[USC02] 50 USC CHAPTER 45, SUBCHAPTER IV: COLLECTION, ANALYSIS, AND SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE
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50 USC CHAPTER 45, SUBCHAPTER IV: COLLECTION, ANALYSIS, AND SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE
From Title 50—WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSECHAPTER 45—MISCELLANEOUS INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AUTHORITIES

SUBCHAPTER IV—COLLECTION, ANALYSIS, AND SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE

§3361. National Virtual Translation Center

(a) Establishment

The Director of National Intelligence shall establish in the intelligence community an element with the function of connecting the elements of the intelligence community engaged in the acquisition, storage, translation, or analysis of voice or data in digital form.

(b) Designation

The element established under subsection (a) shall be known as the National Virtual Translation Center.

(c) Function

The element established under subsection (a) shall provide for timely and accurate translations of foreign intelligence for all elements of the intelligence community through—

(1) the integration of the translation capabilities of the intelligence community;

(2) the use of remote-connection capabilities; and

(3) the use of such other capabilities as the Director considers appropriate.

(d) Administrative matters

(1) The Director shall retain direct supervision and control over the element established under subsection (a).

(2) The element established under subsection (a) shall connect elements of the intelligence community utilizing the most current available information technology that is applicable to the function of the element.

(3) Personnel of the element established under subsection (a) may carry out the duties and functions of the element at any location that—

(A) has been certified as a secure facility by a department or agency of the United States Government; or

(B) the Director has otherwise determined to be appropriate for such duties and functions 1

(e) Deadline for establishment

The element required by subsection (a) shall be established as soon as practicable after November 27, 2002, but not later than 90 days after November 27, 2002.

(Pub. L. 107–306, title III, §313, Nov. 27, 2002, 116 Stat. 2391; Pub. L. 108–458, title I, §1071(g)(2)(A)(i), Dec. 17, 2004, 118 Stat. 3691; Pub. L. 108–487, title III, §304, Dec. 23, 2004, 118 Stat. 3944.)

Codification

Section was formerly classified to section 404n of this title prior to editorial reclassification and renumbering as this section.

Amendments

2004—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 108–458 substituted "Director of National Intelligence" for "Director of Central Intelligence, acting as the head of the intelligence community,".

Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 108–487, §304(a)(2), added subsec. (c). Former subsec. (c) redesignated (d).

Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 108–487, §304(a)(1), (b), redesignated subsec. (c) as (d) and added par. (3). Former subsec. (d) redesignated (e).

Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 108–487, §304(a)(1), redesignated subsec. (d) as (e).

Effective Date of 2004 Amendment

For Determination by President that amendment by Pub. L. 108–458 take effect on Apr. 21, 2005, see Memorandum of President of the United States, Apr. 21, 2005, 70 F.R. 23925, set out as a note under section 3001 of this title.

Amendment by Pub. L. 108–458 effective not later than six months after Dec. 17, 2004, except as otherwise expressly provided, see section 1097(a) of Pub. L. 108–458, set out in an Effective Date of 2004 Amendment; Transition Provisions note under section 3001 of this title.

1 So in original. Probably should be followed by a period.

§3362. Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center

(a) Establishment

The Director of National Intelligence shall establish within the Central Intelligence Agency an element responsible for conducting all-source intelligence analysis of information relating to the financial capabilities, practices, and activities of individuals, groups, and nations associated with international terrorism in their activities relating to international terrorism.

(b) Designation

The element established under subsection (a) shall be known as the Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center.

(c) Deadline for establishment

The element required by subsection (a) shall be established as soon as practicable after November 27, 2002, but not later than 90 days after November 27, 2002.

(Pub. L. 107–306, title III, §341, Nov. 27, 2002, 116 Stat. 2398; Pub. L. 108–458, title I, §1071(g)(2)(C), Dec. 17, 2004, 118 Stat. 3691.)

Codification

Section was formerly classified to section 404n–1 of this title prior to editorial reclassification and renumbering as this section.

Amendments

2004—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 108–458 substituted "Director of National Intelligence shall establish within the Central Intelligence Agency" for "Director of Central Intelligence, acting as the head of the intelligence community, shall establish in the Central Intelligence Agency".

Effective Date of 2004 Amendment

For Determination by President that amendment by Pub. L. 108–458 take effect on Apr. 21, 2005, see Memorandum of President of the United States, Apr. 21, 2005, 70 F.R. 23925, set out as a note under section 3001 of this title.

Amendment by Pub. L. 108–458 effective not later than six months after Dec. 17, 2004, except as otherwise expressly provided, see section 1097(a) of Pub. L. 108–458, set out in an Effective Date of 2004 Amendment; Transition Provisions note under section 3001 of this title.

§3363. Terrorist Identification Classification System

(a) Requirement

(1) The Director of National Intelligence shall—

(A) establish and maintain a list of individuals who are known or suspected international terrorists, and of organizations that are known or suspected international terrorist organizations; and

(B) ensure that pertinent information on the list is shared with the departments, agencies, and organizations described by subsection (c).


(2) The list under paragraph (1), and the mechanisms for sharing information on the list, shall be known as the "Terrorist Identification Classification System".

(b) Administration

(1) The Director shall prescribe requirements for the inclusion of an individual or organization on the list required by subsection (a), and for the deletion or omission from the list of an individual or organization currently on the list.

(2) The Director shall ensure that the information utilized to determine the inclusion, or deletion or omission, of an individual or organization on or from the list is derived from all-source intelligence.

(3) The Director shall ensure that the list is maintained in accordance with existing law and regulations governing the collection, storage, and dissemination of intelligence concerning United States persons.

(c) Information sharing

Subject to section 3024(i) of this title, relating to the protection of intelligence sources and methods, the Director shall provide for the sharing of the list, and information on the list, with such departments and agencies of the Federal Government, State and local government agencies, and entities of foreign governments and international organizations as the Director considers appropriate.

(d) Report on criteria for information sharing

(1) Not later then 1 March 1, 2003, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report describing the criteria used to determine which types of information on the list required by subsection (a) are to be shared, and which types of information are not to be shared, with various departments and agencies of the Federal Government, State and local government agencies, and entities of foreign governments and international organizations.

(2) The report shall include a description of the circumstances in which the Director has determined that sharing information on the list with the departments and agencies of the Federal Government, and of State and local governments, described by subsection (c) would be inappropriate due to the concerns addressed by section 403–3(c)(7) 2 of this title, relating to the protection of sources and methods, and any instance in which the sharing of information on the list has been inappropriate in light of such concerns.

(e) System administration requirements

(1) The Director shall, to the maximum extent practicable, ensure the interoperability of the Terrorist Identification Classification System with relevant information systems of the departments and agencies of the Federal Government, and of State and local governments, described by subsection (c).

(2) The Director shall ensure that the System utilizes technologies that are effective in aiding the identification of individuals in the field.

(f) Report on status of System

(1) Not later than one year after November 27, 2002, the Director shall, in consultation with the Director of Homeland Security, submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the status of the Terrorist Identification Classification System. The report shall contain a certification on the following:

(A) Whether the System contains the intelligence information necessary to facilitate the contribution of the System to the domestic security of the United States.

(B) Whether the departments and agencies having access to the System have access in a manner that permits such departments and agencies to carry out appropriately their domestic security responsibilities.

(C) Whether the System is operating in a manner that maximizes its contribution to the domestic security of the United States.

(D) If a certification under subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) is in the negative, the modifications or enhancements of the System necessary to ensure a future certification in the positive.


(2) The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(g) Congressional intelligence committees defined

In this section, the term "congressional intelligence committees" means—

(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(Pub. L. 107–306, title III, §343, Nov. 27, 2002, 116 Stat. 2399; Pub. L. 108–177, title III, §377(d), Dec. 13, 2003, 117 Stat. 2631; Pub. L. 108–458, title I, §§1071(g)(2)(A)(ii), 1072(d)(1)(A), Dec. 17, 2004, 118 Stat. 3691, 3693; Pub. L. 111–259, title III, §347(f), Oct. 7, 2010, 124 Stat. 2699.)

References in Text

Section 403–3 of this title, referred to in subsec. (d)(2), was repealed and a new section 403–3 enacted by Pub. L. 108–458, title I, §1011(a), Dec. 17, 2004, 118 Stat. 3643, without corresponding amendment to this section. Section 403–3 of this title was subsequently editorially reclassified as section 3025 of this title. The new section 3025 contains a subsec. (c) relating to the composition of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

Codification

Section was formerly classified to section 404n–2 of this title prior to editorial reclassification and renumbering as this section. Some section numbers of this title referenced in amendment notes below reflect the classification of such sections prior to their editorial reclassification.

Amendments

2010—Subsecs. (d) to (h). Pub. L. 111–259 redesignated subsecs. (e) to (h) as (d) to (g), respectively, and struck out former subsec. (d). Prior to amendment, text of subsec. (d) read as follows:

"(1) The Director shall review on an annual basis the information provided by various departments and agencies for purposes of the list under subsection (a) in order to determine whether or not the information so provided is derived from the widest possible range of intelligence available to such departments and agencies.

"(2) The Director shall, as a result of each review under paragraph (1), certify whether or not the elements of the intelligence community responsible for the collection of intelligence related to the list have provided information for purposes of the list that is derived from the widest possible range of intelligence available to such department and agencies."

2004—Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 108–458, §1071(g)(2)(A)(ii), which directed amendment of par. (1) by substituting "Director of National Intelligence" for "Director of Central Intelligence, acting as the head of the intelligence community,", was executed by making the substitution for "Director of Central Intelligence, acting as head of the Intelligence Community," in introductory provisions to reflect the probable intent of Congress.

Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 108–458, §1072(d)(1)(A), which directed amendment of subsec. (c) by substituting "section 403–1(i)" for "section 403–3(c)(6)", was executed by making the substitution for "section 403–3(c)(7)" to reflect the probable intent of Congress and the amendment by Pub. L. 108–177. See 2003 Amendment note below.

2003—Subsecs. (c), (e)(2). Pub. L. 108–177, §377(d), substituted "section 403–3(c)(7) of this title" for "section 403–3(c)(6) of this title".

Effective Date of 2004 Amendment

For Determination by President that amendment by Pub. L. 108–458 take effect on Apr. 21, 2005, see Memorandum of President of the United States, Apr. 21, 2005, 70 F.R. 23925, set out as a note under section 3001 of this title.

Amendment by Pub. L. 108–458 effective not later than six months after Dec. 17, 2004, except as otherwise expressly provided, see section 1097(a) of Pub. L. 108–458, set out in an Effective Date of 2004 Amendment; Transition Provisions note under section 3001 of this title.

1 So in original. Probably should be "than".

2 See References in Text note below.

§3364. Assignment of responsibilities relating to analytic integrity

(a) Assignment of responsibilities

For purposes of carrying out section 3024(h) of this title, the Director of National Intelligence shall, not later than 180 days after December 17, 2004, assign an individual or entity to be responsible for ensuring that finished intelligence products produced by any element or elements of the intelligence community are timely, objective, independent of political considerations, based upon all sources of available intelligence, and employ the standards of proper analytic tradecraft.

(b) Responsibilities

(1) The individual or entity assigned responsibility under subsection (a)—

(A) may be responsible for general oversight and management of analysis and production, but may not be directly responsible for, or involved in, the specific production of any finished intelligence product;

(B) shall perform, on a regular basis, detailed reviews of finished intelligence product or other analytic products by an element or elements of the intelligence community covering a particular topic or subject matter;

(C) shall be responsible for identifying on an annual basis functional or topical areas of analysis for specific review under subparagraph (B); and

(D) upon completion of any review under subparagraph (B), may draft lessons learned, identify best practices, or make recommendations for improvement to the analytic tradecraft employed in the production of the reviewed product or products.


(2) Each review under paragraph (1)(B) should—

(A) include whether the product or products concerned were based on all sources of available intelligence, properly describe the quality and reliability of underlying sources, properly caveat and express uncertainties or confidence in analytic judgments, properly distinguish between underlying intelligence and the assumptions and judgments of analysts, and incorporate, where appropriate, alternative analyses; and

(B) ensure that the analytic methodologies, tradecraft, and practices used by the element or elements concerned in the production of the product or products concerned meet the standards set forth in subsection (a).


(3) Information drafted under paragraph (1)(D) should, as appropriate, be included in analysis teaching modules and case studies for use throughout the intelligence community.

(c) Annual briefings

Not later than December 1 each year, the Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees, the heads of the relevant elements of the intelligence community, and the heads of analytic training departments a briefing with a description, and the associated findings, of each review under subsection (b)(1)(B) during such year.

(d) Congressional intelligence committees defined

In this section, the term "congressional intelligence committees" means—

(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(Pub. L. 108–458, title I, §1019, Dec. 17, 2004, 118 Stat. 3671; Pub. L. 116–92, div. E, title LVII, §5701(b), Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2159.)

Codification

Section was formerly classified to section 403–1a of this title prior to editorial reclassification and renumbering as this section.

Amendments

2019—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 116–92 substituted "briefings" for "reports" in heading and "provide to the congressional intelligence committees, the heads of the relevant elements of the intelligence community, and the heads of analytic training departments a briefing with" for "submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the heads of the relevant elements of the intelligence community, and the heads of analytic training departments a report containing" in text.

Effective Date

For Determination by President that section take effect on Apr. 21, 2005, see Memorandum of President of the United States, Apr. 21, 2005, 70 F.R. 23925, set out as a note under section 3001 of this title.

Section effective not later than six months after Dec. 17, 2004, except as otherwise expressly provided, see section 1097(a) of Pub. L. 108–458, set out in an Effective Date of 2004 Amendment; Transition Provisions note under section 3001 of this title.

Safeguard of Objectivity in Intelligence Analysis

Pub. L. 108–458, title I, §1020, Dec. 17, 2004, 118 Stat. 3672, provided that:

"(a) In General.—Not later than 180 days after the effective date of this Act [probably means the effective date of title I of Pub. L. 108–458, see Effective Date of 2004 Amendment; Transition Provisions note set out under section 3001 of this title], the Director of National Intelligence shall identify an individual within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence who shall be available to analysts within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to counsel, conduct arbitration, offer recommendations, and, as appropriate, initiate inquiries into real or perceived problems of analytic tradecraft or politicization, biased reporting, or lack of objectivity in intelligence analysis.

"(b) Report.—Not later than 270 days after the effective date of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall provide a report to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives on the implementation of subsection (a)."

§3365. Foreign intelligence information

(1) In general

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it shall be lawful for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence (as defined in section 3003 of this title) or foreign intelligence information obtained as part of a criminal investigation to be disclosed to any Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or national security official in order to assist the official receiving that information in the performance of his official duties. Any Federal official who receives information pursuant to this provision may use that information only as necessary in the conduct of that person's official duties subject to any limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of such information. Consistent with the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods, and the responsibility of the Attorney General to protect sensitive law enforcement information, it shall be lawful for information revealing a threat of actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, domestic or international sabotage, domestic or international terrorism, or clandestine intelligence gathering activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power, within the United States or elsewhere, obtained as part of a criminal investigation to be disclosed to any appropriate Federal, State, local, or foreign government official for the purpose of preventing or responding to such a threat. Any official who receives information pursuant to this provision may use that information only as necessary in the conduct of that person's official duties subject to any limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of such information, and any State, local, or foreign official who receives information pursuant to this provision may use that information only consistent with such guidelines as the Attorney General and Director of Central Intelligence shall jointly issue.

(2) Definition

In this section, the term "foreign intelligence information" means—

(A) information, whether or not concerning a United States person, that relates to the ability of the United States to protect against—

(i) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;

(ii) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; or

(iii) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power; or


(B) information, whether or not concerning a United States person, with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to—

(i) the national defense or the security of the United States; or

(ii) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.

(Pub. L. 107–56, title II, §203(d), Oct. 26, 2001, 115 Stat. 281; Pub. L. 107–296, title VIII, §897(a), Nov. 25, 2002, 116 Stat. 2257.)

Codification

Section was formerly classified to section 403–5d of this title prior to editorial reclassification and renumbering as this section.

Amendments

2002—Par. (1). Pub. L. 107–296 inserted at end "Consistent with the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods, and the responsibility of the Attorney General to protect sensitive law enforcement information, it shall be lawful for information revealing a threat of actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, domestic or international sabotage, domestic or international terrorism, or clandestine intelligence gathering activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power, within the United States or elsewhere, obtained as part of a criminal investigation to be disclosed to any appropriate Federal, State, local, or foreign government official for the purpose of preventing or responding to such a threat. Any official who receives information pursuant to this provision may use that information only as necessary in the conduct of that person's official duties subject to any limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of such information, and any State, local, or foreign official who receives information pursuant to this provision may use that information only consistent with such guidelines as the Attorney General and Director of Central Intelligence shall jointly issue."

Change of Name

Reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director's capacity as the head of the intelligence community deemed to be a reference to the Director of National Intelligence. Reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director's capacity as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency deemed to be a reference to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. See section 1081(a), (b) of Pub. L. 108–458, set out as a note under section 3001 of this title.

Effective Date of 2002 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 107–296 effective 60 days after Nov. 25, 2002, see section 4 of Pub. L. 107–296, set out as an Effective Date note under section 101 of Title 6, Domestic Security.

§3366. Authorities of heads of other departments and agencies

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the head of any department or agency of the United States is authorized to receive and utilize funds made available to the department or agency by the Director of National Intelligence pursuant to section 3024(d)(2) of this title, as amended by subsection (a), and receive and utilize any system referred to in such section that is made available to such department or agency.

(Pub. L. 111–259, title IV, §402(b), Oct. 7, 2010, 124 Stat. 2709.)

References in Text

Subsection (a), referred to in text, is subsec. (a) of section 402 of Pub. L. 111–259, title IV, Oct. 7, 2010, 124 Stat. 2708, which amended section 403–1 of this title prior to editorial reclassification and renumbering as section 3024 of this title.

Codification

Section was formerly classified as a note under section 403–1 of this title prior to editorial reclassification as this section.

§3367. Requirement for efficient use by intelligence community of open-source intelligence

The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that the intelligence community makes efficient and effective use of open-source information and analysis.

(Pub. L. 108–458, title I, §1052(b), Dec. 17, 2004, 118 Stat. 3683.)

Codification

Section was formerly classified as a note under section 403–1 of this title prior to editorial reclassification as this section.

§3368. Assistance for governmental entities and private entities in recognizing online violent extremist content

(a) Assistance to recognize online violent extremist content

Not later than 180 days after May 5, 2017, and consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, the Director of National Intelligence shall publish on a publicly available Internet website a list of all logos, symbols, insignia, and other markings commonly associated with, or adopted by, an organization designated by the Secretary of State as a foreign terrorist organization under section 1189(a) of title 8.

(b) Updates

The Director shall update the list published under subsection (a) every 180 days or more frequently as needed.

(Pub. L. 115–31, div. N, title IV, §403, May 5, 2017, 131 Stat. 820.)

§3369. Encouragement of cooperative actions to detect and counter foreign influence operations

(a) Findings

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Russian Federation, through military intelligence units, also known as the "GRU", and Kremlin-linked troll organizations often referred to as the "Internet Research Agency", deploy information warfare operations against the United States, its allies and partners, with the goal of advancing the strategic interests of the Russian Federation.

(2) One line of effort deployed as part of these information warfare operations is the weaponization of social media platforms with the goals of intensifying societal tensions, undermining trust in governmental institutions within the United States, its allies and partners in the West, and generally sowing division, fear, and confusion.

(3) These information warfare operations are a threat to the national security of the United States and that of the allies and partners of the United States. As former Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats stated, "These actions are persistent, they are pervasive and they are meant to undermine America's democracy.".

(4) These information warfare operations continue to evolve and increase in sophistication.

(5) Other foreign adversaries and hostile non-state actors are increasingly adopting similar tactics of deploying information warfare operations against the West, such as recent state-backed operations from China around the Hong Kong protests identified by social media companies.

(6) Technological advances, including artificial intelligence, will only make it more difficult in the future to detect fraudulent accounts, deceptive material posted on social media, and malign behavior on social media platforms.

(7) Because these information warfare operations are deployed within and across private social media platforms, the companies that own these platforms have a responsibility to detect and facilitate the removal or neutralization of foreign adversary networks operating clandestinely on their platforms.

(8) The social media companies are inherently technologically sophisticated and adept at rapidly analyzing large amounts of data and developing software-based solutions to diverse and ever-changing challenges on their platforms, which makes them well-equipped to address the threat occurring on their platforms.

(9) Independent analyses confirmed Kremlin-linked threat networks, based on data provided by several social media companies to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, thereby demonstrating that it is possible to discern both broad patterns of cross-platform information warfare operations and specific fraudulent behavior on social media platforms.

(10) General Paul Nakasone, Director of the National Security Agency, emphasized the importance of these independent analyses to the planning and conducting of military cyber operations to frustrate Kremlin-linked information warfare operations against the 2018 mid-term elections. General Nakasone stated that the reports "were very, very helpful in terms of being able to understand exactly what our adversary was trying to do to build dissent within our nation.".

(11) Institutionalizing ongoing robust, independent, and vigorous analysis of data related to foreign threat networks within and across social media platforms will help counter ongoing information warfare operations against the United States, its allies, and its partners.

(12) Archiving and disclosing to the public the results of these analyses by the social media companies and trusted third-party experts in a transparent manner will serve to demonstrate that the social media companies are detecting and removing foreign malign activities from their platforms while protecting the privacy of the people of the United States and will build public understanding of the scale and scope of these foreign threats to our democracy, since exposure is one of the most effective means to build resilience.

(b) Sense of Congress

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the social media companies should cooperate among themselves and with independent organizations and researchers on a sustained and regular basis to share and analyze data and indicators relevant to foreign information warfare operations within and across their platforms in order to detect and counter foreign information warfare operations that threaten the national security of the United States and its allies and partners;

(2) information from law enforcement and the intelligence community is also important in assisting efforts by these social media companies to identify foreign information warfare operations;

(3) these analytic efforts should be organized in such a fashion as to meet the highest standards of ethics, confidentiality, and privacy protection of the people of the United States, while still allowing timely research access to relevant data;

(4) these analytic efforts should be undertaken as soon as possible to facilitate countering ongoing state or state-backed foreign information warfare operations and to aid in preparations for the United States Presidential and congressional elections in 2020 and beyond;

(5) the structure and operations of social media companies make them well positioned to work with independent organizations and researchers to address foreign adversary threat networks within and across their platforms, and these efforts could be conducted without direct Government involvement, direction, or regulation; and

(6) if the social media industry fails to take sufficient action to address foreign adversary threat networks operating within or across their platforms, Congress would have to consider additional safeguards for ensuring that this threat is effectively mitigated.

(c) Authority to facilitate establishment of Social Media Data and Threat Analysis Center

(1) Authority

The Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, may facilitate, by grant or contract or under an existing authority of the Director, the establishment of a Social Media Data and Threat Analysis Center with the functions described in paragraph (2) at an independent, nonprofit organization.

(2) Functions

The functions described in this paragraph are the following:

(A) Acting as a convening and sponsoring authority for cooperative social media data analysis of foreign threat networks involving social media companies and third-party experts, nongovernmental organizations, data journalists, Federally funded research and development centers, academic researchers, traditional media, and international counterparts, as appropriate.

(B) Facilitating analysis of foreign influence operation, within and across the individual social media platforms as well as hacking and leaking campaigns, and other tactics, and related unlawful activities that fund or subsidize such operations.

(C) Developing processes to share information from government entities on foreign influence operations with the individual social media companies to inform threat analysis, and working with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence as appropriate.

(D) Determining and making public criteria for identifying which companies, organizations, or researchers qualify for inclusion in the activities of the Center, and inviting entities that fit the criteria to join.

(E) Determining jointly with the social media companies what data and metadata related to indicators of foreign adversary threat networks from their platforms and business operations will be made available for access and analysis.

(F) Developing and making public the criteria and standards that must be met for companies, other organizations, and individual researchers to access and analyze data relating to foreign adversary threat networks within and across social media platforms and publish or otherwise use the results.

(G) Developing and making public the ethical standards for investigation of foreign threat networks and use of analytic results and for protection of the privacy of the customers and users of the social media platforms and of the proprietary information of the social media companies.

(H) Developing technical, contractual, and procedural controls to prevent misuse of data, including any necessary auditing procedures, compliance checks, and review mechanisms.

(I) Developing and making public criteria and conditions under which the Center shall share information with the appropriate Government agencies regarding threats to national security from, or violations of the law involving, foreign activities on social media platforms.

(J) Hosting a searchable archive aggregating information related to foreign influence and disinformation operations to build a collective understanding of the threats and facilitate future examination consistent with privacy protections.

(K) Developing data standards to harmonize the sharing of information pursuant to this paragraph.

(d) Reporting and notifications

If the Director of National Intelligence chooses to use funds under subsection (c)(1) to facilitate the establishment of the Center, the Director of the Center shall—

(1) not later than 180 days after December 20, 2019, submit to appropriate congressional committees a report on—

(A) the estimated funding needs of the Center for fiscal year 2021 and for subsequent years;

(B) such statutory protections from liability as the Director considers necessary for the Center, participating social media companies, and participating third-party analytical participants;

(C) such statutory penalties as the Director considers necessary to ensure against misuse of data by researchers; and

(D) such changes to the Center's mission to fully capture broader unlawful activities that intersect with, complement, or support information warfare tactics; and


(2) not less frequently than once each year, submit to the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, and the appropriate congressional committees a report—

(A) that assesses—

(i) degree of cooperation and commitment from the social media companies to the mission of the Center; and

(ii) effectiveness of the Center in detecting and facilitating the removal or neutralization of clandestine foreign information warfare operations from social media platforms; and


(B) includes such recommendations for legislative or administrative action as the Center considers appropriate to carry out the functions of the Center.

(e) Periodic reporting to the public

The Director of the Center shall—

(1) once each quarter, make available to the public a report on key trends in foreign influence and disinformation operations, including any threats to campaigns and elections, to inform the public of the United States; and

(2) as the Director considers necessary, provide more timely assessments relating to ongoing disinformation campaigns.

(f) Funding

Of the amounts appropriated or otherwise made available to the National Intelligence Program (as defined in section 3003 of this title) in fiscal year 2020 and 2021, the Director of National Intelligence may use up to $30,000,000 to carry out this section.

(g) Definition of appropriate congressional committees

In this section, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(1) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;

(2) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate;

(3) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(4) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;

(5) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;

(6) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives;

(7) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives;

(8) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;

(9) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives; and

(10) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(Pub. L. 116–92, div. E, title LIII, §5323, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2130.)

Definitions

For definition of "intelligence community", referred to subsec. (b)(2), see section 5003 of div. E of Pub. L. 116–92, set out as a note under section 3003 of this title.

§3369a. Report on deepfake technology, foreign weaponization of deepfakes, and related notifications

(a) Report on foreign weaponization of deepfakes and deepfake technology

(1) Report required

Not later than 180 days after December 20, 2019, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community determined appropriate by the Director, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on—

(A) the potential national security impacts of machine-manipulated media (commonly known as "deepfakes"); and

(B) the actual or potential use of machine-manipulated media by foreign governments to spread disinformation or engage in other malign activities.

(2) Matters to be included

The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:

(A) An assessment of the technical capabilities of foreign governments, including foreign intelligence services, foreign government-affiliated entities, and foreign individuals, with respect to machine-manipulated media, machine-generated text, generative adversarial networks, and related machine-learning technologies, including—

(i) an assessment of the technical capabilities of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation with respect to the production and detection of machine-manipulated media; and

(ii) an annex describing those governmental elements within China and Russia known to have supported or facilitated machine-manipulated media research, development, or dissemination, as well as any civil-military fusion, private-sector, academic, or nongovernmental entities which have meaningfully participated in such activities.


(B) An updated assessment of how foreign governments, including foreign intelligence services, foreign government-affiliated entities, and foreign individuals, could use or are using machine-manipulated media and machine-generated text to harm the national security interests of the United States, including an assessment of the historic, current, or potential future efforts of China and Russia to use machine-manipulated media, including with respect to—

(i) the overseas or domestic dissemination of misinformation;

(ii) the attempted discrediting of political opponents or disfavored populations; and

(iii) intelligence or influence operations directed against the United States, allies or partners of the United States, or other jurisdictions believed to be subject to Chinese or Russian interference.


(C) An updated identification of the countertechnologies that have been or could be developed and deployed by the United States Government, or by the private sector with Government support, to deter, detect, and attribute the use of machine-manipulated media and machine-generated text by foreign governments, foreign-government affiliates, or foreign individuals, along with an analysis of the benefits, limitations and drawbacks of such identified counter-technologies, including any emerging concerns related to privacy.

(D) An identification of the offices within the elements of the intelligence community that have, or should have, lead responsibility for monitoring the development of, use of, and response to machine-manipulated media and machine-generated text, including—

(i) a description of the coordination of such efforts across the intelligence community;

(ii) a detailed description of the existing capabilities, tools, and relevant expertise of such elements to determine whether a piece of media has been machine manipulated or machine generated, including the speed at which such determination can be made, the confidence level of the element in the ability to make such a determination accurately, and how increasing volume and improved quality of machine-manipulated media or machine-generated text may negatively impact such capabilities; and

(iii) a detailed description of planned or ongoing research and development efforts intended to improve the ability of the intelligence community to detect machine-manipulated media and machine-generated text.


(E) A description of any research and development activities carried out or under consideration to be carried out by the intelligence community, including the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, relevant to machine-manipulated media and machine-generated text detection technologies.

(F) Updated recommendations regarding whether the intelligence community requires additional legal authorities, financial resources, or specialized personnel to address the national security threat posed by machine-manipulated media and machine-generated text.

(G) Other additional information the Director determines appropriate.

(b) Form

The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(c) Requirement for notification

The Director of National Intelligence, in cooperation with the heads of any other relevant departments or agencies of the Federal Government, shall notify the congressional intelligence committees each time the Director of National Intelligence determines—

(1) there is credible information or intelligence that a foreign entity has attempted, is attempting, or will attempt to deploy machine-manipulated media or machine-generated text aimed at the elections or domestic political processes of the United States; and

(2) that such intrusion or campaign can be attributed to a foreign government, a foreign government-affiliated entity, or a foreign individual.

(d) Annual update

Upon submission of the report in subsection (a), on an annual basis, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community determined appropriate by the Director, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees any significant updates with respect to the matters described in subsection (a).

(e) Definitions

(1) Machine-generated text

The term "machine-generated text" means text generated using machine-learning techniques in order to resemble writing in natural language.

(2) Machine-manipulated media

The term "machine-manipulated media" has the meaning given that term in section 5724.

(Pub. L. 116–92, div. E, title LVII, §5709, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2168.)

References in Text

Section 5724, referred to in subsec. (e)(2), is section 5724 of Pub. L. 116–92, which is set out as a note under section 3024 of this title.

Definitions

For definitions of "intelligence community" and "congressional intelligence committees", referred to in text, see section 5003 of div. E of Pub. L. 116–92, set out as a note under section 3003 of this title.

§3369b. Oversight of foreign influence in academia

(a) Definitions

In this section:

(1) Covered institution of higher education

The term "covered institution of higher education" means an institution described in section 1002 of title 20 that receives Federal funds in any amount and for any purpose.

(2) Sensitive research subject

The term "sensitive research subject" means a subject of research that is carried out at a covered institution of higher education that receives funds that were appropriated for—

(A) the National Intelligence Program; or

(B) any Federal agency the Director of National Intelligence deems appropriate.

(b) Report required

Not later than 180 days after December 20, 2019, and not less frequently than once each year thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with such elements of the intelligence community as the Director considers appropriate and consistent with the privacy protections afforded to United States persons, shall submit to congressional intelligence committees a report on risks to sensitive research subjects posed by foreign entities in order to provide Congress and covered institutions of higher education with more complete information on these risks and to help ensure academic freedom.

(c) Contents

The report required by subsection (b) shall include the following:

(1) A list of sensitive research subjects that could affect national security.

(2) A list of foreign entities, including governments, corporations, nonprofit organizations and for-profit organizations, and any subsidiary or affiliate of such an entity, that the Director determines pose a counterintelligence, espionage (including economic espionage), or other national security threat with respect to sensitive research subjects.

(3) A list of any known or suspected attempts by foreign entities to exert pressure on covered institutions of higher education, including attempts to limit freedom of speech, propagate misinformation or disinformation, or to influence professors, researchers, or students.

(4) Recommendations for collaboration between covered institutions of higher education and the intelligence community to mitigate threats to sensitive research subjects associated with foreign influence in academia, including any necessary legislative or administrative action.

(d) Congressional notifications required

Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Director identifies a change to either list described in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (c), the Director shall notify the congressional intelligence committees of the change.

(Pub. L. 116–92, div. E, title LVII, §5713, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2172.)

Definitions

For definitions of "intelligence community" and "congressional intelligence committees", referred to in text, see section 5003 of div. E of Pub. L. 116–92, set out as a note under section 3003 of this title.

§3369c. Notification of an active measures campaign

(a) Definitions

In this section:

(1) Appropriate congressional committees

The term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(A) the congressional intelligence committees;

(B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and

(C) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(2) Congressional leadership

The term "congressional leadership" includes the following:

(A) The majority leader of the Senate.

(B) The minority leader of the Senate.

(C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.

(D) The minority leader of the House of Representatives.

(b) Requirement for notification

The Director of National Intelligence, in cooperation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the head of any other relevant agency, shall notify the congressional leadership and the chairman and vice chairman or ranking member of each of the appropriate congressional committees, and of other relevant committees of jurisdiction, each time the Director of National Intelligence determines there is credible information that a foreign power has, is, or will attempt to employ a covert influence or active measures campaign with regard to the modernization, employment, doctrine, or force posture of the nuclear deterrent or missile defense.

(c) Content of notification

Each notification required by subsection (b) shall include information concerning actions taken by the United States to expose or halt an attempt referred to in subsection (b).

(Pub. L. 116–92, div. E, title LXVII, §6703, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2223.)

Definitions

For definition of "congressional intelligence committees", referred to in subsec. (a)(1)(A), see section 5003 of div. E of Pub. L. 116–92, set out as a note under section 3003 of this title.

§3369d. Committee to counter active measures by the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or other nation state to exert covert influence over peoples and governments

(a) Definitions

In this section:

(1) Active measures by Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, or other nation state to exert covert influence

The term "active measures by Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, or other nation state to exert covert influence" means activities intended to influence a person or government that are carried out in coordination with, or at the behest of, political leaders or the security services of the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or other nation state and the role of the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or other nation state has been hidden or not acknowledged publicly, including the following:

(A) Establishment or funding of a front group.

(B) Covert broadcasting.

(C) Media manipulation.

(D) Disinformation and forgeries.

(E) Funding agents of influence.

(F) Incitement and offensive counterintelligence.

(G) Assassinations.

(H) Terrorist acts.

(2) Appropriate committees of Congress

The term "appropriate committees of Congress" means—

(A) the congressional intelligence committees;

(B) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and

(C) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(b) Establishment

There is established within the executive branch an interagency committee to counter active measures by the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or other nation state to exert covert influence.

(c) Membership

(1) In general

(A) Appointment

Each head of an agency or department of the Government set out under subparagraph (B) shall appoint one member of the committee established by subsection (b) from among officials of such agency or department who occupy a position that is required to be appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate.

(B) Head of an agency or department

The head of an agency or department of the Government set out under this subparagraph are the following:

(i) The Director of National Intelligence.

(ii) The Secretary of State.

(iii) The Secretary of Defense.

(iv) The Secretary of the Treasury.

(v) The Attorney General.

(vi) The Secretary of Energy.

(vii) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(viii) The head of any other agency or department of the United States Government designated by the President for purposes of this section.

(d) Meetings

The committee shall meet on a regular basis.

(e) Duties

The duties of the committee established by subsection (b) shall be as follows:

(1) To counter active measures by Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, or other nation state to exert covert influence, including by exposing falsehoods, agents of influence, corruption, human rights abuses, terrorism, and assassinations carried out by the security services or political elites of the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or other nation state or their proxies.

(2) Such other duties as the President may designate for purposes of this section.

(f) Staff

The committee established by subsection (b) may employ such staff as the members of such committee consider appropriate.

(g) Budget Request

A request for funds required for the functioning of the committee established by subsection (b) may be included in each budget for a fiscal year submitted by the President pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31.

(h) Annual report

(1) Requirement

Not later than 180 days after May 5, 2017, and annually thereafter, and consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, the committee established by subsection (b) shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report describing steps being taken by the committee to counter active measures by Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, or other nation state to exert covert influence.

(2) Content

Each report required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) A summary of the active measures by the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or other nation state to exert covert influence during the previous year, including significant incidents and notable trends.

(B) A description of the key initiatives of the committee.

(C) A description of the implementation of the committee's initiatives by the head of an agency or department of the Government set out under subsection (c)(1)(B).

(D) An analysis of the impact of the committee's initiatives.

(E) Recommendations for changes to the committee's initiatives from the previous year.

(3) Separate reporting requirement

The requirement to submit an annual report under paragraph (1) is in addition to any other reporting requirements with respect to Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, or other nation state.

(Pub. L. 115–31, div. N, title V, §501, May 5, 2017, 131 Stat. 823; Pub. L. 116–92, div. E, title LXVII, §6706(a), Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2224.)

Codification

Section was formerly set out as a note under section 3001 of this title.

Amendments

2019Pub. L. 116–92, §6706(a)(2), inserted ", the People's Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or other nation state" after "Russian Federation" in section catchline.

Pub. L. 116–92, §6706(a)(1), wherever appearing, inserted ", the People's Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or other nation state" after "Russian Federation" and ", China, Iran, North Korea, or other nation state" after "Russia".

Definitions

For definition of "congressional intelligence committees", referred to in subsec. (a)(2)(A), see section 2 of div. N. of Pub. L. 115–31, set out as a note under section 3003 of this title.

§3370. Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task Force

(a) Appropriate congressional committees defined

In this section, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means the following:

(1) The congressional intelligence committees.

(2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.

(3) The Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the House of Representatives.

(b) Requirement to establish

The Director of National Intelligence shall establish a Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task Force to standardize information sharing between the intelligence community and the acquisition community of the United States Government with respect to the supply chain and counterintelligence risks.

(c) Members

The Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task Force established under subsection (b) shall be composed of—

(1) a representative of the Defense Security Service of the Department of Defense;

(2) a representative of the General Services Administration;

(3) a representative of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy of the Office of Management and Budget;

(4) a representative of the Department of Homeland Security;

(5) a representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;

(6) the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center; and

(7) any other members the Director of National Intelligence determines appropriate.

(d) Security clearances

Each member of the Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task Force established under subsection (b) shall have a security clearance at the top secret level and be able to access sensitive compartmented information.

(e) Annual report

The Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task Force established under subsection (b) shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an annual report that describes the activities of the Task Force during the previous year, including identification of the supply chain, cybersecurity, and counterintelligence risks shared with the acquisition community of the United States Government by the intelligence community.

(Pub. L. 116–92, div. E, title LXIII, §6306, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2188.)

Definitions

For definitions of "congressional intelligence committees" and "intelligence community", referred to in text, see section 5003 of div. E of Pub. L. 116–92, set out as a note under section 3003 of this title.

§3370a. Biennial report on foreign investment risks

(a) Intelligence community interagency working group

(1) Requirement to establish

The Director of National Intelligence shall establish an intelligence community interagency working group to prepare the biennial reports required by subsection (b).

(2) Chairperson

The Director of National Intelligence shall serve as the chairperson of such interagency working group.

(3) Membership

Such interagency working group shall be composed of representatives of each element of the intelligence community that the Director of National Intelligence determines appropriate.

(b) Biennial report on foreign investment risks

(1) Report required

Not later than 180 days after December 20, 2019, and not less frequently than once every 2 years thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on foreign investment risks prepared by the interagency working group established under subsection (a).

(2) Elements

Each report required by paragraph (1) shall include identification, analysis, and explanation of the following:

(A) Any current or projected major threats to the national security of the United States with respect to foreign investment.

(B) Any strategy used by a foreign country that such interagency working group has identified to be a country of special concern to use foreign investment to target the acquisition of critical technologies, critical materials, or critical infrastructure.

(C) Any economic espionage efforts directed at the United States by a foreign country, particularly such a country of special concern.

(c) Appropriate congressional committees defined

In this section, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(1) the congressional intelligence committees;

(2) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and

(3) the Committee on Homeland Security and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(Pub. L. 116–92, div. E, title LXVII, §6716, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2227.)

Definitions

For definitions of "intelligence community" and "congressional intelligence committees", referred to in text, see section 5003 of div. E of Pub. L. 116–92, set out as a note under section 3003 of this title.

§3371. Required counterintelligence assessments, briefings, notifications, and reports

(a) Foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to Federal election campaigns

(1) Reports required

(A) In general

As provided in subparagraph (B), with respect to an election for Federal office, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall make publicly available on an internet website an advisory report on foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to campaigns of candidates for Federal office. Each such report, consistent with the protection of sources and methods, shall include the following:

(i) A description of foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to campaigns of candidates for Federal office.

(ii) A summary of best practices that campaigns of candidates for Federal office can employ in seeking to counter such threats.

(iii) An identification of publicly available resources, including United States Government resources, for countering such threats.

(B) Schedule for submittal

(i) In general

Except as provided by clause (ii), with respect to an election for Federal office, a report under this subsection shall be first made available not later than the date that is 1 year before the date of such election, and may be subsequently revised as the Director of National Intelligence determines appropriate.

(ii) 2020 elections

With respect to an election for Federal office that occurs during 2020, the report under this subsection shall be first made available not later than the date that is 60 days after December 20, 2020, and may be subsequently revised as the Director of National Intelligence determines appropriate.

(C) Information to be included

A report under this subsection shall reflect the most current information available to the Director of National Intelligence regarding foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats.

(2) Treatment of campaigns subject to heightened threats

If the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis jointly determine that a campaign of a candidate for Federal office is subject to a heightened foreign counterintelligence or cybersecurity threat, the Director and the Under Secretary, consistent with the protection of sources and methods, may make available additional information to the appropriate representatives of such campaign.

(b) Omitted

(c) Director of National Intelligence assessment of foreign interference in Federal elections

(1) Assessments required

Not later than 45 days after the end of a Federal election cycle, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of such other executive departments and agencies as the Director considers appropriate, shall—

(A) conduct an assessment of any information indicating that a foreign government, or any person acting as an agent of or on behalf of a foreign government, has acted with the intent or purpose of interfering in elections for Federal office occurring during the Federal election cycle; and

(B) transmit the findings of the Director with respect to the assessment conducted under subparagraph (A), along with such supporting information as the Director considers appropriate, to the following:

(i) The President.

(ii) The Secretary of State.

(iii) The Secretary of the Treasury.

(iv) The Secretary of Defense.

(v) The Attorney General.

(vi) The Secretary of Homeland Security.

(vii) Congress.

(2) Elements

An assessment conducted under paragraph (1)(A), with respect to an act described in such paragraph, shall identify, to the maximum extent ascertainable, the following:

(A) The nature of any foreign interference and any methods employed to execute the act.

(B) The persons involved.

(C) The foreign government or governments that authorized, directed, sponsored, or supported the act.

(3) Publication

The Director shall, not later than 60 days after the end of a Federal election cycle, make available to the public, to the greatest extent possible consistent with the protection of sources and methods, the findings transmitted under paragraph (1)(B).

(4) Federal election cycle defined

In this section, the term "Federal election cycle" means the period which begins on the day after the date of a regularly scheduled general election for Federal office and which ends on the date of the first regularly scheduled general election for Federal office held after such date.

(5) Effective date

This subsection shall apply with respect to the Federal election cycle that began during November 2018, and each succeeding Federal election cycle.

(Pub. L. 116–92, div. E, title LIII, §5304, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2119.)

Codification

Section is comprised of section 5304 of Pub. L. 116–92. Subsec. (b) of section 5304 of Pub. L. 116–92 enacted section 3111 of this title and amended the analysis for the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.).

§3371a. Assessment of foreign intelligence threats to Federal elections

(a) Definitions

In this section:

(1) Appropriate congressional committees

The term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(A) the congressional intelligence committees;

(B) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and

(C) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.

(2) Congressional leadership

The term "congressional leadership" includes the following:

(A) The majority leader of the Senate.

(B) The minority leader of the Senate.

(C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.

(D) The minority leader of the House of Representatives.

(3) Security vulnerability

The term "security vulnerability" has the meaning given such term in section 1501 of title 6.

(b) In general

The Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the heads of other relevant elements of the intelligence community, shall—

(1) commence not later than 1 year before any regularly scheduled Federal election occurring after December 31, 2018, and complete not later than 180 days before such election, an assessment of security vulnerabilities of State election systems; and

(2) not later than 180 days before any regularly scheduled Federal election occurring after December 31, 2018, submit a report on such security vulnerabilities and an assessment of foreign intelligence threats to the election to—

(A) congressional leadership; and

(B) the appropriate congressional committees.

(c) Update

Not later than 90 days before any regularly scheduled Federal election occurring after December 31, 2018, the Director of National Intelligence shall—

(1) update the assessment of foreign intelligence threats to that election; and

(2) submit the updated assessment to—

(A) congressional leadership; and

(B) the appropriate congressional committees.

(Pub. L. 116–92, div. E, title LXV, §6503, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2203.)

Definitions

For definitions of "congressional intelligence committees" and "intelligence community", referred to in text, see section 5003 of div. E of Pub. L. 116–92, set out as a note under section 3003 of this title.

§3371b. Information sharing with State election officials

(a) State defined

In this section, the term "State" means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States.

(b) Security clearances

(1) In general

Not later than 30 days after December 20, 2019, the Director of National Intelligence shall support the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis, and any other official of the Department of Homeland Security designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security, in sponsoring a security clearance up to the top secret level for each eligible chief election official of a State or the District of Columbia, and additional eligible designees of such election official as appropriate, at the time that such election official assumes such position.

(2) Interim clearances

Consistent with applicable policies and directives, the Director of National Intelligence may issue interim clearances, for a period to be determined by the Director, to a chief election official as described in paragraph (1) and up to one designee of such official under such paragraph.

(c) Information sharing

(1) In general

The Director of National Intelligence shall assist the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis and the Under Secretary responsible for overseeing critical infrastructure protection, cybersecurity, and other related programs of the Department (as specified in section 113(a)(1)(H) of title 6) with sharing any appropriate classified information related to threats to election systems and to the integrity of the election process with chief election officials and such designees who have received a security clearance under subsection (b).

(2) Coordination

The Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis shall coordinate with the Director of National Intelligence and the Under Secretary responsible for overseeing critical infrastructure protection, cybersecurity, and other related programs of the Department (as specified in section 113(a)(1)(H) of title 6) to facilitate the sharing of information to the affected Secretaries of State or States.

(Pub. L. 116–92, div. E, title LXV, §6506, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2206.)

§3371c. Notification of significant foreign cyber intrusions and active measures campaigns directed at elections for Federal offices

(a) Definitions

In this section:

(1) Active measures campaign

The term "active measures campaign" means a foreign semi-covert or covert intelligence operation.

(2) Candidate, election, and political party

The terms "candidate", "election", and "political party" have the meanings given those terms in section 30101 of title 52.

(3) Congressional leadership

The term "congressional leadership" includes the following:

(A) The majority leader of the Senate.

(B) The minority leader of the Senate.

(C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.

(D) The minority leader of the House of Representatives.

(4) Cyber intrusion

The term "cyber intrusion" means an electronic occurrence that actually or imminently jeopardizes, without lawful authority, electronic election infrastructure, or the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of information within such infrastructure.

(5) Electronic election infrastructure

The term "electronic election infrastructure" means an electronic information system of any of the following that is related to an election for Federal office:

(A) The Federal Government.

(B) A State or local government.

(C) A political party.

(D) The election campaign of a candidate.

(6) Federal office

The term "Federal office" has the meaning given that term in section 30101 of title 52.

(7) High confidence

The term "high confidence", with respect to a determination, means that the determination is based on high-quality information from multiple sources.

(8) Moderate confidence

The term "moderate confidence", with respect to a determination, means that a determination is credibly sourced and plausible but not of sufficient quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence.

(9) Other appropriate congressional committees

The term "other appropriate congressional committees" means—

(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(b) Determinations of significant foreign cyber intrusions and active measures campaigns

The Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall jointly carry out subsection (c) if such Directors and the Secretary jointly determine—

(1) that on or after December 20, 2019, a significant foreign cyber intrusion or active measures campaign intended to influence an upcoming election for any Federal office has occurred or is occurring; and

(2) with moderate or high confidence, that such intrusion or campaign can be attributed to a foreign state or to a foreign nonstate person, group, or other entity.

(c) Briefing

(1) In general

Not later than 14 days after making a determination under subsection (b), the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall jointly provide a briefing to the congressional leadership, the congressional intelligence committees and, consistent with the protection of sources and methods, the other appropriate congressional committees. The briefing shall be classified and address, at a minimum, the following:

(A) A description of the significant foreign cyber intrusion or active measures campaign, as the case may be, covered by the determination.

(B) An identification of the foreign state or foreign nonstate person, group, or other entity, to which such intrusion or campaign has been attributed.

(C) The desirability and feasibility of the public release of information about the cyber intrusion or active measures campaign.

(D) Any other information such Directors and the Secretary jointly determine appropriate.

(2) Electronic election infrastructure briefings

With respect to a significant foreign cyber intrusion covered by a determination under subsection (b), the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall offer to the owner or operator of any electronic election infrastructure directly affected by such intrusion, a briefing on such intrusion, including steps that may be taken to mitigate such intrusion. Such briefing may be classified and made available only to individuals with appropriate security clearances.

(3) Protection of sources and methods

This subsection shall be carried out in a manner that is consistent with the protection of sources and methods.

(Pub. L. 116–92, div. E, title LXV, §6507, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2207.)

Definitions

For definition of "congressional intelligence committees", referred to in subsec. (c)(1), see section 5003 of div. E of Pub. L. 116–92, set out as a note under section 3003 of this title.

§3371d. Designation of counterintelligence officer to lead election security matters

(a) In general

The Director of National Intelligence shall designate a national counterintelligence officer within the National Counterintelligence and Security Center to lead, manage, and coordinate counterintelligence matters relating to election security.

(b) Additional responsibilities

The person designated under subsection (a) shall also lead, manage, and coordinate counterintelligence matters relating to risks posed by interference from foreign powers (as defined in section 1801 of this title) to the following:

(1) The Federal Government election security supply chain.

(2) Election voting systems and software.

(3) Voter registration databases.

(4) Critical infrastructure related to elections.

(5) Such other Government goods and services as the Director of National Intelligence considers appropriate.

(Pub. L. 116–92, div. E, title LXV, §6508, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2208.)