the National Nuclear Security Administration.
(3) Retention and use of amounts
Notwithstanding
(4) Return of amounts not used within 5 years
If an amount contributed under an agreement under paragraph (1) is not used under this subsection within 5 years after it was contributed, the Secretary of Energy shall return that amount to the person who contributed it.
(5) Annual report
Not later than October 31 of each year, the Secretary of Energy shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the receipt and use of amounts under this subsection during the preceding fiscal year. Each report for a fiscal year shall set forth—
(A) a statement of any amounts received under this subsection, including, for each such amount, the value of the contribution and the person who contributed it;
(B) a statement of any amounts used under this subsection, including, for each such amount, the purposes for which the amount was used; and
(C) a statement of the amounts retained but not used under this subsection, including, for each such amount, the purposes (if known) for which the Secretary intends to use the amount.
(6) Expiration
The authority to accept, retain, and use contributions under this subsection expires on December 31, 2023.
(g) Definitions
In this section:
(1) The term "fissile materials" means plutonium, highly-enriched uranium, or other material capable of sustaining an explosive nuclear chain reaction, including irradiated items containing such materials if the radiation field from such items is not sufficient to prevent the theft or misuse of such items.
(2) The term "radiological materials" includes Americium-241, Californium-252, Cesium-137, Cobalt-60, Iridium-192, Plutonium-238, Radium-226, Strontium-90, Curium-244, and irradiated items containing such materials, or other materials designated by the Secretary of Energy for purposes of this paragraph.
(3) The term "related equipment" includes equipment useful for enrichment of uranium in the isotope 235 and for extraction of fissile materials from irradiated fuel rods and other equipment designated by the Secretary of Energy for purposes of this section.
(4) The term "highly-enriched uranium" means uranium enriched to or above 20 percent in the isotope 235.
(5) The term "low-enriched uranium" means uranium enriched below 20 percent in the isotope 235.
(6) The term "proliferation-attractive", in the case of fissile materials and radiological materials, means quantities and types of such materials that are determined by the Secretary of Energy to present a significant risk to the national security of the United States if diverted to a use relating to proliferation.
(
Codification
Section was enacted as part of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, and not as part of the Atomic Energy Defense Act which comprises this chapter.
Amendments
2018—Subsec. (f)(5).
Subsec. (f)(6), (7).
2013—Subsec. (f)(2).
Subsec. (f)(7).
2006—Subsecs. (f), (g).
Acceleration of Replacement of Cesium Blood Irradiation Sources
"(a)
"(b)
"(1) is voluntary for owners of blood irradiation devices;
"(2) allows for the United States, subject to the review of the Administrator, to pay up to 50 percent of the per-device cost of replacing blood irradiation devices covered by the programs;
"(3) allows for the United States to pay up to 100 percent of the cost of removing and disposing of cesium sources retired from service by the programs; and
"(4) replaces such devices with x-ray irradiation devices or other devices approved by the Food and Drug Administration that provide significant threat reduction as compared to cesium chloride irradiators.
"(c)
"(d)
"(1) identification of each cesium chloride blood irradiation device in the United States, including the number, general location, and user type;
"(2) a plan for achieving the goal established by subsection (a);
"(3) a methodology for prioritizing replacement of such devices that takes into account irradiator age and prior material security initiatives;
"(4) in consultation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Food and Drug Administration, a strategy identifying any legislative, regulatory, or other measures necessary to constrain the introduction of new cesium chloride blood irradiation devices;
"(5) identification of the annual funds required to meet the goal established by subsection (a); and
"(6) a description of the disposal path for cesium chloride sources under the covered programs.
"(e)
"(1) the number of replacement irradiators under the covered programs;
"(2) the life-cycle costs of the programs, including personnel training, maintenance, and replacement costs for new irradiation devices;
"(3) the cost-effectiveness of the covered programs;
"(4) an analysis of the effectiveness of the new irradiation devices' technology; and
"(5) a forecast of whether the Administrator will meet the goal established in subsection (a).
"(f)
"(1)
"(A) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives; and
"(B) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, and the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions of the Senate.
"(2)
"(A) The Cesium Irradiator Replacement Program.
"(B) The Off-Site Source Recovery Program."
"Congressional Defense Committees" Defined
Congressional defense committees has the meaning given that term in
§2570. Silk Road Initiative
(a) Program authorized
(1) The Secretary of Energy may carry out a program, to be known as the Silk Road Initiative, to promote non-weapons-related employment opportunities for scientists, engineers, and technicians formerly engaged in activities to develop and produce weapons of mass destruction in Silk Road nations. The program should—
(A) incorporate best practices under the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program; and
(B) facilitate commercial partnerships between private entities in the United States and scientists, engineers, and technicians in the Silk Road nations.
(2) Before implementing the program with respect to multiple Silk Road nations, the Secretary of Energy shall carry out a pilot program with respect to one Silk Road nation selected by the Secretary. It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary should select the Republic of Georgia.
(b) Silk Road nations defined
In this section, the Silk Road nations are Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Republic of Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
(c) Funding
Of the funds authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Energy for nonproliferation and international security for fiscal year 2005, up to $10,000,000 may be used to carry out this section.
(
Codification
Section was enacted as part of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, and not as part of the Atomic Energy Defense Act which comprises this chapter.
§2571. Nuclear Nonproliferation Fellowships for scientists employed by United States and Russian Federation
(a) In general
(1) From amounts made available to carry out this section, the Administrator for Nuclear Security may carry out a program under which the Administrator awards, to scientists employed at nonproliferation research laboratories of the Russian Federation and the United States, international exchange fellowships, to be known as Nuclear Nonproliferation Fellowships, in the nuclear nonproliferation sciences.
(2) The purpose of the program shall be to provide opportunities for advancement in the nuclear nonproliferation sciences to scientists who, as demonstrated by their academic or professional achievements, show particular promise of making significant contributions in those sciences.
(3) A fellowship awarded to a scientist under the program shall be for collaborative study and training or advanced research at—
(A) a nonproliferation research laboratory of the Russian Federation, in the case of a scientist employed at a nonproliferation research laboratory of the United States; and
(B) a nonproliferation research laboratory of the United States, in the case of a scientist employed at a nonproliferation research laboratory of the Russian Federation.
(4) The duration of a fellowship under the program may not exceed two years, except that the Administrator may provide for a longer duration in an individual case to the extent warranted by extraordinary circumstances, as determined by the Administrator.
(5) In a calendar year, the Administrator may not award more than—
(A) one fellowship to a scientist employed at a nonproliferation research laboratory of the Russian Federation; and
(B) one fellowship to a scientist employed at a nonproliferation research laboratory of the United States.
(6) A fellowship under the program shall include—
(A) travel expenses; and
(B) any other expenses that the Administrator considers appropriate, such as room and board.
(b) Definitions
In this section:
(1) The term "nonproliferation research laboratory" means, with respect to a country, a national laboratory of that country at which research in the nuclear nonproliferation sciences is carried out.
(2) The term "nuclear nonproliferation sciences" means bodies of scientific knowledge relevant to developing or advancing the means to prevent or impede the proliferation of nuclear weaponry.
(3) The term "scientist" means an individual who has a degree from an institution of higher education in a science that has practical application in the nuclear nonproliferation sciences.
(c) Funding
Amounts available to the Department of Energy for defense nuclear nonproliferation activities shall be available for the fellowships authorized by subsection (a).
(
Codification
Section was enacted as part of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, and not as part of the Atomic Energy Defense Act which comprises this chapter.
Program on Scientific Engagement for Nonproliferation
"(a)
"(1)
"(2)
"(A) Training and capacity-building to strengthen nonproliferation and security best practices.
"(B) Engagement of scientists of the United States with foreign counterparts to advance nonproliferation goals.
"(3)
"(b)
"(1)
"(A) For each country selected for the program as of the date of such report—
"(i) a proliferation threat assessment prepared by the Director of National Intelligence; and
"(ii) metrics for evaluating the effectiveness of the program.
"(B) Accounting standards for the conduct of the program approved by the Comptroller General of the United States.
"(2)
"(c)
"(1)
"(2)
"(3)
"(A) determines that the modification is urgent and necessary to the national security interests of the United States; and
"(B) not later than 30 days after making the modification, submits to the appropriate congressional committees—
"(i) the report on the modification required by paragraph (1); and
"(ii) a justification for exercising the waiver authority under this paragraph.
"(4)
"(d)
"(e)
"(f)
"(1) The congressional defense committees [Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives].
"(2) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate."
§2572. International agreements on nuclear weapons data
The Secretary of Energy may, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, enter into agreements with countries or international organizations to conduct data collection and analysis to determine accurately and in a timely manner the source of any components of, or fissile material used or attempted to be used in, a nuclear device or weapon.
(
§2573. International agreements on information on radioactive materials
The Secretary of Energy may, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, enter into agreements with countries or international organizations—
(1) to acquire for the materials information program of the Department of Energy validated information on the physical characteristics of radioactive material produced, used, or stored at various locations, in order to facilitate the ability to determine accurately and in a timely manner the source of any components of, or fissile material used or attempted to be used in, a nuclear device or weapon; and
(2) to obtain access to information described in paragraph (1) in the event of—
(A) a nuclear detonation; or
(B) the interdiction or discovery of a nuclear device or weapon or nuclear material.
(
§2574. Enhancing nuclear forensics capabilities
(a) Research and development plan for nuclear forensics and attribution
(1) Research and development
The Secretary of Energy shall prepare and implement a research and development plan to improve nuclear forensics capabilities in the Department of Energy and at the national laboratories overseen by the Department of Energy. The plan shall focus on improving the technical capabilities required—
(A) to enable a robust and timely nuclear forensic response to a nuclear explosion or to the interdiction of nuclear material or a nuclear weapon anywhere in the world; and
(B) to develop an international database that can attribute nuclear material or a nuclear weapon to its source.
(2) Reports
(A) The Secretary of Energy shall submit to the congressional defense committees—
(i) not later than 6 months after October 14, 2008, a report on the contents of the research and development plan described in paragraph (1), and any legislative changes required to implement the plan; and
(ii) not later than 18 months after October 14, 2008, a report on the status of implementing the plan.
(B) The Secretary shall submit each report required by this subsection in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex with such report.
(b) Omitted
(c) Presidential report
(1) In general
Not later than 90 days after October 14, 2008, the President shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the involvement of senior-level executive branch leadership in nuclear terrorism preparedness exercises that include nuclear forensics analysis.
(2) Appropriate committees of Congress
In this subsection, the term "appropriate committees of Congress" means—
(A) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
(
Codification
Section is comprised of section 3114 of
Section was enacted as part of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, and not as part of the Atomic Energy Defense Act which comprises this chapter.
"Congressional Defense Committees" Defined
Congressional defense committees has the meaning given that term in
§2575. Defense nuclear nonproliferation management plan
(a) Plan required
The Administrator shall develop and annually update a five-year management plan for activities associated with the defense nuclear nonproliferation programs of the Administration to prevent and counter the proliferation of materials, technology, equipment, and expertise related to nuclear and radiological weapons in order to minimize and address the risk of nuclear terrorism and the proliferation of such weapons.
(b) Submission to Congress
(1) Not later than March 15 of each even-numbered year, the Administrator shall submit to the congressional defense committees a summary of the plan developed under subsection (a).
(2) Not later than March 15 of each odd-numbered year, the Administrator shall submit to the congressional defense committees a detailed report on the plan developed under subsection (a).
(3) Each summary submitted under paragraph (1) and each report submitted under paragraph (2) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex if necessary.
(c) Elements
The plan required by subsection (a) shall include, with respect to each defense nuclear nonproliferation program of the Administration, the following:
(1) A description of the policy context in which the program operates, including—
(A) a list of relevant laws, policy directives issued by the President, and international agreements; and
(B) nuclear nonproliferation activities carried out by other Federal agencies.
(2) A description of the objectives and priorities of the program during the year preceding the submission of the summary required by paragraph (1) of subsection (b) or the report required by paragraph (2) of that subsection, as the case may be.
(3) A description of the activities carried out under the program during that year.
(4) A description of the accomplishments and challenges of the program during that year, based on an assessment of metrics and objectives previously established to determine the effectiveness of the program.
(5) A description of any gaps that remain that were not or could not be addressed by the program during that year.
(6) An identification and explanation of uncommitted or uncosted balances for the program, as of the date of the submission of the summary required by paragraph (1) of subsection (b) or the report required by paragraph (2) of that subsection, as the case may be, that are greater than the acceptable carryover thresholds, as determined by the Secretary of Energy.
(7) An identification of funds for the program received through contributions from or cost-sharing agreements with foreign governments consistent 1
(8) A description and assessment of activities carried out under the program during that year that were coordinated with other elements of the Department of Energy, with the Department of Defense, and with other Federal agencies, to maximize efficiency and avoid redundancies.
(9) Plans for activities of the program during the five-year period beginning on the date on which the summary required by paragraph (1) of subsection (b) or the report required by paragraph (2) of that subsection, as the case may be, is submitted, including activities with respect to the following:
(A) Preventing nuclear and radiological proliferation and terrorism, including through—
(i) material management and minimization, particularly with respect to removing or minimizing the use of highly enriched uranium, plutonium, and radiological materials worldwide (and identifying the countries in which such materials are located), efforts to dispose of surplus material, converting reactors from highly enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium (and identifying the countries in which such reactors are located);
(ii) global nuclear material security, including securing highly enriched uranium, plutonium, and radiological materials worldwide (and identifying the countries in which such materials are located), and providing radiation detection capabilities at foreign ports and borders;
(iii) nonproliferation and arms control, including nuclear verification and safeguards;
(iv) defense nuclear research and development, including a description of activities related to developing and improving technology to detect the proliferation and detonation of nuclear weapons, verifying compliance of foreign countries with commitments under treaties and agreements relating to nuclear weapons, and detecting the diversion of nuclear materials (including safeguards technology); and
(v) nonproliferation construction programs, including activities associated 1 Department of Energy Order 413.1 (relating to program management controls).
(B) Countering nuclear and radiological proliferation and terrorism.
(C) Responding to nuclear and radiological proliferation and terrorism, including through—
(i) crisis operations;
(ii) consequences management; and
(iii) emergency management, including international capacity building.
(10) A threat assessment, carried out by the intelligence community (as defined in
(11) A plan for funding the program during that five-year period.
(12) An identification of metrics and objectives for determining the effectiveness of each activity carried out under the program during that five-year period.
(13) A description of the activities to be carried out under the program during that five-year period and a description of how the program will be prioritized relative to other defense nuclear nonproliferation programs of the Administration during that five-year period to address the highest priority risks and requirements, as informed by the threat assessment carried out under paragraph (10).
(14) A description and assessment of activities to be carried out under the program during that five-year period that will be coordinated with other elements of the Department of Energy, with the Department of Defense, and with other Federal agencies, to maximize efficiency and avoid redundancies.
(15) A summary of the technologies and capabilities documented under
(16) A summary of the assessments conducted under
(17) Such other matters as the Administrator considers appropriate.
(
Amendments
2018—Subsec. (c)(16) to (18).
2017—Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (b).
Subsec. (b)(16) to (18).
Subsec. (c).
Subsec. (c)(2).
Subsec. (c)(6).
Subsec. (c)(7).
Subsec. (c)(9).
Subsec. (c)(10).
Subsec. (c)(14) to (16).
1 So in original. Probably should be followed by "with".
§2576. Information relating to certain defense nuclear nonproliferation programs
(a) Technologies and capabilities
The Administrator shall document, for efforts that are not focused on basic research, the technologies and capabilities of the defense nuclear nonproliferation research and development program that—
(1) are transitioned to end users for further development or deployment; and
(2) are deployed.
(b) Assessments of status
(1) In assessing projects under the defense nuclear nonproliferation research and development program or the defense nuclear nonproliferation and arms control program, the Administrator shall compare the status of each such project, including with respect to the final results of such project, to the baseline targets and goals established in the initial project plan of such project.
(2) The Administrator may carry out paragraph (1) using a common template or such other means as the Administrator determines appropriate.
(
§2577. Annual Selected Acquisition Reports on certain hardware relating to defense nuclear nonproliferation
(a) Annual Selected Acquisition Reports
(1) In general
At the end of each fiscal year, the Administrator shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on each covered hardware project. The reports shall be known as Selected Acquisition Reports for the covered hardware project concerned.
(2) Matters included
The information contained in the Selected Acquisition Report for a fiscal year for a covered hardware project shall be the information contained in the Selected Acquisition Report for such fiscal year for a major defense acquisition program under
(b) Covered hardware project defined
In this section, the term "covered hardware project" means a project carried out under the defense nuclear nonproliferation research and development program that—
(1) is focused on the production and deployment of hardware, including with respect to the development and deployment of satellites or satellite payloads; and
(2) exceeds $500,000,000 in total program cost over the course of five years.
(
SUBCHAPTER IV—DEFENSE ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP MATTERS
Codification
Part A—Defense Environmental Cleanup
Codification
§2581. Defense Environmental Cleanup Account
(a) Establishment
There is hereby established in the Treasury of the United States for the Department of Energy an account to be known as the "Defense Environmental Cleanup Account" (hereafter in this section referred to as the "Account").
(b) Amounts in Account
All sums appropriated to the Department of Energy for defense environmental cleanup at defense nuclear facilities shall be credited to the Account. Such appropriations shall be authorized annually by law. To the extent provided in appropriations Acts, amounts in the Account shall remain available until expended.
(
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2013—
Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (b).
§2582. Requirement to develop future use plans for defense environmental cleanup
(a) Authority to develop future use plans
The Secretary of Energy may develop future use plans for any defense nuclear facility at which defense environmental cleanup activities are occurring.
(b) Requirement to develop future use plans
The Secretary shall develop a future use plan for each of the following defense nuclear facilities:
(1) Hanford Site, Richland, Washington.
(2) Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina.
(3) Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Idaho.
(c) Citizen advisory board
(1) At each defense nuclear facility for which the Secretary of Energy intends or is required to develop a future use plan under this section and for which no citizen advisory board has been established, the Secretary shall establish a citizen advisory board.
(2) The Secretary may authorize the manager of a defense nuclear facility for which a future use plan is developed under this section (or, if there is no such manager, an appropriate official of the Department of Energy designated by the Secretary) to pay routine administrative expenses of a citizen advisory board established for that facility. Such payments shall be made from funds available to the Secretary for defense environmental cleanup activities necessary for national security programs.
(d) Requirement to consult with citizen advisory board
In developing a future use plan under this section with respect to a defense nuclear facility, the Secretary of Energy shall consult with a citizen advisory board established pursuant to subsection (c) or a similar advisory board already in existence as of September 23, 1996, for such facility, affected local governments (including any local future use redevelopment authorities), and other appropriate State agencies.
(e) 50-year planning period
A future use plan developed under this section shall cover a period of at least 50 years.
(f) Report
Not later than 60 days after completing development of a final plan for a site listed in subsection (b), the Secretary of Energy shall submit to Congress a report on the plan. The report shall describe the plan and contain such findings and recommendations with respect to the site as the Secretary considers appropriate.
(g) Savings provisions
(1) Nothing in this section, or in a future use plan developed under this section with respect to a defense nuclear facility, shall be construed as requiring any modification to a future use plan with respect to a defense nuclear facility that was developed before September 23, 1996.
(2) Nothing in this section may be construed to affect statutory requirements for a defense environmental cleanup activity or project or to modify or otherwise affect applicable statutory or regulatory defense environmental cleanup requirements, including substantive standards intended to protect public health and the environment, nor shall anything in this section be construed to preempt or impair any local land use planning or zoning authority or State authority.
(
Codification
Section was formerly set out as a note under
Amendments
2013—
Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (b)(2) to (4).
Subsec. (c)(2).
Subsec. (f).
Subsec. (g).
Subsec. (g)(2).
Subsec. (h).
2003—Subsec. (d).
Subsec. (h)(1).
§2582a. Future-years defense environmental cleanup plan
(a) In general
The Secretary of Energy shall submit to Congress each year, at or about the same time that the President's budget is submitted to Congress for a fiscal year under
(1) reflects the estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations included in that budget for the Department of Energy for defense environmental cleanup; and
(2) covers a period that includes the fiscal year for which that budget is submitted and not less than the four succeeding fiscal years.
(b) Elements
Each future-years defense environmental cleanup plan required by subsection (a) shall contain the following:
(1) A detailed description of the projects and activities relating to defense environmental cleanup to be carried out during the period covered by the plan at the sites specified in subsection (c) and with respect to the activities specified in subsection (d).
(2) A statement of proposed budget authority, estimated expenditures, and proposed appropriations